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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Yongwoo Jeung  
 
Doctor of Philosophy  
 
Department of Political Science  
 
March 2020  
 
Title: Labor Market Policy American Style: State Capacity and Policy Innovation, 1959-
1968  
 
 
This dissertation delves into the American state’s capabilities by examining its 
experiments with corporatism and labor training during the 1960s. The dissertation relies 
on the frameworks of layering, patchwork, intercurrence, and entrepreneurship from 
various disciplines including comparative historical analysis, historical institutionalism, 
American Political Development, and the school of political creativity.  
The dissertation first challenges the mainstream view that regards as impossible 
any tripartite bargaining among U.S. labor, management, and the state. The United States 
experimented with the unique tripartite committee—the President’s Committee on Labor-
Management Policy—in the early 1960s to address emerging problems such as 
automation and intractable industrial conflicts. The tripartite committee, created by Labor 
Secretary Arthur Goldberg, was to provide a new deliberative platform to labor, 
management and the state. The experiment was short-lived due to reignited turf wars 
between labor and management. The failure paved the way toward further encroachment 
on collective labor rights and the uneven rise of individual employment rights. It also 
contributed to the Kennedy administration’s transition in its policy orientation from  
conventional Keynesianism with public spending to the unconventional macroeconomic 
v 
measure of cutting taxes.   
The dissertation also challenges previous literature that sees the American state’s 
fundamental limitation in implementing interventionist social and welfare policy. By 
examining the origins and evolutions of the War on Poverty (WOP) training programs, I 
reveal that the legislative history of various manpower programs was a patchwork of 
improvisational responses to national and regional change. From the Johnson 
administration’s attempts to update WOP programs to respond to the inflation of 1965, 
the issue of unemployed adults, and Martin Luther King Jr’s request to “hire now, train 
later,” I claim that the fragmented nature of the American state could promote new 
solutions to new problems. 
This study contributes to American political development scholarship by 
providing a non-Weberian optimistic perspective in analyzing the American state. It 
shows how entrepreneurial politics can promote reform in the fragmented structures of 
the American state, shedding light on the ways of continuously recalibrating the 
American state’s capacity.  
This dissertation includes previously published material.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Questions 
In light of industrial and labor market policy, what could the American state do? 
What can it achieve now? This dissertation addresses these questions by examining the 
American state’s experiments with corporatism and labor training during the 1960s, a key 
period in U.S. history. During that time the Federal government conducted many 
innovative and unprecedented policy experiments which aimed to redress the faltering 
New Deal industrial order, prepare the labor force for automation and other technological 
changes, and enlarge the political cause of the civil rights movement to include jobs and 
welfare under the slogan of War on Poverty. The American public as well as 
policymakers shared a great amount of optimism concerning the state’s capabilities. 
Many believed that the Kennedy and Johnson administrations could accomplish a great 
deal of good. This was an exceptional moment in U.S. history, given the American state’s 
tendency to “govern less.”1 
Only a few among many experiments succeeded in bringing expected policy 
outcomes and leaving meaningful institutional legacies in the 1960s. The public’s 
optimistic attitude toward the federal government’s ability to address poverty, 
                                                 
1 Brian Balogh, A Government out of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-Century 
America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 2. 
2 
unemployment, and urban uprisings turned to profound pessimism. People’s frustration 
with the American state gave rise to a conservative coalition, initiated by the Silent 
Majority and mediated by Richard Nixon, and in the early 1980s fully articulated by 
Ronald Reagan, with renewed emotional grounds for antistatism.  
The glaring gap between the lofty promises of the 1960s and their embarrassing 
failures intrigues many scholars. Why did these social experiments fail? To this, we 
already have answers. From a conservative perspective the American state’s intervention 
is to blame because it made poor people more dependent on public aid.2 The perspective 
of liberals on the issue is twofold. One perspective argues that the pace of desegregation 
was too fast for white majorities to accommodate.3 This “backlash” perspective 
emphasizes the radicalization of the civil rights movement and white majorities’ reaction 
to it as the main cause of the failures. The other liberal perspective argues that any social 
program for the poor ended up creating yet another tool for the state to control and 
discipline the poor. The declared goal of helping the poor was never to be realized.4 
However, the reasons presented above appear too superficial to explain each failure 
among the numerous policy experiments of the 1960s. 
For a deeper look, we should ask first how these experiments were able to even 
begin. If the American state held no chance to accomplish anything, why did the savvy 
                                                 
2 George F. Gilder, Wealth and Poverty (New York: Basic Books, 1981); Charles A Murray, Losing 
Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980 (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 
3 Joseph E. Lowndes, From the New Deal to the New Right: Race and the Southern Origins of Modern 
Conservatism (New Haven, Conn.: New Haven, C.T.: Yale University Press, 2008), 3-4. 
4 Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor, [1st ed.]. (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1971). 
3 
policymakers of the 1960s, including Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, prioritize such 
shaky enterprises? In addition, why did the American public become so optimistic about 
the American state in the 1960s, if they were familiar with the federal government’s 
limited abilities which, they believed, had existed since its foundation?  
By examining two exemplary experiments in the fields of industrial relationship 
and welfare policy, this dissertation answers the questions of how and why. The 1960s 
policymakers tried to recalibrate the American state’s capacity through recomposing 
previous policies, institutions, and relationships among federal agencies in order to meet 
new political and economic challenges. A tripartite experiment in the early 1960s and 
evolving adult training programs during the War on Poverty (WOP) were the outcomes of 
agencies’ entrepreneurship amid cultural and institutional constraints imposed on the 
American state as well as unusual political possibilities bestowed by the civil rights 
movement. Examining the experiments, though they failed to bring desired outcomes, 
reveals characteristics of the American state and its limits in a 1960s political and 
economic context.  
The dissertation contributes to the rich scholarship of American state building. 
Beyond the barren dichotomy of weak and strong states, the dissertation contributes to 
general knowledge of when and how the American state can be active and effective in 
bringing meaningful change to society.  
 
Scholarship on the American State 
Scholarship on the American state can be divided into four groups by two 
standards. The standards are 1) a normative perspective on the American state; 2) an 
4 
analytical perspective on ways in which the American state has functioned throughout 
history. Though each standard reflects a unique aspect of scholarship, they are closely 
related within individual scholars’ work on the American state and its historical change.  
The normative standard asks whether the perceived direction of change in the 
American state can enhance the country’s democratic ideal or not. Some scholars 
perceive that the change will enhance individual citizens’ rights and that the state’s 
capacities will be further developed to do so. Others perceive that the American state is 
failing for such reasons as racism which excludes minorities from the mainstream, 
fragmented government structures that undermine governance, and federalism which 
promotes schisms. Those who are negative on the future of American democracy, 
however pessimistic their arguments may seem, sometimes argue for a fundamental 
overhaul of the American state to overcome perennial frustration in the history of 
American state building.  
The analytical standard offers a scholarly judgement on the distinctive qualities 
of the American state compared to other advanced democracies. How different is the 
United States from Western European countries? Is the difference a matter of degree or a 
matter of quality? One group of scholars answers the questions in a Weberian 
perspective. The United States is defined by the absence of modern state qualities 
suggested by Max Weber. The group presumes a Weberian notion that a modern state is 
built with strong bureaucracy supported by hierarchical organizations and professional 
civil servants. Modernization of state bureaucracy will be spurred by the rise of civil 
society which requests more specialized public services. But factors like federalism and 
5 
the principle of checks and balances are believed to hinder emergence of the truly modern 
and effective state in the United States.  
The other group of scholars rejects such a Weberian perspective. They instead 
believe that the lack of Weberian modern state elements in the American state building 
process have led to a different type of governing, which is not observed in other 
countries. The scholars with a non-Weberian perspective believe that the dichotomy of 
strong and weak states would be more misleading than revealing in studies of the 
American state.5 
As such, four groups of scholarship emerge out of two standards. The first group 
of American state scholars—which I call Weberian pessimists—indicates the absence of 
the modern state’s traits like unification, centralization, and bureaucratization as the main 
source of state failure in the United States. The historical conditions that led European 
states to appear as modern states did not exist in the United States. Institutional 
configurations of the American state, once consolidated, made the development of 
modern state in the United Sates more difficult because the institutional configurations 
have their own effect of maintaining the status quo, also known as the phenomenon of 
                                                 
5 William Novak introduces how Max Weber’s concept of the ideal modern state influences scholars of 
American state, to which many scholars compare the United States. Novak summarizes “Weber’s chief 
characteristics of modern statecraft” as “(1) a rationalized and generalized legal and administrative order 
amenable to legislative change; (2) a bureaucratic apparatus of officers conducting official business with 
reference to an impersonal order of administrative regulations; (3) the power to bind—to rule and 
regulate—all persons (national citizens) and all actions within the state’s official jurisdiction via its laws; 
(4) the legitimate authority to use force, violence, and coercion within the prescribed territory as prescribed 
by the duly constituted government.” Out of these criteria, it is believed that “Unification, centralization, 
rationalization, organization, administration, and bureaucratization have become the theoretical hallmarks 
of fully developed, essentially modern states.” See William J. Novak, “The Myth of the ‘Weak’ American 
State,” The American Historical Review 113, no. 3 (2008): 752–72, at 761. 
6 
path dependency. The outlook of Weberian pessimists is not bright because the American 
state is stuck with its underdeveloped state structure that led to more fragmentations.  
Lijphart’s work on comparison of different types of democracy and Huntington’s 
work on finding a “Tudor” order in the American state fall into this category.6 
Furthermore, the works of historical institutionalists who study the American welfare 
state also fall into this group.7  
The second group, which I call Weberian optimists, is those who are optimistic 
about the future of the American state and its development, despite their perceived 
fragmented structure of the government. Scholars of American exceptionalism like Alexis 
de Tocqueville, Louis Hartz, and Seymour Martin Lipset take this position.8 From their 
perspective the American state is not only different from other consolidated democratic 
                                                 
6 Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries 
(New Haven, C.T.: Yale University Press, 1999); as for the “Tudor” state, see Samuel P. Huntington, 
Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, C.T.: Yale University Press, 2006), 96-7. 
7 Ann Shola Orloff and Theda Skocpol, “Why Not Equal Protection? Explaining the Politics of Public 
Social Spending in Britain, 1900-1911, and the United States, 1880s-1920,” American Sociological Review 
49, no. 6 (1984): 726–750; Theda Skocpol, Margaret Weir, and Ann Shola Orloff, eds., The Politics of 
Social Policy in the United States (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988). Hacker and Pierson’s 
works on the increasing economic gaps among the American public and the shrinking American welfare 
state also fall in this category. Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: How 
Washington Made the Rich Richer—and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class, First Simon & Schuster 
hardcover edition. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010); American Amnesia: How the War on Government 
Led Us to Forget What Made America Prosper, First Simon & Schuster hardcover edition. (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2016).  
8 I examine the perspective of American exceptionalism further in the second chapter of the dissertation 
which explores the War on Poverty training programs. See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 
1st Perennial library ed. (New York, N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1988); Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in 
America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution, First edition. (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1955); Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged 
Sword (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996). 
7 
countries, mostly from Western and Northern Europe, but also better than them because 
of its institutional configurations and the American liberal creed.  
Weberian optimists commonly believe that the American state will remain 
superior in realizing “Lockian” ideals of individualism which Hartz describes as a faith in 
property, a belief in class unity, a suspicion of too much state power, and a hostility to the 
utopian mood.9 In their view, the absence of feudal practices in the United States enables 
the country to reach a new level of individual liberty and material affluence.  
The third group is non-Weberian pessimists who find different logics of state 
building in the American state building process. Stephen Skowronek and Karen Orren, 
who founded the school of American Political Development, argue that the American 
state has governed differently. Skowronek’s groundbreaking work, Building a New 
American State, explains why “state building as patchworks” has led to intercurrence of 
multiple orders. As a result of coexisting multiple orders that sometimes conflict with 
each other, the project of American state building ends up in confusion, dysfunction, and 
frustration.10  
Orren and Skowronek’s recent work on the rise of the “policy state” as a result of 
such intercurrence shows the crisis of the American state. The incongruent structure of 
the American state often leads to excessive reliance on policy in governing so that those 
seeking to break the policy status quo can make up for the American state’s inefficiency 
                                                 
9 Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, 270.  
10 Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative 
Capacities, 1877-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
8 
and internal conflicts. But the reality is that “options abound in a policy state, and that 
makes achievements provisional, protection unreliable, and commitments dependent on 
who is next in charge.”11  
From Orren and Skowronek’s perspective, innovative strategies, developed by 
policy entrepreneurs to overcome institutional and jurisdictional barriers, can blur the 
previous boundary between individual rights and state structure. The former is protected 
by the Constitution while the latter, or the administrative division of labor within the 
American state, is designed to execute what is defined by the Constitution as legitimate 
protection of individual rights. The state structure was also designed to bring stability to 
polity. As the protection of individual rights becomes mainly reliant on the elected 
representatives’ will and their policies, the contents of individual rights, which had 
played a role of checking the elected powers and expansion of the federal government, 
become an opportunity structure for policy entrepreneurs.12  
Non-Weberian pessimists believe that the innate weakness of the American state 
takes a toll on contemporary U.S. politics. From Orren and Skowronek’s standpoint “the 
expansion of the policy space at the national space, encompassing potentially all issues of 
economy and society, is an important enabler of polarization today, and likely also one of 
its several causes.”13 Non-Weberian pessimists reach a similar conclusion but in a 
                                                 
11 Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, The Policy State: An American Predicament (Cambridge, M.A.: 
Harvard University Press, 2017), 6, Kindle edition. 
12 Ibid., 17.  
13 Ibid., 173.  
9 
different way, as exemplified by Theodore J. Lowi who laments the breakdown of the 
jurisdictional boundary between the legislature and the executive branch through 
delegation and the rise of “liberal jurisprudence: policy without law.”14   
Adam Sheingate joins this group of non-Weberian pessimists. In his article titled 
“Why Can’t Americans See the State?” Sheingate focuses on public employees hired by 
local and state governments, showing what American local and state governments have 
achieved.15 Local and state governments have been powerful and interventionist in such 
areas as education and public safety, while the federal government has only a limited 
influence on health and social protection.16 Because American citizens do not perceive 
teachers and police officers at the local level as obtrusive arms of the American state, 
they cannot see the most powerful and interventionist aspect of the state. The implication 
he draws from this distinctive feature of American state is negative. He concludes, 
“Although critical to the success of the democratic experiment, the veiled nature of public 
authority in the United States produces a complex set of institutions and a complex 
relationship between Americans and their state,” which presents obstacles to 
understanding and meeting contemporary challenges to the American state.17  
The fourth group of scholarship, which I call non-Weberian optimists, does not 
believe such non-Weberian characteristics of the American state have necessarily caused 
                                                 
14 Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority, [1st ed.]. 
(New York: Norton, 1969), see especially chapter 5.  
15 Adam Sheingate, “Why Can’t Americans See the State?,” The Forum 7, no. 4 (January 25, 2010): 1–14.  
16 Ibid., 10.  
17 Ibid., 14.  
10 
the failure of the American state. While sharing criticism of the inapplicability of 
Weberian concepts of state to the American state with non-Weberian pessimists, they 
emphasize the creativity of agency in navigating fragmented structures of the American 
government to achieve certain political goals and fulfill democratic ideals. In addition, 
though not all of them are pragmatists, the non-Weberian optimists tend to follow the 
method of what Novak sees as a pragmatist approach to the state in that they “aimed at 
action-oriented “how” questions—how officials acted, how policy was made, how 
government functioned—as opposed to more essentialist questions about the nature or 
essence of law or the state.”18 Simply put, the non-Weberian optimists tend to prioritize 
researching what types of actions were actually taken by the American state. 
Robert C. Lieberman explains in “Weak State, Strong Policy: Paradoxes of Race 
Policy in the United States, Great Britain, and France” how the institutional 
fragmentation of American state nurtured policy entrepreneurship in transforming the 
“color-blind” approach of the 1960s to the race-conscious approach for African 
Americans.19 The fragmented structure of American state, which is allegedly the source 
of state weakness, had promoted close cooperation among organizations like the National 
Association of Advancement of Colored People's Legal Defense, the federal courts, and 
Equal Economic Opportunity Commission. As a result, the American state could pursue a 
                                                 
18 Novak, “The Myth of the ‘Weak’ American State,” 765.   
19 Robert C. Lieberman, “Weak State, Strong Policy: Paradoxes of Race Policy in the United States, Great 
Britain, and France,” Studies in American Political Development 16, no. 2 (2002): 138–61.  
11 
more effective race-conscious approach in attacking racial discrimination than could the 
United Kingdom and France.  
Lieberman can be optimistic about the American state’s capacities to meet new 
social problems because “the fluidity of American political institutions give wide scope 
to social forces that would exploit that ambivalence, and those social actors have seized 
the strategic opportunities that American politics offers them.”20 
Non-Weberian optimists also pay attention to nonhierarchical forms of the 
American state. Fred Block in “Swimming against the Current: The Rise of a Hidden 
Developmental State in the United States,” and Brian Balogh in A Government Out of 
Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-Century America, argue that a 
hidden form of developmental network state (Block) or an associative form of 
governance (Balogh) in the American state have been effective in achieving various 
policy goals.21  
For Block, the American Federal government has actively promoted new 
technologies by creating pioneering offices like the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA) in the Pentagon, created in the late 1950s. Such organizations exist in a space 
between the private and public spheres, brokering expertise, political power, and proper 
organizational forms in order to transform new technologies into marketable 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 160.  
21 Fred Block, “Swimming Against the Current: The Rise of a Hidden Developmental State in the United 
States,” Politics & Society 36, no. 2 (June 2008): 169–206; Brian Balogh, A Government out of Sight: The 
Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009). 
12 
commodities. The American developmental state, which is composed of loosely 
connected networks of quasi-public organizations, also facilitates technological 
innovations by setting standards for new technologies to make it safe for private investors 
to fund the projects.22 In the eyes of the general public, Block argues, the American 
developmental state has more leeway than believed in promoting certain technology 
policies.23  
For Balogh, nineteenth century America was governed by a different logic from 
that of the Weberian state. Instead of exerting unilateral power, the American state of the 
period relied on “mobilizing compatible resources in the private and voluntary sectors” to 
“enable rather than command” the desired policy outcomes.24 Even when progressives 
attempted to replace what they perceived as a laissez-fair regime in terms of the state-
society relationship with a more regulatory one, Balogh argues, they did so by applying 
“a more enduring, and historically consistent, associative vision” that had previously 
served the country.25 Governing through the partnership between public and private 
authority has remained a defining characteristic of the American state since then. Balogh 
believes this type of governing has created “impressive results” in the United States.26  
                                                 
22 Block, “Swimming Against the Current,” 174.  
23 Ibid., 199. 
24 Balogh, A Government out of Sight, 2-3.  
25 Ibid., 354.  
26 Ibid., 3. 
13 
Gerald Berk introduces the founding moment of the “problem-solving” state 
within the American state during World War II in his article “Building the Problem 
Solving State: Bridging Networks and Experiments in the US Advisory Specialist Group 
in World War II.”27 Berk pays close attention to the historical process of creating an 
improvisational agency called the Advisory Specialist Group (ASG) which was layered 
over the insurmountable jurisdictional divides of the standing federal agencies in waging 
the Second World War.  
Berk shows how a few entrepreneurial individuals through the ASG overcame 
jurisdictional conflicts and successfully addressed new tasks like applying new 
microwave radar technologies to antisubmarine warfare, blind bombing, and so on by 
transposing skills and practices from one domain to another, by promoting mutual 
learning among experts, and by creating improvisational organizations to quickly respond 
to emerging problems which occurred in wartime. The implication of the ASG episode is 
that ASG’s success has opened the door to a “problem-solving state” where strategic 
organizations like ASG continue to promote policy experiments, bridge the jurisdictional 
gap between federal bureaus, and recompose previous relationships in a new way.28  
 
                                                 
27 Gerald Berk, “Building the Problem-Solving State: Bridging Networks and Experiments in the US 
Advisory Specialist Group in World War II,” Politics & Society 46, no. 2 (June 2018): 265–94. 
28 Ibid., 286-8.  
14 
A Non-Weberian Optimist Approach to the 1960s Policy Experiments 
A non-Weberian optimist standpoint is the best tool to explain the 1960s 
experiments in the field of industrial relationship and labor training. While the Weberian 
perspectives provide an insight into the fragmented structure of the American state’s 
effect on limiting the range of policies that can be successful in the United States, these 
perspectives explain little about the political dynamics that the policy experiments created 
during the 1960s. External and emergent events such as industrial conflicts, lingering 
unemployment, the civil rights movement, a sudden threat of inflation, a series of urban 
uprisings, all of which were unpredicted by the 1960s policymakers, provided unusual 
political opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to challenge the policy status quo. They 
responded to the events by recombining previous governing practices, institutions, and 
norms in new ways. The capabilities of the American state were continuously recalibrated 
by policymakers’ efforts to overcome the perceived limitations imposed on the America 
state. In this vein, examining failed 1960s experiments from a non-Weberian optimist 
point of view enables us to see how the American state was under the continuous process 
of adjusting itself to given situations, and exerted its power accordingly.  
The dissertation does not follow the non-Weberian pessimistic view that sees 
further confusion and dysfunction in the American state as inevitable. The dissertation 
instead assumes that entrepreneurial efforts to navigate multiple orders can sometimes 
result in desirable political solutions to current problems. The shorted-lived and failed 
experiments of the 1960s do not necessarily confirm the non-Weberian pessimist 
conclusion that the phenomena of intercurrence and layering, which typically occurred in 
the American state, are destined to create further confusion in the American state. Though 
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failed, such experiments reveal new ways of reconfiguring the American state’s 
capacities to meet new problems.  
 
Framework 
In order to examine the 1960s policy experiments and the American state’s 
actions behind them, the dissertation relies on the frameworks of layering, patchwork, 
intercurrence, and entrepreneurship. Application of the frameworks to empirical cases is 
further elaborated in chapters two and three where policy cases are analyzed. Here I will 
briefly explain the basics of the concepts and why they are proper tools in the 
dissertation.  
 
Layering 
The framework of layering indicates a general pattern of policymaking in the 
American state. According to Eric Schickler, layering is a common strategy for 
lawmakers,29 who prefer to add new elements, or layers, onto the previously enacted laws 
when they legislate. Replacing the old law with a new one is politically risky because the 
previous law was likely to produce those having an interest in keeping the old law in 
place. Their vested interest in the previous law leads them to obstruct any attempt to 
replace the old law.  
                                                 
29 Eric Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
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This tendency toward status quo is amplified by the structure of the U.S. 
Congress. The committee and subcommittee systems enable a small group of lawmakers 
to wield enormous power to slow down the lawmaking process or kill the proposed bill if 
they wish. If a bill does not accommodate diverse interests in the committee and 
subcommittee, it likely will not become legislated. In addition, Congress is porous to 
societal interests. Interest groups can gain access to key policymakers who participate in 
key committees or subcommittees, which makes it harder for a reform-minded lawmaker 
to replace an old law with a proposed new bill. 
As a result, a lawmaker, who wants to replace an old law with a new one, is 
usually a weak challenger in James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen’s sense,30 too weak to 
change the status quo. The dominant strategy for the weak challenger in Congress is 
layering. However, layering does not necessarily bring limited change to the system. 
“Such layering can, however, bring substantial change if amendments alter the logic of 
institution or compromise the stable reproduction of the original “core.””31 Thus, a 
cumulative effect of layering also can bring a wholesale change in a law.  
Chapter two applies the strategy of layering to the creation of a tripartite 
experiment in the Kennedy administration. When the New Deal order of moderating 
industrial conflicts between labor and management through a collective bargaining 
platform became dysfunctional in guaranteeing industrial stability, savvy policymakers 
                                                 
30 James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” in Explaining 
Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, ed. Mahoney and Thelen (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 1-37, at 17. 
31 Ibid., 16-7. 
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added a non-European style tripartite committee onto the previous industrial order to 
solve the problem. Chapter three finds the logic of layering active in the legislative 
development of manpower programs32 before the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) of 
1964. During the War on Poverty, the old elements in the EOA also provided the 
Department of Labor (DOL) with political opportunities to develop adult training 
programs even though the EOA’s original mission was to serve poor youths in urban 
areas.  
 
Patchwork and Intercurrence 
Patchwork is the concept which Stephen Skowronek applies to his description of 
the reform efforts between 1877 and 1900 in the United States. He argues that an urge to 
build a modern federal bureaucracy with sufficient administrative power to meet requests 
from drastic industrialization was incompatible with the highly institutionalized structure 
of the American government of the 19th century. The previously developed structure of 
the American government is known as “a state of courts and parties.”33 Thus, the effort to 
develop a modern administration in the period was done in a patchwork-like manner, in 
the sense that the reformers kept “innovations subordinate to preexisting political and 
institutional arrangements.”34 Similar to the concept of layering which describes the 
                                                 
32 I use the term “manpower” throughout the dissertation to stay true to the language of the earlier era. 
33 Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative 
Capacities, 1877-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 16, 24, 46.  
34 Ibid., 46.  
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tendency for a reformer to install new elements atop the previous arrangements of laws, 
institutions, and orders, the concept of patchwork indicates the general tendency to put 
new elements next to previous logics or orders in an attempt to reform the government.   
The implication of seeing American state building as patchwork is that it often 
leads to an incomplete political reform. Coexisting multiple orders, which the concept of 
intercurrence captures, cause internal conflicts in drawing jurisdictional boundaries, 
defining legitimate authorities, and specifying who is entitled to a newly created policy.35  
The logic of intercurrence is critical for understanding the development of the 
War on Poverty manpower and welfare programs and their achievements. A new hybrid 
policy discourse for antipoverty-manpower programs arose after the success of the 
Vocational Educational Act of 1963, the failure of the Youth Employment Bill of 1963, 
and the rise of antipoverty discourse for poor youths among liberals. The Kennedy 
administration decided to patch the civil rights cause into this context and enlarge its job 
training program to poor youths. As a result, the War on Poverty manpower programs 
were composed of different orders that were sometimes in conflict to each other.  
However, as I argue against the non-Weberian pessimist viewpoint above, 
intercurrence does not necessarily create further confusion in the American state. Indeed, 
even under the intercurrence of different orders, policy entrepreneurs in the Johnson 
administration came up with innovative ways to tame the incongruent qualities of the 
hybrid discourse for antipoverty-manpower programs in order to address inflation in 1966 
                                                 
35 Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 108. 
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and a series of urban uprisings. The policy discourse of structural unemployment, which 
institutionalists like Margaret Weir believe to be completely supplanted by an antipoverty 
discourse at the beginning of the War on Poverty,36 was revived by the Council of 
Economic Advisers and resulted in the creation of the President’s Committee on 
Manpower that was designed to bring back the coordinating role in all federally 
sponsored training programs to the Labor Secretary. In addition, a series of urban 
uprisings and Martin Luther King Jr.’s public letter to urge President Johnson to “hire 
now, train later” created fertile political grounds for policymakers to experiment with 
public-private training projects in urban ghettos. 
 
Entrepreneurship  
My dissertation also relies on the framework of political entrepreneurship in 
order to analyze the role of agency in the intercurrence of multiple orders.37 According to 
Adam Sheingate, a political entrepreneur explores the jurisdictional gap between 
institutions. Policy entrepreneurs then combine previous resources in a new manner to set 
up a new jurisdiction for policy innovation. They often find a new problem that needs a 
new solution through mastery of previous policy discourses and policy ideas. The 
capabilities of the American state during the 1960s were under constant recalibration due 
to entrepreneurial efforts to overcome the perceived limits on the state. If guided properly 
                                                 
36 Margaret Weir, Politics and Jobs: The Boundaries of Employment Policy in the United States (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), 83.  
37 Adam D. Sheingate, “Political Entrepreneurship, Institutional Change, and American Political 
Development,” Studies in American Political Development 17 (2003):185–203.  
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by entrepreneurship, the intercurrence of multiple orders could be an effective source for 
the policy entrepreneur to challenge the status quo and address social and economic 
problems in an innovative way.  
Chapter two examines how the President’s Advisory Committee on Labor-
Management Policy was created under the leadership of Labor Secretary Arthur 
Goldberg. During the 1950s, a group of policymakers believed that the faltering New 
Deal order, out of increasing industrial conflicts and drastic technological changes, 
should be revised in a new manner. When the election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 
provided the group a political opportunity, Arthur Goldberg and his staff, who were part 
of the group, tried to create a non-European style tripartite committee by extending roles 
for public representatives to apply their expertise impartially beyond the adversarial 
labor-management relationship, merging different policy goals to the political cause of 
recovering national industrial competitiveness, and devising a decentralized structure to 
placate American antistatism sentiments.  
Chapter three focuses on the role of entrepreneurship to solve problems in 
running War on Poverty training programs. The Johnson administration asked big 
companies to open factories in urban ghetto areas, train the residents, and hire them, in 
response to King’s letter to Johnson asking for public jobs. The chapter reveals how the 
Johnson administration deliberated on King’s request, discussed proposals from several 
federal bureaus to create public jobs, and came up with a new policy breakthrough to 
address urban uprisings by outsourcing public services to private businesses. Private 
companies like Kodak were guided by the Department of Commerce to train urban 
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residents, create jobs for them, and hire them—an example of Balogh’s concept of an 
associative form of governance.  
 
Methodology 
In addition to the frameworks above, I rely on various methods in the 
dissertation. First, I apply Comparative Historical Analysis (CHA) to find historical cases 
that have a lingering influence on contemporary politics.38 CHA’s emphasis on case 
studies and its theory-generating comparison of large and complex outcomes guides my 
work in 1960s tripartisim and labor training policy experiments that have been 
overlooked by scholars of American politics. CHA also provides a sense of the influence 
of temporalities on causal relationships. Even if factor A produces policy outcome B 
during period C, it does not guarantee the same causal relationship between A and B 
during period E. This helps me to question the validity of the conventional view that 
neither corporatism nor socialism has operated in the United States.  
Second, historical institutionalism and American political development (APD) 
scholarship explain how such different temporalities influence causal relationships among 
complex factors. Especially, Thelen and Mahoney’s work and Schickler’s work have 
                                                 
38 James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, “Comparative-Historical Analysis in Contemporary Political 
Science,” in Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis, ed. Mahoney and Thelen (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 3–28, kindle edition.  
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guided me to conceptualize different modes of incremental change such as layering, 
drifting, conversion, and displacement.39  
APD scholarship provides a developmental temporality to explain political 
change. Orren and Skowronek define political development as “a durable shift in 
governing authority,”40 which is usually enforced by the American state. The change is 
durable as long as a governing authority is occasionally challenged by those who prefer a 
different type or distribution of governing authority. Against the teleological concept of 
political change, the direction of political development in APD is contingent on 
individual political conflicts, whose purposes are to break the governing authority’s status 
quo. Thus, failed attempts to challenge the governing authority also become historical 
inquiries for APD scholars to identify the qualities of the governing authority in the 
period of concern. What was the governing authority in the period? How was authority 
distributed? How resilient was it against the challenge? Why did the attempt to change it 
fail? My dissertation answers these questions by examining failed policy experiments of 
the 1960s. It provides key insights into the transformation of the governing order of the 
1960s.  
APD scholarship also indicates the internal instability of the governing authority, 
which is composed of “a complex web of relations, a composite of controls gotten up at 
                                                 
39 James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” in Explaining 
Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, ed. Mahoney and Thelen (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 1-37; Eric Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the 
Development of the U.S. Congress (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
40 Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development (Cambridge, 
U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 123. 
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different times for different purposes.”41 In this sense, the governing authority is 
multilayered and a source of dysfunctions within the American state, which is explained 
in the concepts of patchwork and intercurrence above.  
Meanwhile, I embrace William Sewell Jr’s criticism of freezing historical 
moments to extract variables.42 While it increases comparability among cases, such 
practice of extracting variables from a flux of events hides the influence of the process 
itself on causal relationships among factors. Instead of applying such experimental 
temporality to prejudging the conditions necessary for the successful tripartite experiment 
and effective adult training programs, I pay attention to various creative actions attempted 
by the 1960s policy entrepreneurs to overcome institutional and cultural barriers.  
Third, the project of political creativity offers a useful method to research 
political entrepreneurship.43 In running the tripartite experiment in the early 1960s and 
devising adult training programs during the WOP period, policy entrepreneurs in the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations could reconfigure previous relationships among 
federal bureaus and connect acceptable policy goals in a new manner to make their policy 
projects less threatening to stakeholders. They also could make use of given institutions 
to create new ones. This view contrasts with a mainstream institutionalist perspective that 
reduces institutions to constraints for actors. The project of political creativity provides 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 125.  
42 William H. Sewell Jr, Logics of History : Social Theory and Social Transformation (Chicago, I.L.: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005), chapter 3. 
43 Gerald Berk, Dennis C. Galvan, and Victoria Hattam, eds., Political Creativity : Reconfiguring 
Institutional Order and Change (Philadelphia, P.A.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). 
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various models for change by conceptually transforming “agency as relationality, order as 
assemblage, and change as the politics of time.”44  
Along with these three methods, I rely on various sources to conduct my 
research. First, I use primary printed sources such as newspapers, transcripts of 
Congressional hearings, and the CQ Almanac from 1950 to 1968. Second, I review 
archival records from the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Among them I closely 
examine the general and executive documents produced by federal agencies including the 
Departments of Labor and Commerce, the Office of Economic Opportunity, and the 
Council of Economic Advisers. I also review important administrators’ oral interviews 
archived in the presidential libraries. Third, I researched archival records from the Walter 
P. Reuther Library at Wayne State University in Detroit, MI. Lastly, I rely on a great deal 
of secondary sources from various disciplines including history, sociology, economics, 
and political science.  
Through primary and secondary sources I make an important contribution to the 
studies of American politics by examining the implications of unnoticed 1960s policy 
experiments in subsequent policy developments. These experiments have been neglected 
by many scholars due to their deterministic understanding of the American state’s 
capabilities that allegedly limited the range of feasible new programs.    
 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 5.  
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Order of the Dissertation  
The order of the dissertation is as follows. 
 
Chapter 2. A U.S. Tripartite Experiment in the Kennedy Administration 
Chapter two was published at Polity 52, no. 1 (January 2020).45 It examines the 
creation of the President’s Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy and its 
achievements. The chapter challenges the mainstream view on American political 
economy, which regards any tripartite bargaining among U.S. labor, management, and 
the state as impossible. From Salisbury’s work to the work of Campbell, Hollingsworth, 
and Lindberg, and to Hall and Soskice’s work, scholars commonly believe a tripartite 
coordination in the U.S. economy has been discouraged due to the impossibility of 
overcoming an arm’s-length relationship among societal actors, and the tendency for U.S. 
businesses to concentrate on mass production and vertical integration with abundant 
unskilled labor, and thus avoid upgrading skills through labor-management collaboration. 
The dearth of coordinating institutions in the U.S. system also discourages Americans 
from creating nonmarket institutions that can bridge labor, management, and state 
because only a new institution that can complement the other institutions is deemed able 
to survive.  
Furthermore, Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol’s work on the structure of American 
government shows how underdevelopment of the American state has deterred the rise of 
                                                 
45 Yongwoo Jeung, “A U.S. Tripartite Experiment in the Kennedy Administration,” Polity 52, no. 1 
(January 2020): 116-55.  
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comprehensive job training and welfare policies. Despite a few reformers’ attempt to 
streamline the DOL and its state agencies for policy coherence and effectiveness during 
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, it eventually failed because of the 
institutionally fragmented structure of the American state.  
Chapter two challenges the mainstream view by providing evidence that the U.S. 
government began experimenting with corporatist arrangements since the Great 
Depression. Especially, the chapter focuses on the unique tripartite experiment which 
occurred in the early 1960s.  
 The first section of the chapter, “the Intractable Industrial Conflict of the 1950s,” 
reveals the conditions under which the tripartite experiment emerged. During the 1950s 
the American economy suffered from inadequate response to technological changes, 
declining competitiveness, and labor-management conflicts. Recurrent conflicts between 
steel companies and the United Steelworkers of America (USW) during the 1950s, which 
inflicted server damage on the national economy, substantiate the intractable industrial 
conflicts of the 1950s. One source of the 1950s industrial conflicts was automation on 
which the management of big manufacturing companies relied to enhance efficiency and 
lower production costs. Labor unions were hostile to automation for fear of losing jobs 
and losing control at the workplace. Pundits and policymakers started to develop a policy 
discourse of structural unemployment to understand the effect of automation and prepare 
for its negative effect on society.  
The second section, “Experimentation: the Kaiser Tripartite Committee,” traces 
the origin of the Kennedy administration’s tripartite experiment to the U.S. steel industry. 
Steel management attempted to apply automation without the USW’s consent, which 
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resulted in the steel strike of 1959 over section 2B of the previous collective bargaining 
contract. Arthur Goldberg, general counsel to USW at that time, designed the Kaiser 
Committee to defuse the explosive topic of automation in the collective bargaining 
contract and create another planform to discuss structural issues under the guidance of 
public representatives. The Kaiser Committee not only ended the long standoff between 
steel companies and the USW but also awakened policymakers to the possibility of 
greater public interventions in the labor market. 
The third section, “Embarking on a Tripartite Experiment in 1961,” reviews 
Labor Secretary Goldberg’s entrepreneurship in setting up a foreign tripartite committee, 
the President’s Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy, to address the 
intractable industrial conflicts. The fourth section, “The Politics of the LMAC,” shows 
how Goldberg’s experiment failed due to reignited turf wars between labor and 
management. Goldberg’s decision to run the tripartite committee in a nonauthoritative 
way hamstrung the tripartite committee’s ability to handle the schism between labor and 
management. The section criticizes the institutionalist viewpoint that sees such tripartite 
experiment in the United States as temporary and abortive.  
In the “Epilogue and Conclusion: The Legacy of Failed Political 
Entrepreneurship and the Rise of Commercial Keynesianism after the LMAC 
Experiment,” I discuss how political entrepreneurship works between institution and 
agency by reviewing Goldberg’s strategy to rearticulate discreet policy goals and design 
the LMAC in a typical way to avoid participants’ antistatist sentiments. I also discuss 
when such entrepreneurship fails, based on the LMAC’s case. Then I explain how the 
failure in the early 1960s tripartite experiment paved the way toward further 
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encroachment on collective labor rights and the uneven rise of individual employment 
rights in the long term, a process that Katherine Stone calls “industrial pluralism.”46 The 
failure also contributed to the Kennedy administration’s transition in its policy orientation 
from public spending to the unconventional macroeconomic measure of cutting taxes 
while leaving government expenditures intact in order to stimulate the national economy, 
which is described as “growth liberalism,” or “reactionary Keynesianism.”47  
 
Chapter 3. War on Poverty and Adult Training  
Chapter three examines the origins and evolutions of the War on Poverty training 
programs, relying on the frameworks of layering, patchwork, intercurrence, and 
entrepreneurship. The War on Poverty, declared in 1964, focused mainly on the 
disadvantaged who could not attain competitive jobs for themselves. The chapter explains 
how the public as well as policymakers became more concerned with poor youths in the 
1960s. The innovative training programs during the WOP, however, failed to produce 
desired effects, which invites many scholars’ criticism of the programs’ unrealistically 
ambitious goals, the absence of a control tower, and the American state’s weak capacity 
to run the programs.  
                                                 
46 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, “The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension between Individual 
Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System,” University of Chicago Law Review 
59 (1992): 575–644. 
47 Robert M. Collins, More: The Politics of Economic Growth in Postwar America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of America (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 
Aaron Major, “The Fall and Rise of Financial Capital,” Review of International Political Economy 15 
(2008): 800–25. See also chapter. 2’s note 69.  
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The chapter challenges the previous literature that sees the fundamental 
limitation of the American state in implementing interventionist social and welfare 
policy. Especially, the chapter shows how the perspective of American exceptionalism is 
influential in the scholarly works that evaluate the WOP. According to the American 
exceptionalist scholarship from such scholars as Tocqueville, Hartz, Lipset, and Sombart, 
the absence of a feudal past in the United States made the U.S. genuinely liberal. Any 
governmental policy against the principle of voluntarism would perish. Even though an 
exceptional event like the civil rights movement of the 1960s could open the window of 
opportunity for liberal reformers to conduct unprecedented policy experiments in the 
areas of manpower training and welfare, the obtrusive governmental programs were 
destined to stall eventually because the American public would rescind their support for 
the programs.  
In the first section, “Previous research on the U.S. Welfare System and the War 
on Poverty,” I review the works of Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Margaret Weir, and Jill 
Quadagno on the American welfare state. They commonly explain how the American 
liberal welfare state has survived periodic reform attempts throughout U.S. history. 
Without new class mobilization, new cross-class coalitions, and creation of innovative 
institutional devices, Esping-Andersen argues, the American liberal welfare state will 
remain unchanged. Weir argues that when the DOL, a champion agency for adult training 
programs, was marginalized during the WOP, the previously developed policies for 
manpower training became adrift. Quadagno argues that liberals’ effort to build an equal 
opportunity welfare state with affirmative action and desegregation had an unintended 
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consequence of furthering racial stratification. They commonly assume the failure in 
WOP training programs to be structurally inevitable. 
I provide schematic criticism of their limited view on the state’s capabilities. In 
contrast to their quite static perspective on state capabilities during the WOP, I show how 
the Johnson administration indeed addressed unexpected political events by redefining 
the relationship among federal bureaus, redrawing the contours of the training programs, 
and creating new programs on a pilot basis.  
In the second section, “Legislative Developments,” I reveal that the legislative 
history of various manpower programs, from the National Defense Education Act of 1958 
to the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and its 1965 Amendments, was a patchwork of 
improvisational responses to national and regional economic change. I argue that policy 
incoherence in the series of legislative acts was not so much the outcome of the 
fragmented nature of federal agencies as an outcome of the agencies’ adaptive strategy to 
cultivate new policy constituencies whenever they faced hostile political environments 
that would jeopardize the survival of the programs. I also examine how the logics of 
intercurrence and layering worked in the development of U.S. manpower policy during 
the 1960s. 
The third section, “State Capacity to Adjust and a Recurrent Theme of Training 
the Nondisadvantaged after 1964,” analyzes the Johnson administration’s effort to update 
WOP training programs. It focuses on three moments that forced the administration to 
consider changing from its previous emphasis on poor youths. The first moment came in 
late 1965 when the threat of inflation led the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) to 
seek the DOL’s advice in running the on-the-job training in order to address labor 
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shortages in skilled labor and thereby curb inflationary pressures on wages. In the 
process, Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz retained control of federally administered 
training programs through his chairmanship of the President’s Committee on Manpower. 
This episode shows how the fragmented nature of the American state could promote a 
new solution to inflation. If the American state had had a hierarchically organized 
bureaucratic structure, the dominance of CEA over the DOL in their competition at the 
beginning of the Johnson administration would have resulted in replacing DOL’s policy 
expertise on the issue of structural unemployment with Keynesian macroeconomic 
approaches.  
The second moment was when the Johnson administration started to consider 
new programs for unemployed adults. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW), DOL, and the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) respectively proposed to 
create public jobs for unemployed adults. Discussing three proposals within the Johnson 
administration provided a discursive background for forging another new policy 
experiment that assisted big businesses to locate in the ghetto, and provide training and 
employment for the disadvantaged. The third moment was when Martin Luther King Jr. 
sent his public letter to President Johnson asking for public jobs. The Johnson 
administration responded to the request with a new program called Job Opportunities in 
the Business Sector (JOBS) in 1968. The section analyzes the way the American state 
functioned in an associative form to provide public services beyond institutional hurdles.  
I sum up the implications of the WOP training programs and their evolution in 
“Chapter Conclusion.” I also clarify how the frameworks of layering, intercurrence, and 
entrepreneurship are applied to my cases.  
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Conclusion 
In the Conclusion, I revisit the category of non-Weberian optimists, one of four 
categories suggested in the introduction regarding scholarship on the American state. I 
reaffirm how my case studies of a tripartite experiment in the Kennedy administration 
and WOP training programs can contribute to the non-Weberian optimist viewpoint and 
furthermore to the discipline of American political development.  
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CHAPTER II  
A U.S. TRIPARTITE EXPERIMENT IN THE KENNEDY 
ADMINISTRATION 
This chapter was published online December 11, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1086/707026 at 
Polity, volume 52, number 1 (January 2020), pp. 116–155. 0032-3497/2020/5201-
0006$10.00. © 2019 Northeastern Political Science Association. All rights reserved. 
 
Introduction 
Scholars regard the United States as a model for laissez-faire economies. In their 
view, the United States, with its fragmented representation of societal interests and arm’s-
length market coordination, has lacked centrally organized business and labor peak 
associations to moderate industrial conflicts. As a result, any tripartite bargaining among 
U.S. labor, management, and the state has proved impossible.48 
This view discourages research on tripartite bargaining in the United States, 
because scholars tend to focus on the question of why there is no corporatism in the 
                                                 
48 For example, Colin Gordon indicated that “in an environment in which competitive self- interest is 
uniquely encouraged, celebrated, and rewarded, private cooperation is extremely difficult to accomplish or 
justify.” See his New Deals: Business, Labor, and Politics in America, 1920–1935 (Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 130. Without a historically developed legacy of forming trade 
associations or other forms of peak association among businesses, Gordon argues, the goal of business 
leaders to tame unbridled market competition during the interwar period was easily dropped in the Great 
Depression (at 160–61). Furthermore, Frank Dobbin argues that Americans, witnessing the success of the 
railroad industry in the nineteenth century in the absence of public coordination, began at that time to 
believe that industrial progress would not have occurred without the government’s hands-off stance; see his 
Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain, and France in the Railway Age (Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 59. David Vogel, who traces fluctuating business power in the United 
States, indicates that America is different from other capitalist countries in having “no peak organization 
capable of representing the views and interests of American business as a whole”; see his Kindred 
Strangers: The Uneasy Relationship between Politics and Business in America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 132. 
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United States, as in Salisbury’s seminal work.49 Relying mainly on Mancur Olson’s logic 
of collective action, Salisbury argues that it would be generally difficult to form 
“singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally 
differentiated” peak associations in the United States, where no feudal legacy makes an 
associative form of economic governance acceptable to the people.50 While Salisbury 
acknowledges “national emergencies” during which it was temporarily possible to create 
peak associations covering diverse interests, he does not explore why and how they 
failed, or what legacies they left.51 
By contrast, Campbell, Hollingsworth, and Lindberg’s edited volume researches 
various forms of nonmarket economic governance in America where, in contrast to the 
conventional wisdom, state governments play active roles in promoting cooperation 
among local actors.52 But this work still echoes Salisbury’s argument that any meaningful 
attempt to move beyond market coordination at the national level will fail eventually for 
structural reasons—or “parameters,”53 in Hollingsworth’s terms. The degree of exposure 
to foreign trade has been too low for U.S. companies to form “associational structures in 
                                                 
49 Robert Salisbury, Interests and Institutions: Substance and Structure in American Politics (Pittsburgh, 
P.A.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992), chapter 6. 
50 Ibid., 133. 
51 Ibid., 135–36. 
52 John L. Campbell, J. Rogers Hollingsworth, and Leon N. Lindberg, eds., Governance of the American 
Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). The nonmarket forms of economic governance 
are obligational networks, hierarchies, monitoring, and promotional networks; see their chapter 1, 
“Economic Governance and the Analysis of Structural Change in the American Economy,” 3–34. 
53 Ibid., 35. 
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order to cooperate in competition internationally.”54 While an abundance of unskilled 
labor and high flexibility in job markets encouraged Chandlerian mass production with 
vertical integration and automation, it discouraged management and labor from 
collaboratively upgrading skills to meet technological challenges together.55 But the 
parameters that supposedly determine industrial actors’ preferences actually underwent a 
sea change in recent decades. 
Changes in the world economy, such as the two oil shocks of the 1970s, trade 
liberalization, the emergence of global finance, and the rise of integrated global 
production attracted the attention of talented scholars across disciplines.56 One question 
that interested them was whether a nation’s previous institutional setting would change, 
given the challenges. A breakthrough came with the work of the “varieties of capitalism” 
scholars, who synthesized institutional approaches and conceptualized two stereotypes of 
economic governance that they expected to be enduring: liberal market economies and 
coordinated market economies.57 Against the convergence theory of neoclassical 
economics, these scholars substantiate that the world remains divergent due to 
institutional complementarity: a new economic institution will more likely survive if it 
                                                 
54 Ibid., 67 
55 Ibid., 53.  
56 For instance, see Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for 
Prosperity (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial 
Policy in Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985); and Peter A. Gourevitch, Politics in Hard 
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57 Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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supplements the functions of other institutions. The United States will remain reliant 
exclusively on market functions because a dearth of coordinating institutions at the 
national level tends to discourage the development of nonmarket institutions. 
Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol’s work on U.S. social policies resonates with the 
institutionalists’ findings.58 The underdevelopment of the American state and its 
fragmented institutional structure result in residual social welfare programs, in which the 
state takes minimum responsibility for those forced out of job markets, failing to connect 
such programs to production strategies. Weir elaborates on this argument by noting that 
even though the American state sought to implement ambitious employment programs 
targeted at broader social strata than the hard-core poor in order to meet new 
technological challenges during the 1960s, it failed due to its limited capacity to oversee 
the new programs. As a result, despite the ripe atmosphere for reforming labor markets à 
la European tripartism, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations could do no more than 
rediscipline the poor who resisted market principles.59 Hence the narrative that the U.S. 
federal government is too weak to reshape industrial relations also appears in studies of 
U.S. politics, providing another structural explanation for “why there is no corporatism in 
the United States.” 
                                                 
58 Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol, eds., The Politics of Social Policy in the United 
States (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
59 Margaret Weir, “The Federal Government and Unemployment: The Frustration of Policy Innovation 
from the New Deal to the Great Society,” in The Politics of Social Policy in the United States, 149–90, at 
171–72 (see previous note). See also Margaret Weir, Politics and Jobs: The Boundaries of Employment 
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As a result of these tendencies, scholars find it difficult to acknowledge that there 
have been corporatist experiments in the United States; they know little about where 
those experiments have occurred, in what ways they failed, how they are similar and 
different from their European counterparts, and what implications they have had for 
subsequent policy options and institutional trajectories. Perceiving the U.S. national 
economy as a liberal monolith creates a blind spot about these questions. But, as Andrew 
Shonfield indicates, the U.S. government began experimenting with corporatist 
arrangements at the national level during the Great Depression in order to force private 
actors to serve public objectives. His examples were the short-lived Agricultural 
Adjustment Act (AAA) and the National Recovery Act (NRA), both of which were ruled 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.60 The National War Labor Board (NWLB), 
created during the Second World War, embraced the spirit of corporatism to a limited 
degree, as I will elaborate later. 
In a sense, the U.S. tripartite experiments were entrepreneurial ways to address 
the structural constraints that the scholars above carefully describe. According to 
Sheingate, political entrepreneurs navigate jurisdictional gaps between institutions and 
constantly search for speculative opportunities for innovation.61 In the process, 
entrepreneurs often rely on policy ideas—or discourses—through which they discover 
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new problems and connect them to a certain “politics.”62 Political entrepreneurship is an 
individual or collective effort to bring about a meaningful change in policies, politics, and 
institutions by creatively making use of available resources and challenging the status 
quo. The framework of political entrepreneurship is a theoretical tool that reveals when, 
why, and how reform-minded actors initiate change. Studying such entrepreneurship in 
U.S. tripartite experiments, therefore, makes it possible to see a mode of policy change in 
which agency and idea play key roles. 
Moreover, U.S. tripartite experiments are resourceful venues where scholars can 
re-evaluate the dynamics of American politics, even though those attempts appear to have 
been fruitless in bringing a lasting change to the political system as a whole. Orren and 
Skowronek argue that an institution does not necessarily reflect a single order or a 
governing principle. Rather, it often contains multiple orders created at different times, 
innately in tension.63 For those who seek to break the institutional inertia, such 
incoherence within an institution or among institutions leaves room for an agent to 
                                                 
62 Jal Mehta summarizes three prominent models in political science for turning ideas into policy as 
follows: “Peter Hall’s view that successful ideas combine policy, political, and administrative appeal; John 
Kingdon’s view that policy ideas succeed when entrepreneurs link them to ‘problem’ and ‘politics’ streams; 
and the work of historically inclined scholars who argue that prevailing ideas are shaped by the contours of 
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recombine disparate institutional components for innovation.64 In this regard, studying 
U.S. tripartite experiments, though they were unsuccessful, can shed new light on how an 
agent’s creativity interacts with structural constraints to bring about institutional change, 
often resulting in institutional inertia at first, but also leaving policy remnants that 
encourage later entrepreneurial efforts.65 This perspective, which provides a vivid picture 
of how politics produces policies or vice versa, differs from the sort of structural 
determinism that the previous literature commonly embraces. 
This chapter explores the overlooked dynamism that policy entrepreneurs have 
created in U.S. politics by delving into a tripartite experiment conducted by Labor 
Secretary Arthur Goldberg, through the President’s Advisory Committee on Labor- 
Management Policy (LMAC), during the Kennedy administration in the early 1960s. I 
argue that this tripartite experiment was a product of policy entrepreneurs’ attempts to 
tackle the decline of U.S. manufacturers’ market competitiveness, rather than being 
merely a negligible outlier from mainstream American liberalism. Grafting a non-
European style tripartite committee onto the faltering New Deal industrial order was a 
                                                 
64 See Sheingate, “Political Entrepreneurship,” 189 (see note 61 above); and Karen Orren and Stephen 
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strategy of layering devised by a group of shrewd policy entrepreneurs.66 Given the 
absence of peak business and labor associations, and without strong state capacity to 
arbitrate failures in voluntary labor-management negotiations, the policy entrepreneurs 
sought to add a new device for coordination to the existing order, because, as Mahoney 
and Thelen explain, the “institutional challengers lack the capacity to actually change the 
original rules.”67 In this chapter, I will re-evaluate the tripartite experiment of the 1960s 
by focusing on entrepreneurs’ creativity in devising a new institution and articulating a 
policy discourse to address uncertainties created by technological change—while 
acknowledging the structural restraints on their options. 
I also aim to show how the LMAC’s failure is connected to the broader currents 
of U.S. political development. On the one hand, the failure laid the foundations for the 
transition from the New Deal order, based on collective labor rights, to the industrial 
pluralism of the present period. When the uniquely American form of tripartism failed in 
modernizing the collective bargaining platform, a new legal system of individual 
employment rights arose along with a long-term attack on union power. On the other 
hand, the LMAC’s failure opened the way for commercial Keynesianism, which led the 
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government to prioritize tax cuts and planned deficits over industrial policies. There came 
to be no real programmatic difference between liberals and conservatives in fiscal policy. 
In the next section, I will explain the conditions under which the tripartite 
experiment emerged, amid a crisis in U.S. mass production, as a solution to commonly 
perceived industrial problems such as technological changes, declining competitiveness, 
and labor-management conflicts. Then, the chapter traces the origin of the Kennedy 
administration’s tripartite experiment from the U.S. steel industry, where management’s 
attempt to apply automation—without the United Steelworkers’ consent— rendered the 
industry vulnerable to nationwide strikes. The Kaiser Committee, designed by Arthur 
Goldberg and other entrepreneurs, became the novel response from management, labor, 
and the public to the crisis. Finally, after examining the activities of the LMAC in 1961 
and 1962, I discuss how the tripartite experiment’s failure paved the way toward what 
scholars have called “growth liberalism” or “reactionary Keynesianism”68 and “industrial 
pluralism.”69 
 
                                                 
68 Robert M. Collins sees in the 1960s the rise of “growth liberalism,” in which top economic officials 
prioritized economic growth over other economic goals. See his More: The Politics of Economic Growth in 
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contrasts stimulating the economy by monetary easing to the traditional Keynesian program of deficit 
spending. He names the former “conservative Keynesianism” and the latter “liberal Keynesianism.” See his 
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The Intractable Industrial Conflicts of the 1950s 
The Kennedy administration’s tripartite experiment was designed to address the 
intractable industrial conflicts of the 1950s. The New Deal industrial order, having tamed 
the Great Depression of the 1930s, underwent severe stress following World War II. This 
section examines two aspects of that stress. The first consisted of the intensifying labor-
management conflicts over prices and wages following the war. The Truman 
administration in the 1940s oversaw upward pressure on prices and wages, with only 
limited tools to curb it. During the Eisenhower administration’s hands-off policy on 
domestic economic issues, labor-management conflicts grew and finally dominated 
contract negotiations. The second aspect of stress on the New Deal order was automation 
in the manufacturing industry. Due to the uncertainty that technological changes brought 
to previous power relationships within industries, automation served as a political catalyst 
in enlarging the scope of previous industrial conflicts, not only between labor and 
management, but also within the U.S. labor movement. These two stresses preconditioned 
the tripartite experiment of the 1960s. 
 
The New Deal Industrial Order under Stress 
Maintaining the New Deal order’s virtuous circle of mass production and mass 
consumption was key to its stability, and guaranteeing employees’ purchasing power with 
high wages and benefits ensured growing domestic markets for consumer goods. To meet 
these growing demands, mass production systems required stability in the organization of 
production. Unexpected strikes would upset this order, because investment and 
production decisions required a degree of certainty about likely demand for products and 
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future returns. Hence, instead of resorting to strikes, workers were obliged to file 
grievances through their grievance office, the role and jurisdiction of which were 
negotiated through collective bargaining. The leaders of organized labor opposed direct 
action such as wildcat strikes led by radicals, because they recognized that unions had an 
integral role in maintaining system stability.70 
In its heyday, the New Deal order seemed to permit U.S. producers to attain a 
continuous flow of profits without squeezing the workforce and depriving laborers of 
their dignity. Stable production growth also allowed U.S. manufacturers to plan market 
expansion abroad, along with hegemonic U.S. foreign policies toward Western Europe 
and Asian countries after WWII.71 
The virtuous circle of mass production and mass consumption did not secure 
industrial peace, however. As U.S. manufacturers sought to expand their markets abroad 
to sell surplus production, they also sought to enhance foreign consumers’ purchasing 
power by transferring technologies and financial aid to help them rebuild their domestic 
economies. U.S. manufacturers’ efforts cultivated fruitful soil in which new foreign 
producers arose, which potentially disrupted the United States’ simultaneous pursuit of 
mass production and mass consumption. Indeed, as Western European and Japanese 
economies recovered from the war’s carnage, foreign industrial competitors with cheap 
labor and government protections began challenging U.S. manufacturers for foreign and 
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domestic markets. Growing global competitive pressures denied U.S. manufacturers the 
stability that they craved. Even worse for U.S. manufacturers were growing demands for 
wage increases as inflationary pressures threatened to erode real wages. As a 
consequence, a cauldron of simmering industrial conflicts occurred in the 1950s, as the 
conditions that sustained the stable New Deal order began to unravel. 
U.S. manufacturers’ immediate response to the deteriorating economic 
conditions for mass production was to ignore organized labor’s requests for wage 
increases right after the Second World War. Some sought to roll back labor’s hard- 
fought gains in job security, health care, and pension arrangements.72 Manufacturers also 
grew resistant to federal government pledges to hold product prices stable. The glorious 
years of rapid economic growth which seemed to confirm U.S. hegemony began to falter 
by the dawn of the 1950s. U.S. manufacturers’ newfound brazenness in battling unions 
and government worsened industrial conflicts, threatening to undermine the New Deal’s 
cooperative foundations. 
Incessant disruptions of U.S. labor markets beginning in the late 1940s reflected 
this faltering postwar New Deal industrial order. Bureau of Labor Statistics data shows 
that 10.5% of the total employed in the United States, including agricultural and 
government employees, participated in work stoppages in 1946. This is an unusually high 
percentage, reflecting the end of the forced industrial peace during the war. After that 
year, the annual rate of work stoppage participation decreased. But from 1947 to 1959, 
                                                 
72 Nelson Lichtenstein, State of the Union: A Century of American Labor (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2013), 99, 109, 110. 
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the period of concern, the average annual participation rate in work stoppage remained as 
high as 4.5%, which was considerably higher than the 3.7% from 1927 to 1945 and the 
2.9 percent from 1960 to 1979. Similarly, idled days due to work stoppages amounted to 
0.28% of the estimated total days spent productively in the United States from 1947 to 
1959, which was higher than the 0.15% from 1939 to 1945 and the 0.19% from 1960 to 
1979.73 The period between 1947 and 1959, therefore, was marked by substantially 
higher rates of industrial conflict compared to the periods before and after it. 
 
                                                 
73 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, “Analysis of Work Stoppages, 1979” 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, 1981), 7 and Figures 1–2 in the appendix; also available at 
https://www.bls.gov/wsp/wspfaq.htm#Question_10. 
Figure 1. U.S. Work Stoppages, 1929—80 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Analysis of Work Stoppages, 1979 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 7; also available at 
https://www.bls.gov/wsp/wspfaq.htm#Question_10. 
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The reasons for relatively frequent industrial disruptions in the 1947–1959 period 
were simple. Manufacturers had sought to raise prices immediately after WWII to realize 
profits that had been forcibly postponed by the government during wartime. Labor also 
asked for wage increases to compensate for their wartime solidarity with Democratic 
presidents, and thereby sought to catch up with rapidly rising costs of living.74 
 
                                                 
74 The Truman administration abandoned price controls in 1946 due to political pressure from business as 
well as Republicans in Congress who opposed government encroachment upon private enterprise. Without 
a device to moderate the upward spiral of prices and wages in wartime, the Truman administration 
addressed inflation by refusing any type of tax cuts. But opposition from the executive branch was 
overridden by a supermajority in Congress, which passed tax cuts in 1948. However, the Korean War 
created a political case to reinstate price controls. See Herbert Stein, The Fiscal Revolution in America 
(Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1990), 207. 
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Figure 2. U.S. Work Stoppages involving, 1000 or more, 1947—88 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release, U.S. Department of Labor, February 
9, 2018, at www.bls.gov/wsp/monthly_listing.htm. 
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The Truman administration attempted to repress labor and management demands 
because it feared uncontrollable inflation.75 The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 
helped the Truman administration justify its effort to reinstate price controls. Since the 
Democratic president had the upper hand in labor negotiation— labor being a loyal 
constituency of his party—the administration managed to quell organized labor’s request 
with little political cost. But the administration’s attempts to draw voluntary compliance 
from private corporations failed spectacularly.76 
The Truman administration’s temporary seizure of the U.S. Steel corporation in 
1952 in response to the company’s raising the prices of steel products typified its 
difficulty in maintaining industrial peace. While the United Steelworkers of America 
(USW) intended to comply with the government’s arbitration, U.S. Steel decided to raise 
its prices, to Truman’s surprise. Management’s recalcitrance in response to the 
government’s request for stable steel prices resulted in the government’s unprecedented 
seizure of a private corporation in April 1952, relying on the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. 
                                                 
75 President Truman’s closest advisers from business advised him to pursue “decontrol of the economy, 
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But in June the Supreme Court declared the executive branch’s decision unconstitutional. 
The Court’s ruling quieted this fight, but it did not put an end to industrial conflicts.77 
The Eisenhower administration subsequently pursued a hands-off policy on 
wages and prices. Without a labor-aligned Democrat in the White House, the battlefield 
for industrial conflicts shifted to the individual collective bargaining tables occupied by 
management and labor. As a result, the U.S. industrial landscape during the 1950s was 
full of conflicts between labor and business at the collective bargaining table. 
 
Automation 
Automation exacerbated industrial conflicts between business and labor, further 
disrupting the New Deal industrial order. Automation threw a spark into the industrial 
tinderbox, aggravating the labor-management relationship and also the dormant conflict 
between skilled and unskilled labor, as new technologies quickly rendered the latter 
obsolete. During the 1950s, U.S. manufacturers, especially in the steel and auto 
industries, introduced new machinery into production processes to enhance efficiency and 
lower long-run production costs. These investments, entailing huge fixed costs, 
deliberately aimed to curb organized labor’s power.78 Capitalists exploited workers’ fears 
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of being replaced by machines to gain bargaining power, and conflicts arose between 
skilled and less skilled workers over automation.  
Skilled workers tended to be more permissive toward automation because they 
faced no immediate danger of being laid off. In contrast, unskilled workers, mostly in the 
bottom rung of seniority systems and often nonwhite, demanded that union leaders stand 
up against automation. This division drove a wedge through the labor movement.79 
Without a coherent vision of the long-term effects of automation on employment, union 
leaders could not effectively address the issue in the early 1950s.80 
To respond to business’s unilateral decision to apply new technologies, organized 
labor developed a policy discourse of structural unemployment, differentiating it from 
cyclical unemployment, which fluctuates with changes in the business cycle. Structural 
unemployment referred to the mismatch between skills needed for emergent industrial 
processes and skills possessed by the unemployed. Those believing in the concept of 
structural unemployment argued that the mismatch in skills would constrain national 
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economic growth, resulting in constant shortages of skilled labor and an overall decline 
of purchasing power among the public.81 
The automation controversy finally became politicized in 1955 through a series 
of congressional hearings. The hearings on “Automation and Technological Change” 
illustrate how industrial conflicts over managerial prerogatives and automation penetrated 
the political arena. Laborites exploited the hearings to successfully move labor and 
industrial policy onto the national agenda, while representatives of General Electric 
Company and Ford Motor Company accused labor witnesses in the hearings of relying on 
scientifically unproven data. The companies also attacked the presumption of the hearings 
that the current path of automation benefited big business at the expense of broader 
society. They argued that automation’s impact on jobs had not yet been fully studied and 
cautioned against unreasoned assumptions that automation would necessarily lead to 
mass unemployment. While acknowledging that automation disrupted labor markets in 
the short term, business representatives argued that it would eventually promote 
productivity gains and national economic growth. They staunchly opposed meddling with 
managerial prerogatives by outsiders.82 
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Forging common ground among policymakers, organized labor, and business in 
the crisis of the New Deal order was nearly impossible. Nevertheless, these actors shared 
an aversion to recurrent industrial conflicts, foreshadowing the cooperation that unfolded 
in the Kennedy administration and led to an unprecedented nationwide tripartite 
committee. 
 
Experimentation: The Kaiser Tripartite Committee 
Despite the intractable industrial conflicts of the 1950s, political conditions for a 
major policy breakthrough ripened at the end of the decade. The Eisenhower 
administration’s poor performance in managing macroeconomic conditions paved the 
way for John F. Kennedy’s election in 1960. After the recession of 1958, the Eisenhower 
administration pursued a large budgetary surplus by closing many expenditure programs; 
their goal was to reduce inflation and strengthen confidence in the U.S. dollar. 
Eisenhower personally believed that maintaining a balanced budget was necessary to 
prevent another economic recession.83 But the unemployment rate rose from 5.0% in June 
1959 to 6.1% in October and reached 6.6% in December 1960.84 The 1960 election 
campaign and result cast the Eisenhower’s market promotion and fiscal conservativism as 
                                                                                                                                                  
automation on employment, see pp. 56–57; for General Electric’s evaluation, see pp. 431–32. D. J. Davis, 
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ineffective in reviving the deflated economy. During the campaign, even Vice President 
Richard Nixon distanced himself from Eisenhower’s austere policies. In contrast, 
Kennedy seemed poised and proficient in suggesting new ways to address industrial 
problems which, many believed, had plagued the national economy since WWII. Pundits 
and policy makers interpreted JFK’s victory as a mandate to apply innovative economic 
policy strategies. Continuous frustration with intractable industrial conflicts also led to 
broad acknowledgment of the need for a new approach to solve the crisis in the New Deal 
industrial order. 
Among the many innovative advisors that Kennedy brought to Washington, 
Labor Secretary Arthur Goldberg was best poised to address the labor-management 
conflict, automation, and industrial growth. Goldberg had served as general counsel to 
United Steelworkers of America (USW) and had provided legal advice to the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (CIO) when it merged with the American Federation of Labor 
(AFL) in 1955. He also helped craft labor legislation, proposed by then-Senator Kennedy, 
which aimed to revise the pro-business Taft- Hartley Act. 
Goldberg’s experience in negotiating a 1959 accord with major steel companies 
for the USW qualified him to navigate the nation’s intractable industrial conflicts. When 
an industry alliance led by U.S. Steel sought to roll back organized labor’s shop 
jurisdiction over workforce allocation by drastically revising Section 2B of the previous 
collective bargaining contract, Goldberg and union leader David McDonald argued that 
the change would completely undermine the union’s power in the workplace. If the union 
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could not protect its members from layoffs due to technological change, it would lose its 
raison d’être to rank-and-file members.85 
The late 1950s battles over Section 2B reflected a deepening crisis in the New 
Deal order. Section 2B required management to consult with union leadership concerning 
new technologies that would substitute machines for human labor. As foreign competitors 
began offering cheaper products by using cheaper metals like aluminum instead of 
expensive steel, major steel companies were compelled to become more efficient. In this 
context, U.S. Steel President Roger Blough successfully persuaded leaders of other steel 
companies to hold a hard line against Section 2B and the USW’s demands for higher 
wages and expanded benefits.86 
Major steel companies declared they would provide no improvements in wages 
and benefits until Section 2B was revised or removed. The USW walked out of 
negotiations over this unacceptable demand, steelworkers went on strike, and the 
Eisenhower administration reluctantly intervened by issuing a Taft-Hartley injunction on 
November 7, 1959, forcing workers to return to their jobs for eighty days. The USW and 
steel industry alliance were supposed to resume negotiations during that period. If both 
sides failed to reach an agreement, rank-and-file union members would vote on 
management’s final offer. In a context of relatively high unemployment and widespread 
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economic anxiety, workers leaned toward approving management’s offer, preferring to 
keep their jobs even if it meant sacrificing the union’s power on the shop floor.87 
Despite declining rank-and-file support, Goldberg led the USW to a stunning 
victory in January 1960 in its defensive war against the industry alliance by forging an 
innovative approach to management’s effort to protect its prerogative to control 
technology. In collaboration with Edgar Kaiser, who was the chief executive officer of 
Kaiser Steel Corporation, Goldberg proposed a tripartite study committee tasked with 
fostering collaboration among labor and management in order to reorganize production to 
regain competitiveness in international markets. This innovative proposal disrupted the 
steel industry’s united front against the USW as Kaiser Steel, a leading manufacturer, 
broke ranks and invited labor’s collaboration. The announcement of the proposal on 
October 25, 1959 also shifted public perceptions by envisioning possibilities beyond 
zero-sum labor-management conflict.88 
The tripartite committee created in the Kaiser Steel Corporation on December 8, 
1959 also awakened policymakers to the possibility of greater public interventions in the 
labor market.89 Indeed, after bargaining between the USW and Kaiser Steel was 
publicized, the Eisenhower administration retreated from its openly probusiness position, 
which had been evidenced by its issuance of the Taft-Hartley injunction in favor of the 
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steel companies. In December 1959, Vice President Nixon intervened to end steelworker 
strikes by forcing other steel company CEOs to accept deals similar to the one struck 
between Kaiser Steel and the USW two months earlier. That agreement provided 
increasing wages to a moderate degree, leaving Section 2B unchanged, and created 
tripartite committees for a long-term study of automation, productivity, wage increases, 
and their relations with each other.90 For the USW, this settlement was a big victory 
because it achieved not only an increase in wages, albeit lower than the union’s request, 
but also protection of the union’s power in the workplace. The latter was possible because 
the idea of creating tripartite committees helped labor and management avoid an 
immediate showdown over Section 2B. 
Goldberg’s suggestion of this tripartite committee, which would become known 
as the Kaiser Committee, was innovative in two ways. First, it created a new institutional 
venue to discuss complex issues such as Section 2B, which union leaders viewed as a 
vital preserve of labor power, but which was perhaps becoming anachronistic in a world 
of advancing technology and growing competition. As steel strikes in 1949, 1952, 1955, 
1956, and 1959 had shown,91 the existing collective bargaining platform was not 
adequate for deliberation on the confluence of evolving technologies, pressures, markets, 
and opportunities. The tripartite committee was a better forum for navigating this tangled 
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web by involving public representatives with impartial expertise to address industrial 
problems. Public officials could steer conversations in a productive direction by 
promoting issue linkage, developing best industry practices, and promoting coherent 
industry-wide responses to changing structural realities. Compared to the more rigid 
decision-making structures of tripartite committees within West European corporatist 
systems—where labor and business members have legal mandates to decide on behalf of 
their hierarchically organized associations and state representatives play the role of 
impartial arbitrators and ruthless enforcers of deals—the emphasis on deliberation in the 
Kaiser Committee was an innovation providing more flexibility in organizing tripartite 
committees.92 
The Kaiser Committee experiment was also innovative in including public 
representatives active in industrial dispute resolution such as John Dunlop, David Cole, 
and George Taylor, who brought impartial expertise to the committee’s proceedings, 
promoting what they saw as the public good: the simultaneous achievement of industrial 
peace and economic progress.93 After Edgar Kaiser accepted the list of public 
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representatives from Goldberg, the Kaiser Committee sought to make a “plan for 
equitable sharing between the stockholders, the employes [sic] and the public of the fruits 
of the company’s progress” during the two-year contract between the USW and Kaiser 
Steel Corporation.94 Enlarging the scope of industrial conflicts through public members 
had already been attempted in the National War Labor Board during WWII. The board 
also was a place to train experienced arbitrators after the war. However, its tasks were 
limited to settling labor disputes on wage differentials and stabilizing wages.95 Under 
“no-strike and no-lockout” pledges, the National War Labor Board provided institutional 
protection for labor against the rising tide of conservatism inside and outside of Congress, 
which was necessary for President Roosevelt to maintain his governing coalition. Public 
representatives were expected to address wage disputes. In comparison, the Kaiser 
Committee focused more on how organized labor and management could modify their 
bargaining positions when faced with changing market environments and demands for 
automation. In this setting, the public members’ role extended from arbitrators stabilizing 
the New Deal order to ardent participants in innovation. The next section explores in 
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detail the role that Goldberg envisioned for public representatives in nationalizing 
industrial issues and devising a new approach. 
The steel industry was not alone in setting up tripartite study committees to 
address automation. When Armour and Company, a dominant player in the meat-packing 
industry, decided to close six production plants in major cities including Chicago, 
management and labor clashed over the decision. The dispute was resolved when three 
concerned groups—management at Armour and Company, the United Packinghouse 
Workers, and the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen—formed a tripartite 
study committee to collectively address the closure. Under the chairmanship of Clark 
Kerr, who was president of the University of California, Amour’s Tripartite Automation 
Committee deliberated on automation’s effect on the meat-packing industry and sought 
solutions based on the research of academics who served on the committee as impartial 
public representatives.96 This uniquely American way of organizing tripartite committees 
brought research and public expertise to bear on complex industrial issues. Unlike their 
West European neocorporatist counterparts, tripartite committees in the United States 
lacked authority to make binding decisions impacting labor and industry. Perhaps 
because of their lack of unilateral power to put an end to industrial conflicts, U.S. 
tripartite committees widened possibilities for labor-management collaboration. 
Goldberg’s experience of resolving the 1959 steel industry dispute by 
championing a new tripartite institutional form won him political capital among 
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organized labor and its Democratic Party allies. As a result, President Kennedy tapped 
Goldberg to serve as his Secretary of Labor. Goldberg brought to that position his 
experience in working on industrial issues on the Kaiser tripartite committee, such as 
intensifying market competition, recurring breakdowns in collective bargaining, 
recession-induced unemployment, and declining real wages in face of stubborn inflation. 
Goldberg’s experience persuaded president-elect Kennedy to form a nationwide tripartite 
committee, called the President’s Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy, in 
February 1961. The next section explains how Goldberg applied lessons learned from his 
Kaiser Committee experience to organize the LMAC in ways designed to try to overcome 
intractable industrial conflicts. 
 
Embarking on a Tripartite Experiment in 1961 
On February 16, 1961, President Kennedy, following Goldberg’s advice, created 
the President’s Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy through Executive 
Order 10918. As Labor Secretary, Goldberg tried to address industrial conflicts on a 
national scale by applying the tripartite bargaining model across industries. This section 
explores how Goldberg’s entrepreneurship enabled him to lead the foreign tripartite 
committee to address industrial conflicts, despite the allegedly numerous institutional and 
cultural constraints on American tripartism. 
Goldberg did not simply seek to enlarge the Kaiser Committee model beyond the 
steel industry, knowing that simple replication might not work in other industries. 
Business managers, as strategic actors, were willing to learn from the successes and 
failures of other managers in dealing with labor-management issues, and they had little 
60 
incentive to join a nationwide tripartite committee if it would require them to surrender a 
degree of managerial control to antagonistic governmental and labor forces. They openly 
resisted allowing public representatives to participate in the committee and take side with 
labor representatives. Business managers worried about being outnumbered in the 
committee even though it was unclear what kind of legal authority the nationwide 
tripartite committee would have. Various industrial actors expressed concern when many 
newspapers introduced Goldberg to the public in mid-December 1960 as a Labor 
Secretary nominee, along with his plan to create a tripartite committee to promote 
industrial peace. The National Association of Manufacturers, although relieved by 
Goldberg’s presence at its annual meeting on December 7, 1960 (a few days before his 
nomination) and by the future labor secretary’s stated opposition to compulsory 
arbitration of labor-management disputes, still voiced its strong opposition to the possible 
creation of any legal requirement for outside arbitration by the Kennedy administration.97 
On February 4, the New York Times reported that business leaders and labor unionists 
expressed concerns that a nationwide tripartite committee such as the LMAC might 
displace conventional forms of collective bargaining.98 If the LMAC were given power to 
determine the collective bargaining agenda, both labor and management would be 
deprived of their previous rights to decide the terms of their contracts. 
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Recognizing these challenges, what did Goldberg hope to accomplish by 
proposing a national tripartite committee after he was nominated to become Secretary of 
Labor in December 1960? Were Goldberg and his staff so naive as to suggest that the 
new President waste his limited political capital on a futile experiment?99 Or were they 
audacious enough to believe that the tripartite committee would thrive under the 
leadership of the new president, who had won the election by a razor-thin margin, despite 
business’s ascendancy in the previous decade? Given Goldberg’s political savvy and 
earlier career successes, such scenarios are unsatisfactory. 
Goldberg and his staff sought to persuade stakeholders to take part in their 
institutional experiment by combining multiple policy goals in an unconventional way. 
Once it was tasked with new goals, such as recovering national competitiveness and 
finding consensual ways to apply new machinery to the workplace, the LMAC and its 
stipulated goals in the executive order looked less dangerous to both labor and business. 
Section II of the executive order explicitly links these diverse goals: 
The Committee shall study, and shall advise with and make 
recommendations to the President with respect to, policies that may be 
followed by labor, management, or the public which will promote free and 
responsible collective bargaining, industrial peace, sound wage and price 
policies, higher standards of living, and increased productivity. The 
Committee shall include among the matters to be considered by it in 
connection with its studies and recommendations (1) policies designed to 
ensure that American products are competitive in world markets, and (2) 
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the benefits and problems created by automation and other technological 
advances.100 
 
This passage first highlights the urgent goal of bringing management and labor together 
to avoid costly strikes. It then addresses consumers’ concern for improving real wages in 
the context of creeping inflation and rising unemployment. Finally, it addresses the issue 
of automation that had animated the 1959 steel-labor dispute over Section 2B. The 
executive order explicitly also linked issues of industrial peace and automation to the goal 
of rebuilding industrial global market competitiveness.  
Goldberg and his staff linked these four goals in order to avoid unnecessary 
conflicts before the experiment got underway. Goldberg broadened the scope of industrial 
conflicts beyond competition among interest groups and called public attention to 
overarching economic issues such as automation and inflation. The LMAC became a 
conduit for spreading Goldberg’s agenda and a venue where leading industrialists could 
participate in the experiment without bringing inflexible positions to the committee. If the 
LMAC had not purposefully linked structural changes in markets to sectoral labor-
management issues, it would have become bogged down in the kinds of stalemates that 
had previously occurred between labor and business.101 
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The organizational characteristics of the LMAC call attention to how Goldberg 
and his staff designed the committee to persuade representatives of diverse interests to sit 
together and discuss thorny issues. The LMAC required unanimous agreement on 
important decisions. This design stands in stark contrast to the top-down decision-making 
structures of neocorporatist European tripartite committees. The absence of a centralized 
LMAC decision-making mechanism was an intentional gambit by Goldberg, rather than 
evidence of enduring weakness of American coordinating mechanisms. One might argue, 
relying on Varieties of Capitalism, that “because trade unions and employer associations 
in LMEs [Liberal Market Economies] are less cohesive and encompassing,” it might be 
institutionally dysfunctional to have a centralized decision-making mechanism at the 
national level.102 The committee’s participants also seemed hostile to a hierarchical way 
of reaching an overarching agreement across industries due to their long-shared 
voluntarism. Furthermore, scholars of the American state might argue that the U.S. 
government is simply incapable of coordinating conflicting interests through tripartism 
because U.S. industrialization, preceding the establishment of modern bureaucracy, 
rendered the federal government organizationally underdeveloped and jurisdictionally 
fragmented, as well as limited by federalism. Consequently, Goldberg seemed to have no 
other option but to leave the committee decentralized, which in a sense foreshadowed the 
dim prospects of the LMAC. 
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It would have been possible to make the committee more centralized than it was 
by allowing divided votes among the committee members and using majority rule to 
decide what to suggest to the president. Hypothetically, the LMAC could have been a 
device for the Kennedy administration to unilaterally champion its agenda if it had been 
provided with powerful chairmanship and pro-government members who were friendly to 
Kennedy’s goal of providing jobs to the unemployed.103 But Goldberg did not choose this 
option because he knew it would produce no meaningful change in the conflictual labor-
management relations of the 1950s. In the first LMAC meeting, Goldberg instead guided 
all the committee’s members to discuss its procedures and internal rules. They reached a 
conclusion that the LMAC should not quell individuals’ dissenting voices for the sake of 
coherency, although the committee should strive to reach decisions by the principle of 
consensus. When summarizing the discussion, Goldberg reaffirmed that the government 
would not use the LMAC as leverage to enforce government guidelines upon industrial 
actors.104 This made the LMAC less threatening to industrialists, who were very sensitive 
to the danger of being outnumbered by representatives of labor and the public in 
collective decisions. 
                                                 
103 Notice that the ability to establish a more centralized committee does not guarantee its success. But the 
purpose of forming an institution outside of regular bureaucracy can be varied, regardless of its prospect of 
success. For the various roles that the committee or commission can play in bringing policy change within 
the government, see Patrik Marier, “The Power of Institutionalized Learning: The Uses and Practices of 
Commissions to Generate Policy Change,” Journal of European Public Policy 16 (2009): 1204–23, at 
1209–10. 
104 Records of U.S. Department of Labor, Roll 72, LMAC Meeting No. 1, at 3–4, at the John F. Kennedy 
Presidential Library (hereafter, JFK Library). 
65 
Furthermore, the LMAC’s stipulated goals were assigned respectively to five 
subcommittees, each chaired by a public representative. This division of labor granted 
greater autonomy and agency to committee members in discussing issues. Although its 
decentralized structure tended to slow the LMAC’s capacity to assemble reports and form 
recommendations, it enabled Goldberg to head off and dampen potential conflicts by 
giving more leeway to individual LMAC members. 
The five subcommittees addressed: 1) collective bargaining; 2) economic growth 
and unemployment; 3) automation, productivity, and the standard of living; 4) 
international industrial competitiveness; and 5) wage and price policies. The five sub-
committees were to submit initial reports on their topics. The members of the committee 
were each assigned to at least two subcommittees.105 Public representatives, except the 
Secretaries of Commerce and Labor, presided over each subcommittee to enhance the 
impartiality of discussion within it. When a subcommittee completed a draft of the report 
on its topic, the entire LMAC discussed the draft in its monthly meeting, finalized the 
content, and sent it to the White House. For instance, Subcommittee No. 1 was to submit 
an initial report on collective bargaining, which would be discussed in the LMAC’s 
general meeting. Without a strong scientific basis for a rebuttal, the other individual 
members of the LMAC could not easily oppose what a subcommittee had suggested once 
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it reached an agreement. This seemed to be the intention of Goldberg and his staff in 
decentralizing the LMAC’s functioning, despite the limit for Goldberg in influencing 
ways in which the five topics were discussed in the subcommittees. 
Opposing members, primarily business representatives who resisted greater 
public regulatory authority in labor-management relations, intervened in subcommittee 
discussions by submitting dissenting remarks prior to the subcommittee’s final 
recommendations. Opponents also threatened to append dissenting statements to official 
policy proposals to undermine the significance of the reports’ findings. Such threats 
became bargaining chips in efforts to negotiate more modest policy proposals. 
The design features of unanimous consent and the decentralization of authority 
across subcommittees, combined with the LMAC’s broad and difficult mission, placed 
the committee on a path toward conflict. The next section analyzes how the LMAC’s 
design created a sui generis politics in regard to national economic policies. 
 
The Politics of the LMAC 
By articulating in a new way the various industrial problems of the U.S. 
manufacturing sector, the LMAC enabled those who had been feuding at the collective 
bargaining table to sit together in a national tripartite committee. Frequent production 
stoppages and the gradual deterioration of U.S. competitiveness in world markets had set 
the stage for policy entrepreneurs to embark on this experiment.  
But Goldberg’s approach of designing the tripartite committee in a non- 
authoritative way to overcome entrenched positions soon reignited turf wars between 
labor and management. Deliberative processes were quickly undermined as business and 
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labor representatives turned to inflexible policy discourses. Policy fissures first appeared 
in Subcommittee No. 3 on automation and technological advance, followed by 
Subcommittee No. 1 on free and responsible collective bargaining and industrial peace. 
Additionally, the LMAC’s decentralized structure, initially envisioned as a means of 
defusing conflict, promoted more schisms among members throughout the deliberative 
process. This section elaborates how the politics of the LMAC played out via competing 
policy discourses and discusses what factors ultimately derailed Goldberg’s experiment. 
The first venue where a laborite automation policy discourse appeared and 
provoked business members’ anger was Subcommittee No. 3. In Summer 1961, the first 
official draft of “Automation and Technological Advance” went to all committee 
members before the fifth general meeting.106 The draft included a statement connecting 
automation and structural unemployment.107 It stated that “high unemployment is an 
unacceptable price to pay for progress. The problem, therefore, is how to encourage 
progress, in the form of automation and technological change, while at the same time, 
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maintaining full employment.”108The report recommended shortening work hours among 
the employed to offer jobs to those laid off due to automation. The report did not specify 
whether those still employed would be paid less than before. Neither did the report 
discuss the employers’ additional financial burden in providing fringe benefits to the 
newly hired. This left unaddressed the possibility that employers would bear the costs of 
hiring additional workers for the new positions that shortening work hours would create, 
without benefiting from expanded productive capacity or profit margins. 
The statement immediately drew an angry response from Henry Ford II of the 
Ford Motor Company.109 Ford maintained that the report’s assumption that increased 
unemployment was attributable primarily to employers’ decisions to automate production 
was scientifically unproven and politically unacceptable. He also claimed that in 
addressing unemployment, the report had drifted too far afield from the subcommittee’s 
charge to focus on automation and technological advance.110 In response, the 
subcommittee changed the report’s title from “Automation and Technological Advance” 
                                                 
108 “The Report of Subcommittee No. 3: Automation and Technological Advance”; and letter from 
Executive Director of the LMAC, W. Willard Wirtz, written on August 15, 1961; both in the WPR 
Collection, Box 387 Folder 6, Walter Reuther Library. 
109 Henry Ford II submitted two statements opposing the view of Subcommittee No. 3’s report. “Statement 
of Henry Ford II with Regard to Report of Subcommittee No. 3, President’s Advisory Committee on Labor-
Management Policy,” 4; received by Walter P. Reuther on October 13, 1961; and “Ford II with Regard to 
November 6, 1961 Report of Subcommittee No. 3,” November 24, 1961. Both documents were found in 
the WPR Collection, Box 387 Folder 9, Walter Reuther Library. 
110 “Statement of Henry Ford II with Regard to Report of Subcommittee No. 3, President’s Advisory 
Committee on Labor-Management Policy”; Received by Walter P. Reuther on October 13, 1961, page 1. 
Found in the WPR Collection, Box 387 Folder 9, Walter Reuther Library. 
69 
to “The Benefits and Problems Incident to Automation and Other Technological 
Advance.” 
The subcommittee’s effort failed to appease Ford, who offered scorching 
criticism of the subcommittee’s recommendation to shorten working hours. Ford and 
Arthur Burns, a pro-business public member of the LMAC and former chair of President 
Eisenhower’s Council of Economic Advisers, viewed the idea as an extra financial 
burden on business because it basically asked management to employ more people than 
was necessary to mitigate creeping unemployment, which was beyond their control. 
Furthermore, Ford and Burns argued that state meddling into managerial 
prerogatives, if the subcommittee’s recommendations became law, would discourage 
long-term private investment and was anathema to their free market principles.111 Despite 
revisions to appease Ford and Burns, their dissenting statements were included in the 
final report, published on January 11, 1962.112 This outcome undoubtedly diluted the 
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Policy, January 11, 1962 (Washington, D.C.), 9. The first two documents listed above were found in the 
WPR Collection, Box 387 Folder 9; the third document was found in Box 387, Folder 10, Walter Reuther 
Library. 
112 Another business member of the tripartite committee, Joseph L. Block from the Inland Steel Company, 
tried to find middle ground on the issue by modifying the expressions used in regard to shortening work 
hours. But this did not appease Ford II and Burns, either; see “Memorandum to All Committee Members,” 
with attachment of Block’s letter to Wirtz: “A letter from Executive Director Wirtz to Reuther,” November 
22, 1961, WPR Collection, Box 387 Folder 9, Walter Reuther Library. 
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political impact of the report and the LMAC’s activities, as indicated by an editorial from 
the New York Times.113 
Could the fight in Subcommittee No. 3 have been avoided or resolved more 
favorably? Was Goldberg’s experiment to break new ground beyond conflicting positions 
of labor and business destined to fail? A different possibility had existed at the LMAC’s 
inception, based on conjectures from the minutes from the second meeting of the full 
committee concerning “work hours.” 
The second meeting, held in the White House on May 1, 1961,114 discussed basic 
terms and approaches from various angles concerning automation. Three papers were 
presented by Curry M. Gillmore from the IBM Corporation, Stanley H. Ruttenberg from 
the AFL-CIO, and Seymour L. Wolfbein from the U.S. Department of Labor, 
representing the three tripartite parties. Participants discussed the issues raised by the 
papers. In the end, the authors and Clark Kerr synthesized the discussion and wrote a 
draft statement for media release, which the committee members approved at the end of 
the session. The committee reviewed, revised, and released this statement without 
controversy. 
Noticeably, the discussion at the May meeting did not address short-term 
unemployment through temporary measures such as shortened work hours. Instead, it 
focused on logics and methods to promote national economic growth with maximum 
employment, which had to do with the promotion of national industrial competitiveness. 
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114 “LMAC Minutes of No. 2 (May 1, 1961),” Records of Department of Labor, Roll 72, JFK Library. 
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Retraining workers to meet new market demands for skilled labor along with 
technological change was considered a means to achieve these goals. No one questioned 
the validity of structural employment. Public member Kerr led the discussion, sharing 
with the rest of the committee his experience as chairman of a tripartite committee with 
representatives from the Armour Company and two labor unions in the meat-packing 
industry.115 Kerr also argued for the necessity of examining European labor market 
policies, especially the Swedish model of connecting unemployment insurance to 
participation in job retraining programs. His suggestion interested several business and 
labor representatives, which later led to the LMAC hosting Swedish officials, 
businesspersons, and union leaders in the United States in March 1963.116 
While labor members Walter Reuther from the United Auto Workers and David 
McDonald from the United Steel Workers of America raised the issue of shortening work 
hours, this did not disrupt the conversation within the committee.117 They suggested the 
                                                 
115 The industry faced massive layoffs in upgrading production facilities in the 1950s, which had caused 
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above). 
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idea only as a means to achieve full employment on a voluntary basis, a goal even the 
most pro-business members in the meeting regarded as desirable. Arthur Burns, who had 
adamantly opposed government’s meddling with the market, joined labor representatives 
by saying that “a full employment economy would certainly create a much easier 
framework for solving the problem of structural unemployment ”118 Burns believed that 
employers in a full employment economy would be willing to train their unskilled 
employees, thus reducing structural unemployment, and that this method of increasing the 
skill level of the workforce would be more efficient than government training because the 
former would be for actual jobs.119 No one at the meeting promoted shortening work 
hours as one of their legislative goals. 
Given the different preferences over an idea of shortening work hours, one might 
argue, such a fight as in Subcommittee No. 3 would be unavoidable. According to this 
view, it would be just a matter of time before pro-business members would oppose the 
idea and derail the deliberations, even if they did not do so in the second meeting. 
However, in hindsight it is doubtful whether shortening work hours was really an issue 
that would divide the committee. Even Reuther, who first floated the idea of shortening 
work hours in the May meeting, was not sure of its effectiveness in addressing 
unemployment. Indeed, a year later, he refused to endorse a plan for establishing a 
mandatory reduction in hours through enactment of a new law, for fear of its side effects 
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on national productivity.120 There was no entrenched position shared by all labor 
representatives on this issue, which points out that it was possible for Goldberg to 
manipulate Subcommittee No. 3’s report by avoiding any recommendation to shorten 
work hours and thus avoid provoking business’s animosity. The LMAC’s media 
statement after its May meeting also showed that it was possible to avoid fruitless debates 
over the conceptual validity of structural unemployment. While the statement did not hide 
disagreements over automation and unemployment, it emphasized points of agreement. 
Above all, LMAC members agreed that “the achievement of general prosperity and 
highest practicable rate of overall economic growth is the best assurance against 
unemployment, including unemployment resulting from automation. With full 
employment the problems of adjustment to technological change are more easily solved; 
without it they can never be adequately met.”121 Instead of defining and promising to 
solve structural unemployment, LMAC members hoped to find a practical middle ground 
for maximizing employment and economic growth amid rising technological demands. 
This possibility vanished after Summer 1961, when Subcommittee No. 3’s 
recommendation that businesses voluntarily shorten work hours created an irresolvable 
schism between labor and business members. 
                                                 
120 “But,” Reuther stated in a hearing, “if you commit yourself rigidly to a lower level of hours either 
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Committee, January 1962 Economic Report of the President: Hearings before the Joint Economic 
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A similar fight broke out in Subcommittee No. 1 concerning responsible 
collective bargaining and industrial peace.122 Drawing on an earlier policy discourse, 
some business members rejected outright the subcommittee’s stated goal to enlarge the 
government’s role in collective bargaining. A draft of the subcommittee’s first report 
appeared in August 1961 with several proposals. They included the empowerment of a 
fact-finding committee, which would give the president more tools to intervene in 
industrial disputes by, for example, appointing those who were favorable to the president 
to the fact-finding committee, thus tacitly guiding the committee when information was 
needed, or using the committee to prod the parties into another round of voluntary 
bargaining.123 While the president already possessed tools such as issuing legal 
injunctions, seizing production facilities, and compelling binding arbitration in the case of 
national emergency, he was always hesitant to rely on them because they were too 
controversial to use. Thus, the president was usually inactive in industrial disputes, which 
led to prolonged labor-management conflicts. Thus, the draft emphasized the importance 
                                                 
122 A letter, “President’s Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy,” from Thomas E. Harris, 
Associate General Counsel for AFL-CIO, to Walter P. Reuther, with attachment of Subcommittee No. 1’s 
draft report. August 8, 1961, WPR Collection, Box 387, Folder 5, Walter Reuther Library. Subcommittee 
No. 1 consisted of David L. Cole (Chairperson, attorney), George Taylor (University of Pennsylvania), 
Clark Kerr (University of California), Joseph L. Block (Inland Steel Company), Richard S. Reynolds, Jr. 
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123 A series of nationwide strikes in the preceding decade seemed to become a new U.S. industrial norm, 
which led business as well as labor to start seeking alternatives to fruitless standoffs. Indeed, the country 
witnessed tumultuous confrontation between labor and management in the steel industry in 1952, which 
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Taft-Hartley Act. The problem was that Truman’s decision was neither effective in mediating conflicting 
interests with minimum damage to wartime production nor legally grounded. In June 1952, the Supreme 
Court declared the government’s nationalization of the steel industry unconstitutional. 
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of expanding the executive branch’s responsibility in such disputes beyond its traditional 
role as reluctant moderator of last resort. The text was ambiguous about the tools’ 
limitations on presidential intervention in industrial disputes, which required deliberation 
between labor and business members. Still, the draft was based on a broad consensus 
among LMAC members, who had learned from the preceding decade the necessity of 
revising the Taft-Hartley Act to discourage showdowns between labor and management. 
Henry Ford II submitted a brief statement in opposition to the subcommittee’s 
draft report, with two main objections.124 First, he did not share the draft’s assumption 
that employers should “furnish full information on prices, profits, unit costs, individual 
company productivity, and the like” in collective bargaining for the sake of the public 
interest. He viewed the request for such internal information as an unnecessary 
encroachment on business prerogatives because, from his standpoint, the purpose of 
collecting the list of information above was merely to confirm the labor union’s request 
for wage increases. Second, Ford argued that putting too much power in the president’s 
hands would undermine the principle of free bargaining. While Ford agreed that failures 
of collective bargaining inflicted high costs on society, he did not believe that expanding 
the president’s power over industrial relations would lead to better outcomes for the 
entire society if the system of private decision-making was sacrificed. 
Ford was concerned about the amount of information that employers were asked 
to submit to the fact-finding board for productive collective bargaining, rather than 
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ideologically rejecting all information sharing under all circumstances. Since labor 
members of the subcommittee also shared Ford’s fear of enlarging the president’s power, 
they took Ford’s opposition seriously.125 The subcommittee’s subsequent meetings 
demonstrated this.126 Members gradually narrowed the gap in opinion on the fact-finding 
committee and other suggested tools for the president to influence the disputes in an 
orderly manner. Scholars of corporatist institutions often neglect how such shared 
voluntarism in a specific context could provide common ground to promote tripartism. 
However, the amicable atmosphere started to unravel at the LMAC’s seventh general 
meeting, held on January 11– 12, 1962, after Subcommittee No. 3’s final report was 
announced to the public as well as to the president. 
The LMAC’s seventh general meeting was a catalyst for activating deep-rooted 
anti-labor sentiment among business members. The meeting first unanimously approved 
the final draft of Subcommittee No. 3’s report, leaving unchanged its recommendation of 
shortening work hours to mitigate automation-induced unemployment. Since the final 
draft of Subcommittee No. 3’s report was to be submitted to President Kennedy on that 
day, none raised a serious question on its contents. Some business members remained 
angry with that approval when discussing Subcommittee No. 1’s draft report on collective 
                                                 
125 In several general meetings, George Meany from the AFL-CIO, David McDonald from the USW, and 
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bargaining. As a result, they tapped into the legacy of labor-management adversarialism. 
Ford’s previous opposition to fact-finding committees and extra intervention tools for the 
president was no longer discussed. The agitated anti-labor sentiment among pro-business 
members set the terms of the following meetings. 
Despite an internal rule of the LMAC that meeting minutes would not include 
verbatim member exchanges, the culmination of the conflict between labor and business 
in the seventh general meeting became apparent in comments by Richard S. Reynolds, 
president of Reynolds Metals Company. He said Subcommittee No. 1’s report “contains 
the unwarranted implication that the Committee believes the employer’s right to lock-out 
should no longer be recognized.” He suggested including in the report the employer’s 
right to “let the employees strike or to impose a lock-out in appropriate situations.”127 
Ford seconded Reynolds’s point by emphasizing that the rights of employers should be 
articulated and qualified in the next draft of the report. Ford’s comment tacitly implied 
that growing industrial discord sprang mainly from abuses of union power.128 He 
suggested that the next draft include employers’ rights of lockout and permanent 
closeout. Goldberg, who chaired the meeting and attempted to quell the growing business 
insurrection by reaffirming the basic principles upon which the LMAC had initially 
agreed, insisted that 1) “collective bargaining be endorsed as the basic procedure” against 
third-party arbitration; 2) “the right to strike and lock-out be reaffirmed”; and 3) 
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collective bargaining continually be improved and made “more responsive to the national 
interest.”129 But Goldberg’s recitation of the committee’s founding principles failed to 
stop the acrimonious blame game, which carried over into subsequent meetings. 
The dormant conflicts became manifest in the ninth and tenth general meetings, 
when Ford invoked a union monopoly power discourse that resonated with Arthur Burns 
and Eliot B. Bell, editor of Business Week magazine. They condemned the committee’s 
effort to address problems of contemporaneous collective bargaining practices without 
addressing collective bargaining problems growing from union monopoly.130 In his 
written statement on the topic of collective bargaining in the LMAC, Ford argued that the 
collective bargaining problems had stemmed not from flawed bargaining practices but 
from “the excessive power of unions” attained by “their monopoly position and legal 
privileges.” Ford argued that the unions’ power needed to be “rexamined from the point 
of view of the public interest” before discussing any reform in collective bargaining 
practices.131 A similar accusation appeared in the ninth and tenth general meetings. In 
Ford’s, Burns’s, and Bell’s arguments, a union monopoly of power meant that unions had 
grown powerful enough to dictate wage levels by threatening strike action. Because the 
union monopoly of power discourse assumed the existence of a “fair wage” that would 
satisfy both the employer and the employee, any wage increase beyond the fair wage that 
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was forced on the employer by the threat or actual implementation of strike action was an 
example of the union exercising its monopolistic power to distort the market price of 
labor.132 Business’s discourse about union monopoly had already been developed before 
the 1950s. When President Harry S. Truman prepared for his reelection of 1948, after the 
Democrats’ defeat in the 1946 midterm elections, he changed his lukewarm attitude 
toward organized labor and the CIO to a wholehearted embrace. In response to the 
Truman administration’s political orientation and the ensuing re-establishment of an 
electoral alliance that ensured Democrats’ victory in 1948, conservative Republican 
employers mobilized against unions’ monopolistic power in setting wages and working 
conditions and rallied behind the banner of anti-unionism, delivering a stunning victory in 
overriding Truman’s veto of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.133 In three consecutive 
meetings from March to May 1962, LMAC business members tapped this ready-made 
discourse to nullify the previously shared goal of revising collective bargaining practices. 
In response, the labor representatives of the LMAC also used the monopoly of power 
discourse to argue in those three general committee meetings that the public should be 
concerned about the power of big business. The labor representatives blamed big business 
for closing production facilities without fully negotiating with labor unions, even though 
such lockouts could inflict considerable damage on the national economy.134 
                                                 
132 Nathan P. Feinsinger, “Union Monopoly Power and Responsibility,” Monthly Labor Review 81 (1958): 
601–02, at 601. 
133 Amberg, The Union Inspiration in American Politics, 143–44 (see note 75 above). 
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Meanwhile, business member Joseph Block from Inland Steel Company tried to 
contain the fallout by suggesting that Subcommittee No. 1 write a special report studying 
exclusively the monopoly power of labor and management, thus separating the explosive 
topic from Subcommittee No. 1’s collective bargaining report.135 To mitigate labor 
representatives’ concern that they were accused of being the sole cause for industrial 
conflicts, Block added to the special report the task of examining big business’s 
monopoly of power, such as U.S. Steel’s power to set product prices in relation to those 
of other businesses in the same sector. But its final report,136 published in May 1962, 
included a long list of addenda from both business and labor members concerning 
monopoly of power, whether union or business, that undermined the spirit of consensus 
of the tripartite experiment because the addenda criticized each other harshly. 
Because the Kennedy White House scheduled a Conference on National 
Economic Issues for May 21–22, 1962, and because the remaining subcommittees were 
still writing their initial reports, LMAC members cancelled the committee’s regular 
meetings in June and July 1962. Since the White House asked all LMAC members to 
play the roles of organizer and moderator for the conference, with more than 250 leaders 
from business, labor, and academia in attendance, the LMAC members were too busy to 
prepare for a regular LMAC general meeting in June in addition to the initial reports from 
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Policy,” May 1, 1962. 
81 
the subcommittees to which they were assigned. Also, as the initial reports from 
Subcommittees No. 1 and 3 revealed, the dormant fissure between labor and business 
members would need to be carefully addressed in preparing three subcommittees’ reports, 
which further delayed the LMAC’s general meeting to August 7.137 
Goldberg’s chairmanship expired on May 22, 1962,138 and he was nominated to 
the Supreme Court in August, which meant he could no longer prod the LMAC to tackle 
intractable industrial conflicts through concrete policy recommendations. Following the 
LMAC’s thirteenth general meeting, held on August 7, 1962, the LMAC’s new chair, 
Luther Hodges from the Commerce Department, made the LMAC’s discussions 
innocuous to all members by avoiding controversial topics such as reforming the 
coverage of collective bargaining and addressing the concentration of economic power by 
labor and business. In that general meeting, public representative Arthur Burns, who was 
in charge of Subcommittee No. 4 (tasked with writing an initial report on “Policies 
Designed to Ensure that American Products are Competitive in World Markets”), 
confessed that it was impossible for his subcommittee to write concrete but 
uncontroversial recommendations on the topic. His subcommittee’s suggestions had to be 
vague and general in order to upset no one in the LMAC. Business member Joseph Block 
from Inland Steel dissented from the draft report, questioning the usefulness of “so many 
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vague generalities” found in the draft’s suggestions.139 But no one supported him in the 
meeting. 
The LMAC’s thirteenth general meeting also decided to defer the study of 
economic power indefinitely. Block, who had suggested the study three months earlier in 
order to quell the internal fight over the union monopoly of power discourse, again 
opposed the deferral because he believed the same type of conflicts would recur when it 
was time to discuss the reforms of labor relations and managerial practices. However, 
when the majority of LMAC members preferred not to “reopen the old wound” under 
Luther’s chairmanship, Block finally complied.140 After that, the task of reviewing the 
macroeconomic topics presented by the Council of Economic Advisers and by the Bureau 
of Budget took the place of the LMAC’s previous major tasks of deliberating on 
technological changes, declining competitiveness, and labor-management conflicts. 
Goldberg’s experiment in creating a new institution for collectively devising innovative 
solutions for intractable industrial conflicts had stalled. The LMAC held its last general 
meeting of the Kennedy administration on October 29–30, 1963, to discuss corporate 
pension plans.141 
The legacy of labor-management adversarialism, consolidated by the LMAC’s 
business representatives’ discourse concerning unions’ monopoly of power, inflicted 
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irrecoverable damage to Goldberg’s experiment by permanently dividing the committee 
into two groups and forcing the public representatives to take the side either of labor or 
business. The failures did not stem from the weakness of the state or the inherent 
foreignness of tripartite institutions in the United States, as some scholars have 
implied.142 Neither did American voluntarism critically undermine the broad consensus 
for a new experiment upon which the committee was built. These factors became critical 
when they became intertwined with long-simmering industrial adversarialism for which 
rigid, pre-existing policy discourses acted as a conduit. In the end, the LMAC was torn 
apart from the inside. Goldberg’s entrepreneurship could not arrest the developing 
animosity between labor and management after the seventh general meeting. Goldberg 
mistakenly believed he could avoid the perils of entrenched interest-based conflict by 
diffusing power across decentralized, consensual institutions. This structure, however, 
preserved veto authority for business interests who were wary of new government 
interventions in the private sphere. Their use of that power diminished the LMAC’s 
intended function of promoting deliberation on solutions for the industrial conflicts, 
deliberation that would lead beyond entrenched positions. 
 
                                                 
142 The concept of institutional complementarities among the varieties of capitalism scholars “suggests that 
nations with a particular type of coordination in one sphere of the economy should tend to develop 
complementary practices in other spheres as well.” See Hall and Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism, 18 
(see note 57 above). 
84 
Epilogue and Conclusion: The Legacy of Failed Political Entrepreneurship 
and the Rise of Commercial Keynesianism after the LMAC Experiment 
Following Goldberg’s experiment, the LMAC became a device for government 
to sell its wages-and-prices guideposts to labor and management members. While 
tripartite members were still involved in income policy making under the chairmanship of 
Commerce Secretary Hodges, they no longer addressed structural problems such as the 
lack of skilled labor and deteriorating national industrial competitiveness. The committee 
also advised the president during national emergency disputes like the steel strike of 
1962, but its overall role grew marginalized.143 The LMAC raises two theoretical 
implications, nevertheless. 
First, Goldberg’s experiment, despite its failure, provides an insight about how 
political entrepreneurship works between institution and agency. Goldberg addressed the 
intractable 1950s industrial conflicts that concerned both U.S. management and labor by 
transforming the emergent tripartite experiments into a nationwide organization for 
coordination. What enabled him to graft a non-European coordinating institution onto the 
faltering New Deal order were several elements: extended roles for public representatives 
to apply their expertise passionately and try to bridge the gap between labor and 
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management; a creative manner of connecting separate policy goals and ideas in efforts to 
recover national industrial competitiveness; and the intended decentralization of 
authority. By exploiting the opportunities given to him to find a feasible organization 
format and attach new policy goals to it, Goldberg attempted to overcome the various 
obstacles to forming American tripartism. 
When Subcommittee No. 3’s recommendation for shortening work hours 
reignited the rhetoric of managerial prerogatives, the familiar turf wars kicked in, 
derailing Goldberg’s effort to nurture the collective capacity of meeting challenges 
arising from the discrepancy between new technologies and outmoded collective 
bargaining terms. In a sense, the LMAC was designed to reconfigure the traditional 
principle of voluntarism, according to which state actors could not intervene in bipartite 
contract negotiations by including the public representatives on the LMAC as 
stakeholders in collective bargaining. Doing so immediately invoked business’s hostility, 
which is not surprising to such scholars as Lichtenstein, who disproves the myth of the 
New Deal’s “labor-management accord.”144 Incessant conflicts erupted between labor and 
management under the disguise of accord from 1947 to the late 1970s. Juxtaposing 
managerial prerogatives with the unions’ alleged monopoly on the power to dictate wage 
levels through their threat of going on strike was a carefully honed strategy for business 
to win rhetorical battles. Subcommittee No. 3’s report activated it. 
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Goldberg failed to predict that the business representatives would tap into 
premade rhetoric in order to resist the reconfiguration of collective bargaining. While he 
was skilled at manipulating the 1950s structural unemployment discourse to warrant new 
tasks for the LMAC, he was clumsy at bringing the discursive battle between labor and 
business members under control. For instance, he could have met with Ford earlier in 
order to contain Ford’s disagreement with the concept of structural unemployment and 
hence avoid full-fledged rhetorical warfare over the unions’ monopoly of power. He also 
had insufficient time to respond to business’s aggression, since he was appointed to the 
Supreme Court, and thus left no lasting legacy on the institution. Without its ardent 
champion, the LMAC’s role dwindled during the rest of the Kennedy administration and 
completely stalled from November 1963 to February 1966. Although Johnson reactivated 
the LMAC on March 23, 1966, and it continued in existence until December 19, 1968, 
during that period it only had the role of affirming government’s macroeconomic policies 
for price stability.145 
The political entrepreneur eventually fails when ill-positioned to address 
contingencies that competitors make. In this tripartite experiment, the business 
representatives had stakes in enshrining the voluntaristic principle of excluding the third 
party’s role in shaping the terms of contracts. Had Goldberg actively engaged with the 
union’s monopoly of power discourse, he might have built upon his small victories and 
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opened up a new jurisdictional realm that would have enabled a third party such as the 
LMAC to set the terms of collective bargaining between labor and business concerning 
technological change.146 
The second theoretical implication of the failed experiment lies in its continuity 
with the broader currents of American political development. One might argue that the 
institutionalist approach based on functional complementarity could reach the same 
conclusion as this chapter has, and in a theoretically simpler manner. This argument 
appears to be true because it is not easy to track political contingencies in the tripartite 
experiment that shaped decisions. In this view, the general tendency of the U.S. economy 
toward laissez-faire suffices in answering the question of why there is no corporatism in 
America, and the LMAC is merely a minor anecdote. 
But that perspective misses the fact that the culmination of labor-management 
conflicts over the principle of voluntarism in collective bargaining was the major culprit 
in Goldberg’s failure. This failure set the stage for further encroachment on collective 
labor rights and for the uneven rise of individual employment rights in the long term, a 
process that Katherine Stone calls “industrial pluralism.”147 Since First National 
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB in 1981, employers have had no obligation to bargain with 
unions about management decisions “that fundamentally change the scope or direction of 
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the enterprise.”148 Labor unions could no longer challenge managerial decisions 
concerning plant locations, the introduction of new technology, and financial 
restructuring through mergers or takeovers. This was not the case in the previous, New 
Deal legal system. As explained in the Kaiser tripartite committee, the 1959 Steel Strike 
was over Section 2B of the previous bargaining contract, which required management to 
consult with union leadership about the application of new technologies. Under the New 
Deal system, management was unable to remove this section despite its long fight against 
the USW. Meanwhile, as the coverage of collective employees’ rights has diminished 
since the early 1980s, state courts and legislatures have become protectors of individual 
employees’ rights, a trend that Stone calls “industrial pluralism” because the coverage of 
individual employees’ rights protected by states varies and is sometimes insufficient.149 
The LMAC and its failure to modernize collective bargaining amid industrial 
challenges consolidated the American path toward industrial pluralism, seeding 
business’s long-term attack on union power in the following decades. In a sense, 
Goldberg’s tripartite experiment was an effort to create a new institutional platform for a 
broad social consensus that would renew the coverage of collective bargaining. The 
political entrepreneurs in the LMAC thought that the coverage by collective bargaining of 
such employers’ adaptive strategies as re-location, automation, layoffs, and 
subcontracting had to be recalibrated in order to avoid unproductive industrial conflicts. 
However, the failure of the tripartite experiment tied the hands of reform-minded policy 
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makers in the rest of the 1960s. Their defeat in rhetorical battles revealed that the public 
and labor representatives lacked strategies and the imagination to nullify business’s 
rhetorical attack. This partly explains why policy makers after Goldberg did not try to 
confront business rhetoric and resume the task of reforming collective bargaining. The 
task of modernizing New Deal labor relations drifted for more than a decade. Once the 
power balance between labor and management tipped irrecoverably toward the side of 
business in the early 1980s, business unilaterally reduced the scope of collective 
bargaining. In this regard, the failure of the LMAC was a key event in understanding the 
development of industrial pluralism in the United States, which those taking a purely 
institutional approach are unlikely to notice. 
The institutionalist approach also misses the rise of “growth liberalism” or 
“reactionary Keynesianism”150 after the failure of the LMAC experiment. For Keynesians 
like Walter Heller from the Council of Economic Advisers, the failure of the tripartite 
experiment seemed to promote their agenda for prioritizing macroeconomic policies over 
conflict-laden labor policies.151 Heller called for a $10 billion deficit through a temporary 
tax cut at the beginning of the Kennedy administration, but the president was not initially 
persuaded, because his priorities lay in balancing the budget and decreasing 
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unemployment.152 To the frustration of council members, Kennedy’s perspective on 
unemployment was largely shaped by the structural unemployment discourse after his 
visit to West Virginia during his campaign, making him concerned more with selective 
programs for the unemployed than with general tax cuts to increase total economic 
demand.153 In addition, there was little chance that the temporary tax cut would be passed 
in the House Ways and Means Committee, chaired by Wilbur D. Mills, and the Senate 
Finance Committee, chaired by Robert S. Kerr, because both committees stuck to a 
balanced budget principle.154 However, after the opportunity to reform labor-management 
relations and restructure U.S. labor markets through Goldberg’s experiment seemed to 
have been lost by May 1962, and as the possibility of another economic recession loomed 
large from the stock market crash in June, Keynesians swayed Kennedy to accept tax cuts 
and planned deficits, a policy shift revealed in Kennedy’s commencement address at Yale 
University in June 11, 1962.155 Kennedy’s New Frontier liberalism now turned its 
attention from public spending to the unconventional macroeconomic measure of cutting 
taxes while leaving government expenditures intact in order to stimulate the national 
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economy at that time, which some scholars describe as the full embrace of “growth 
liberalism” or “reactionary Keynesianism.”156 
This study has re-evaluated the conditions under which political entrepreneurship 
can work to change the system. Examining how the politics of the LMAC derailed 
Goldberg’s strategy of building a nonmarket coordinating institution enriches our 
understanding of the current features of American liberalism. Subsequent political 
developments such as industrial pluralism, and reactionary Keynesianism, which made 
the United States distinctive even among other liberal market economies—such as the 
United Kingdom—can be better understood through an understanding of Goldberg’s 
experiment. Given political science’s general bias toward studying only successful cases, 
we still have little knowledge about the emergent politics that political entrepreneurs 
create and their effects on subsequent political development. Through this chapter, I have 
aimed to help overcome that bias. 
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CHAPTER III 
WAR ON POVERTY AND ADULT TRAINING   
 
Introduction  
When the War on Poverty (WOP) was declared in 1964, it became evident that 
the federal government would focus exclusively on the disadvantaged who were not able 
to attain competitive jobs for themselves. Previous efforts to reconfigure U.S. labor 
markets after benchmarking European labor market policies seemed halted. Upgrading 
skills among the employed and the unemployed to meet challenges from technological 
change was no longer the most urgent task for the federal government to tackle when 
Johnson succeeded Kennedy in 1963 and was elected as president in 1964. In addition to 
the stalemate among tripartite committee members in the rise of business-management 
conflicts, described in the previous chapter, Johnson’s prioritizing the poverty issue 
rendered the task of reforming labor markets no longer politically urgent following the 
presidential election of 1964. Macroeconomic policies orchestrated by the Council of 
Economic Advisers (CEA) and supplementary social policies for the poor, suggested also 
by Chair of the CEA Walter Heller, had won over President Johnson. The influence of 
Department of Labor (DOL) and its support for employment policy dwindled. This turn 
in policy orientation frustrated policy entrepreneurs and politicians who championed 
various active labor market policies for the employed as well as the unemployed at the 
beginning of the Kennedy administration, which my previous chapter examines.  
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During the War on Poverty, the Johnson administration experimented with 
various programs to reinstate the hardcore poor both from rural and urban areas to labor 
markets. They remained unemployed despite Keynesian macroeconomic policy or “fine 
tuning” to boost aggregate economic growth while those who lost their jobs due to 
automation in the manufacturing sector seemed able to find jobs in other fields before 
long. Being aware of the limit of their macroeconomic measure in salvaging the hardcore 
poor, economists from the CEA and the Bureau of Budget designed a set of social 
programs under Johnson. After carefully choosing the slogan—the War on Poverty—to 
combine individual programs that had already been developed, President Johnson 
delegated power to Sargent Shriver, who had successfully led the Peace Corps, to bring 
the blueprint outlined by CEA economists into being.  
The philosophical underpinning of the social experiments—except the concept of 
community action that aimed to empower the poor by allowing their maximum feasible 
participation in programs and letting them decide the direction of reform—was that the 
most disadvantaged ought to change their internal personalities in order to be hired. 
School dropouts and the children of welfare recipients became major targets in the 
experiments because they lost their opportunities for being legitimate members of society 
at an early stage of their lives. Both the Job Corps and the Neighborhood Youth Corps, 
two major training programs in the WOP, recruited youngsters to teach them a work 
ethic, reading, communicating skills, and basic calculation. The task of training poor 
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youth for entry-level jobs became intertwined with that of rehabilitating them from 
mental and physical hardships.157  
The nebulous goal of training poor youth—whether for jobs or to rehabilitate 
their health—created a serious evaluation problem during the WOP period. By design, 
whether the Job Corps and the Neighborhood Youth Corps had succeeded or not was 
hard to tell because gauging the change in enrollees’ internal characteristics was not easy. 
The job placement rate after graduation might be a proxy for the programs’ effectiveness. 
But it was still incomplete in measuring enrollees’ internal change that the programs 
allegedly brought about. What was worse, it was financially hard to track graduates’ 
long-term status and make a fair judgment of the effectiveness of the programs in 
reinstating them to the labor markets.  
The difficulty in evaluating the Job Corps and Neighborhood Youth Corps had 
undermined any training program sponsored by the federal government. Their effect on 
relieving poverty was perceived by much of the American public as dubious at best 
because their immediate effect was small, and fraudulent at worst because the programs 
seemed to play the role of income maintenance for those who were unwilling to work. 
Without tangible achievements to get the enrollees to find jobs—or without available 
tools to measure the internal change of enrollees—the programs easily fell prey to 
conservatives criticizing the government for squandering the taxpayers’ money. A series 
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of urban uprisings,158 culminating in the 1967 Detroit Riot, further damaged the moral 
ground of the training programs.  
For those who are familiar with the perspective of American exceptionalism, 
such unsuccessful records as in the WOP programs are not surprising at all. The United 
States had been known for an innate resistance to efforts to install social programs that 
would aim to decrease inequalities among the public by allowing the state to intervene in 
individuals’ decisions. While the Johnson administration’s goal to decrease political and 
economic inequalities garnered wide support initially from the public, it was basically 
against the principle of voluntarism, that individuals should be on their own. Considering 
the alleged general tendency for voluntarism in the United States, the WOP programs 
were destined to fail once the temporary consensus for the state’s active intervention in 
salvaging the needy dissipated.  
In this regard, one should question the value of reexamining a series of social 
policy developments during the 1960s in light of current contexts. Beyond the 
conventional interpretation from the perspective of American exceptionalism of the 
allegedly destined failure of the War on Poverty and Great Society during the 1960s, 
what types of new knowledge can be gleaned in historical and social-scientific research? 
An overview of the theory of American exceptionalism would eventually reveal what we 
know, or what we believe to know, and what we don’t know about 1960s social policy 
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developments. Hence this chapter’s research on the War on Poverty programs is placed in 
a broad academic context.  
Scholars of American exceptionalism have observed several factors that make 
the United States distinctive among advanced industrial countries. Alexis de Tocqueville, 
to whom many scholars refer in building their arguments on American exceptionalism, 
attributes the distinctiveness of the United States among the industrialized and 
democratized societies to its absence of feudalism.159 Such feudal legacies as 
organizational hierarchies that historically burgeoned inside and outside of Catholic and 
Orthodox churches, social orders based on status that often invoke class consciousness 
between the rich and the poor, or centralized bureaucracy designed to enhance ancient 
regimes’ efficiency in collecting money from subjects, do not exist in the United States. 
As Tocqueville emphasizes in his introductory chapter of Democracy in America, the 
absence of feudal legacies made the general equality of conditions for the American 
public central to their political and social lives. Tocqueville derived the strong tendency 
of self-governing among the American public from the equality of conditions.160   
To this “absence of feudalism” Louis Hartz adds “the presence of the liberal 
idea” in explaining the exceptional qualities of the United States.161 The American liberal 
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idea, which Hartz describes as “Lockian,”162 guided New Deal reformers to not deviate 
from mainstream “irrational” liberalism. It’s irrational because Hartz believes there was 
neither a social movement for liberalism nor liberal political parties throughout U.S. 
history, unlike European counterparts. Americans are just born Lockian liberal and have 
an unexplainable attachment to “Lockian” individualism.163 Such attachment to 
liberalism, Hartz argues, caused Franklin D. Roosevelt to focus on experimenting with 
pragmatic solutions rather than on enlarging untrustworthy bureaucracy and meddling 
with sacred property rights.164 “A faith in property, a belief in class unity, a suspicion of 
too much state power, a hostility to the utopian mood,” of which American liberalism is 
composed, had narrowed the range of New Deal reforms.165 Hartz’s analysis of American 
liberalism in the New Deal affects those who review another wave of social reforms in 
the 1960s.  
Seymour Martin Lipset furthered Hartz’s findings by providing more systemic 
cross-national comparisons of values and aggregate economic indexes.166 According to 
him, the American “Creed,” composed of “liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, 
populism, and laissez-faire,”167 promoted the general propensity among U.S. citizens 
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against statism or any extended role for the state in economic and welfare policies.168 
Prior to the Great Depression, U.S. labor movements ranging from the moderate 
American Federation of Labor (AFL) to the radical Industrial Workers of the World 
(IWW) were indifferent to the issue of expanding public welfare programs for the 
working class and the underprivileged out of their suspicion of the government.169 Lipset 
believes it shows how the American creed delayed the rise of modern welfare systems in 
the United States.  
Some scholars take a different path toward American exceptionalism based on a 
societal or so-called power resource approach.170 The existence of well-organized labor 
unions and labor parties that represent them in the public sphere is assumed as a 
necessary condition for the rise of the modern welfare state. Since Werner Sombart asked 
in 1906 why there was no socialism in America, scholars have delved into American 
labor movements’ weakness in their organizational capacities and their ideological 
ambivalence compared to their European counterparts—especially the Social Democratic 
Party in Germany (SPD) before WWI. Assuming that organized labor’s preference for 
welfare is fixed throughout history—which is problematic to those who are skeptical of 
the essentializing tendency of American exceptionalism in perceiving the preferences of 
                                                 
168 Ibid., 22; 74; 252.  
169 Ibid., 95.  
170 Vicente Navarro, “Why Some Countries Have National Health Insurance, Others Have National Health 
Services, and the U.S. Has Neither,” Social Science & Medicine 28, no. 9 (1989): 887–898; Gøsta Esping-
Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
99 
social groups as even and fixed,171 scholars want to show how weak U.S. organized 
labor’s political power is and how it has resulted in underdeveloped or residual welfare 
programs. 
A group of institutionalists pay attention to institutional characteristics of the 
American state and its influence on the ways in which societal interests are mediated in 
the United States to explain the underdeveloped American welfare system.172 First, 
external institutional characteristics have made welfare reform in the United States 
difficult. Federalism renders it difficult for a reform-minded group to embark on a 
wholesale welfare reform because state governments can easily resist such effort in the 
distributed power structure. The principle of checks and balances also increases the 
possibility for reform to be derailed by stakeholders who can make use of institutionally 
guaranteed access to the decision making process and obstruct the reform. The U.S. two-
party system deters the development of programmatic party systems because two parties 
are incentivized to fight over the median voter instead of developing their own distinctive 
social programs before examining public opinions on the issues.173  
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Second, the institutionalists also pay attention to internal institutional 
characteristics and the politics that institutional settings engendered in mediating interests 
of various societal groups and the public administration. State actors or policymakers can 
develop quite distinctive policy preferences isolated from those of societal actors. Also, 
“the organizational structures of states indirectly influence the meanings and methods of 
politics for all groups in society”174 through policy feedback effects or the tendency of 
path dependence in policy developments. Policy choices made at one point influence 
subsequent policy options by narrowing the range of feasible policy options. For instance, 
according to Orloff and Skocpol, when the progressives attempted to reform American 
welfare systems, they had to do it in the context of their fight against the spoils system of 
19th America.175 That is, reformers could not take into consideration making another 
powerful branch in the state government to run new welfare programs for fear of its 
corruptibility, even though they wanted to address the shortcomings of the American 
residual welfare system. They had to “keep the state out of new realms of social 
spending” 176 by allowing a newly created third party to regulate new welfare programs, 
as shown in Orloff and Skocpol’s case study of Massachusetts before the 1920s.177  
Reflecting the theory of American exceptionalism, the failure in the 1960s social 
experiments are regarded as unsurprising and predictable. Scholars believe that the 
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difficulty of WOP programs in achieving their declared goal of eradicating poverty in the 
United States was innate in the American political and cultural contexts.178 For them, the 
rollback of many WOP programs was inevitable because those policy experiments to 
address the hardcore poor did not fit the cultural and institutional qualities of the U.S. 
society. Scholars, relying on the policy feedback effect and the path-dependent tendency 
that preceding policy choices created, also perceive the War on Poverty in the Johnson 
administration as a watershed moment that strengthened the alleged U.S. liberal tendency 
against comprehensive social programs. According to them, the nation’s ability to reform 
its labor markets became culturally and institutionally limited after undergoing the WOP. 
The failure in sustaining the WOP made the American public suspicious of the 
government’s training programs in general. The Department of Labor aimed to reform 
market-related institutions for skilled labor to meet new demands from the labor market 
at the beginning of the Kennedy administration. Instead, the Johnson administration 
aimed to remove barriers in achieving equal economic opportunities for racial minorities 
by punishing bigotry and discriminatory practices still prevalent in U.S. labor markets. 
The Johnson administration also attempted to equip unemployed youth with basic skills 
for entry-level jobs. No active labor market policy, such as reskilling and deep skill 
development following European labor market policies for the broader strata of people 
was considered in fighting the War on Poverty. Training in the WOP setting offered only 
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basic education, which often had a stigmatizing effect on trainees. In this sense, the WOP 
training policy departed from the previous Labor-Management Advisory Committee 
(LMAC) emphasis on labor-business coordination to recover national industrial 
competitiveness through a better prepared manpower. After witnessing racial revolts in 
the late 1960s in urban areas where experiments in training programs for the poor 
occurred, the American public started to see all sorts of government training programs as 
economically wasteful and politically corrupt. Any effort to supplement the function of 
labor markets in the United States through active labor market policy became unpopular, 
along with policymakers, since the War on Poverty.  
This exceptionalist explanation has undoubted merit in grasping a chronicled 
deterioration of the American welfare state throughout the 1960s and the rollback of 
many social programs in subsequent U.S. history. We can learn from the conventional 
application of the American exceptionalism perspective to the 1960s WOP programs that 
many factors including ideological, institutional, and political inside and outside the 
administration prevented a series of the Johnson administration’s social experiments from 
being fully developed and successfully implemented. The Johnson administration also 
had insurmountable difficulty in forging a durable political coalition inside and outside of 
Congress for the government’s social expenditures, mainly because the administration 
narrowly targeted the poor as the programs’ major beneficiaries who had no leverage to 
pressure politicians to act on their behalf. Social programs failed to survive 
conservatives’ attacks in the following years. 
 However, we still do not know much from the exceptionalist perspective about 
what policy experiments were tried and under which contexts they were attempted. 
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Previous researchers leave many policy developments during the WOP unexplained. 
WOP programs were not designed in a coherent manner by a single agency or a few 
masterminds. Instead they were designed and revised by multiple agencies at different 
times. Thus, the training programs were incoherent and layered, depicted as “layering” by 
Schickler or Mahoney and Thelen, and as “intercurrence” or simultaneous operation of 
different political orders by Orren and Skowronek.179 In addition, the WOP training 
programs often reflected the influence of external events that required immediate policy 
responses from the Johnson administration. Consequently, the WOP training programs 
could not be easily grouped as a package of similar policies that expected to share a 
common public philosophy or a consensual policy assumption on the targeted population. 
Also, the conventional approach to expected failures in waging the WOP pays 
little attention to the capacity of the U.S. federal government to make use of unexpected 
opportunities. Its diversity in organization, allegedly known for its ineffectiveness and 
organizational weakness in the American exceptionalism perspective, could also promote 
policy experiments that were not completely controlled by a single powerful organization 
like the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) or Office of Economic Opportunity 
(OEO).180 Despite the OEO’s emphasis on the community action program that 
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emphasized empowering the poor and letting them decide how to use the money that the 
federal government gave to them, it did not mean that the racial politics that the 
community action programs generated had determined the whole of policy experiments 
during the WOP. Various training programs adjusted to diverse requests from welfare 
recipients, local community organizers, and politicians beyond the influence of 
community action programs. Not completely controlled by the CEA and OEO, those 
training experiments were allowed to adjust and evolve in response to emergent external 
changes, such as macroeconomic changes, social movements, and the Vietnam War, 
which are worth examining to see what was tried, what failed, and why.  
My archival research reveals two findings. First, ongoing policy deliberation led 
policymakers to consider various policy options in addressing unemployment and poverty 
within the Kennedy and Johnson administrations during the 1960s, which is key to 
understanding the evolution of WOP training programs. Accordingly, the notion that 
WOP training programs focused exclusively on unemployed youth due to conventional 
factors from the American exceptionalism perspective is incomplete in showing what 
sorts of training program were attempted in the period and why they failed. Second, 
multiple policy experiments addressed the unexpected threat of inflation in late 1965 and 
a series of urban uprisings to which Martin Luther King Jr. responded in 1967 in an open 
letter to President Johnson, asking for immediate creation of public jobs for urban ghetto 
dwellers. These events and the Johnson administration’s responses to them show the 
importance of the emergent political dynamics in shaping the evolution of WOP training 
programs.  
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Consequently, the boundary and contents of the WOP’s training programs had 
changed during the period. The WOP’s training programs evolved in response to many 
events inside and outside the government. This chapter elaborates the evolution of the 
programs in the midst of 1960s politics and urban uprisings. It examines the evolution of 
American training programs in their political and institutional contexts. The order of 
chapter is as follows: 1) previous research on the U.S. welfare system and the Johnson 
administration’s War on Poverty; 2) legislative developments; 3) the state’s capacity to 
adjust and a recurrent theme of training the nondisadvantaged after 1964; 4) chapter 
conclusion.  
 
Previous research on the U.S. Welfare System and the War on Poverty  
 
Gøsta Esping-Andersen: U.S. Welfare System in Comparison 
Gøsta Esping-Andersen identifies three welfare regimes in the world of 
capitalism: 1) the liberal welfare state; 2) the corporatist welfare state; 3) the social-
democratic welfare state. Falling into the first category of liberal welfare state, the United 
States is characterized chiefly by its prevailing means test for welfare benefits, a liberal 
work ethic that often stigmatizes welfare recipients, and strict entitlement rules that allow 
economically marginalized citizens to apply for public aid only as a last resort.181 Relying 
on “the nature of class mobilization, class-political coalition structures, and the historical 
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legacy of regime institutionalization,”182 Esping-Andersen explains how these three 
regimes progress in an expected way. While historical change in class mobilization, class 
coalition, and institutions is possible in theory, such change is seldom highlighted in 
Esping-Andersen’s work, suggesting that change in those factors is too slow to be 
perceived. As long as critical change in those variables hardly occurs, the United States 
will remain a liberal welfare state.  
Esping-Andersen’s work aptly explains the United States of the 1960s, and 
criticizes those arguing that the expansion of political rights will lead to expansion of the 
welfare state and in the end to a social democratic regime.183 Against such modernization 
school theory in the field of welfare, Esping-Andersen argues that the newly franchised 
do not necessarily pursue a certain type of welfare regime. Politics instead should 
determine their preference in welfare. The development of various antipoverty programs 
in the United States of the 1960s provides an interesting case study for the argument. At 
its face value, the expansion of political rights for racial minorities through the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 seemed to proceed with the expansion of welfare state in the name of 
the War on Poverty. However, it did not result in the expansion of welfare programs to 
the general public. No systemic change seemed to ensue. Few consider the 1960s as a 
move toward a social democratic welfare regime. The basic characteristics of the 
American welfare regime were unchanged despite drastic social experiments conducted 
by the Johnson administration to empower the poor, as some scholars lamented in 
                                                 
182 Ibid., 29. 
183 Ibid., 11-2.  
107 
evaluating the legacy of the War on Poverty.184 Adult training programs, which a social 
welfare regime usually connects with unemployment insurance to incentivize the 
unemployed to return to the labor market with upgraded skills, had failed in the Johnson 
administration. It seemed that no meaningful change in the nature of class mobilization, 
class-political coalition structures, and the historical legacy of regime 
institutionalization—three determining factors in Esping-Andersen’s theory that would 
result in three ideal types—had occurred to support the adult training programs of the 
Johnson administration during the period. 
 
Margaret Weir: U.S. Labor Market Reforms in the 1960s that Failed 
Similarly, Margaret Weir explains why the United States remained a liberal 
welfare state by relying on an institutional approach.185 The ascendancy of liberalism in 
the early 1960s was an engine behind the ambitious social experiments that aimed to 
eradicate poverty in the United States. Congress was a prolific spawning pool for 
innovative policy ideas during the period. For instance, the policy idea of structural 
unemployment, firstly championed by Senator Joseph Clark from Pennsylvania, was 
carefully discussed by the Congress, in the search for an effective manpower policy to 
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address unemployment and poverty,186 sparking a radical idea of restructuring the U.S. 
labor markets to accommodate nationwide unemployment. No matter how intense such 
reformist urges had been, however, little had been institutionalized. Numerous innovative 
experiments in the field of welfare and labor market policies had failed to transform the 
basic characteristics of the American welfare system.187 Welfare aids remained residual 
in the U.S. economic system because welfare addressed only those who did not fit within 
the mainstream economic system. Aid was limited to a subsistence level.  
In Weir’s viewpoint, two constraints hindered the transformation of the 
American welfare state in the 1960s. First, the racial politics initiated by the civil rights 
movement had severely narrowed the Johnson administration’s social ground in pursuing 
new welfare programs by limiting the programs’ targets to nonwhite urban dwellers. 
Identification of the War on Poverty with African Americans severely narrowed the range 
of viable manpower policies that had been developed over the decades. Black poverty 
was believed to stem from behavioral and cultural characteristics of individuals and their 
communities. Rather than make new institutions to compensate for insufficient 
opportunities given to the unemployed in finding proper jobs, WOP’s manpower policies 
focused on cultivating work ethics among the presumed non-hardworking people.188 In 
this vein, it’s not surprising that the Job Corps—the most notable training program for 
poor youth—was ineffective in placing enrollees in decent jobs which usually asked job 
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applicants for substantial skill sets. The major purpose of the Job Corps was to infuse a 
work ethic into delinquent youth. 
When antipoverty programs turned out to be ineffective in precluding the series 
of urban uprisings, the white majority’s skepticism on innovative programs for the poor 
grew too fast for the Democratic party to find an alternative way to congeal the postwar 
New Deal coalition.189 Targeting WOP training programs toward general adults from the 
beginning, Weir argues, would have garnered more stable political support. When public 
support for Johnson’s reformist effort waned, previous experiments designed mostly for 
racial minorities disappeared leaving no meaningful institutional legacy.  
Second, Weir highlights the lack of institutional support to transform the 
American welfare state to accommodate broader strata of the American population. She 
emphasizes the dominance of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) over other 
cabinet members in shaping federal economic policy. The CEA, composed of Keynesian 
economists, was interested exclusively in promoting national economic growth while 
acknowledging the necessity of a supplementary social policy for the hardcore poor, since 
the hardcore poor, by definition, would not be influenced by CEA’s macroeconomic 
measures aiming to moderate the business cycle. They would remain unemployed 
without a policy addressing them directly, which CEA members, acknowledging the 
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theoretical shortcoming of their macroeconomic approach, attempted to address in the 
WOP.190 
Furthermore, no proper institutional device existed to implement more market-
interventionist policies like skill training for the general public at the local and federal 
levels.191 Weir emphasizes how hard it was to reform United State Employment Services 
for the new role of coordinating local training programs for the unemployed in the 1960s. 
The United States was not equipped with properly developed institutional tools to solve 
coordination problems that would occur in connecting unemployment insurance with 
training programs for the poor as well as the general public.192 In addition, state and local 
governments were often incapable of canvassing manpower demands from the private 
sector and responding to them by flexibly reorganizing their training programs.  
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Weir believes the policymakers’ way of responding to the institutional 
constraints worsened the hardship in running the training programs. To overcome the 
innate coordination problem, the poverty planners from the CEA and the Bureau of 
Budget borrowed the concept of community action from experiments conducted by the 
President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency. The concept was designed to bypass the 
standing bureaucracies at all levels—because their inefficiency and intentional neglect 
was generally perceived as the source of the failing poverty programs—and to make the 
poor themselves be coordinators as well as recipients of antipoverty programs. Poverty 
planners thought that relying on the concept of community action would be the cheapest 
way to solve the coordination problem in waging the war on poverty because it did not 
require them to create an extra federal department or local agencies. They deemed it 
sufficient to create a federal agency under the White House to merely monitor nationwide 
community action programs. And the agency created at the White House—the Office of 
Economic Opportunity—would be directly supervised by President Johnson, which met 
Johnson’s political interest in getting full credit in waging the war on poverty.193  
However, while the poor started to challenge existing institutions and the 
previous jurisdictional conflicts between federal and local bureaus over antipoverty 
programs remained unaddressed, policymakers’ decision to put community action 
forefront on the WOP became a huge political liability for the Johnson administration,194 
making it harder to institutionalize antipoverty training programs. As a result, the WOP 
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experiments failed without leaving any meaningful policy and institutional legacy behind 
it. 
 
Jill Quadagno: Race that made the American Welfare State Exceptional 
Jill Quadagno puts race at the forefront of her discussion of the American welfare 
state.195 By emphasizing racial inequality as an exclusively important factor that mediates 
all the other factors that have explained American exceptionalism,196 Quadagno 
reinterprets the 1960s in a new manner that seems to strengthen the exceptional quality of 
the American welfare state. That is, despite good intentions to transform the previous 
racist welfare system by WOP programs, the Johnson administration had failed as it 
created the programs’ own adversaries unintentionally while finding no political ally 
outside of government. Though she seems open to the possibility of changing the racial 
inequality by “reviving the vital center”197 and overcoming racial stigma from the 
previous social programs by creating new family programs, the American racial welfare 
state seems to remain unchanged. Quadagno’s independent variable in explaining the 
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failure of WOP programs—that is, racial inequality—seems too profoundly rooted in the 
American political and cultural environments in her framework to be changed.  
How does racial inequality, Quadagno’s independent variable for the failure of 
WOP programs and also for the failure to build the “equal opportunity welfare state,” 
mediate the other factors that make the American welfare state exceptional? First, 
Quadagno argues that ideological factors like American creeds and innate liberalism, 
from which Tocqueville and Hartz draw American distinctiveness, suffer from internal 
conflict. Relying on Gunnar Myrdal, she argues that Americans’ ideological attachment 
to the American creed is possible only when racial inequality in the South is intentionally 
ignored or when the “contradictions between egalitarian ethos and anti-democratic 
practices” are forgotten by the American public and their representatives.198  
According to Quadagno, the role of the American creed matters in shaping the 
American welfare state, but via its contradiction with de facto racial inequalities. The 
American creed ultimately urges the American public to acknowledge the contradictions 
and guides them to address them, reminiscent of James Morone’s work on the cyclical 
rise and fall of the “Democratic Wish” that nullifies the development of undemocratic 
state power.199 Like Morone’s “Democratic Wish,” the American has been continuously 
frustrated. Indeed, in the 1960s, in Quadagno’s view, the majority of Americans agreed to 
address the discrepancy between undemocratic practices toward African Americans and 
                                                 
198 Ibid., 187-8.  
199 James A. Morone, The Democratic Wish : Popular Participation and the Limits of American 
Government (New York: Basic Books, 1990). 
114 
their egalitarian and liberal ethos.200 In this regard, Johnson and his administration were 
revolutionaries because they tried to replace the New Deal racial welfare state with the 
“equal opportunity welfare state”201 by enlarging social and economic rights to African 
Americans through WOP programs. However, the revolutionaries’ attempt to transform 
the previous racial welfare state failed due to societal and institutional reasons which 
were again mediated by racial inequality. 
Social factors in American exceptionalism indicate the lack of support from 
societal groups—especially organized labor—in creating comprehensive social programs 
for the poor and the vulnerable.202 The United States has had allegedly weak labor 
movements with no party that represents organized labor in Congress. Racial inequality, 
Quadagno argues, created such weak and fragmented labor movements. Racial issues 
inside of organized labor also made politically infeasible its collaboration with liberal 
administrations.203  
During the New Deal trades unions strongly resisted forging any collaborative 
relationship with state and federal governments, for instance, in accepting and training 
new members, for fear of possible government pressure to integrate in exchange for 
financial support. As a result, organized labor lost the opportunity to participate in the 
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Kennedy-Johnson administration to work together to design progressive social programs 
for their members as well as the general public. When civil rights activists could no 
longer tolerate organized labor’s recalcitrance to desegregation and forced them—mainly 
those who belonged to the previous American Federation of Labor (AFL), construction 
trades, and the Teamsters—to face discriminatory union practices, organized labor 
became even more indifferent to WOP programs.204  
In answering why the United States failed to develop a capable bureaucracy—
i.e., the institutional factors that Skocpol, Weir, and Orloff rely on in explaining the 
exceptional quality of the American welfare state205—Quadagno also emphasizes the 
importance of racial inequality. The undemocratic Southern system was designed to 
deprive African Americans of political rights for its racially stratified labor market. 
Southern state governments remained quite autonomous from central government 
authorities to protect their racial order, which partly inhibited coherent policy 
developments across the country. Those who focus only on the timing of democratization 
vis-à-vis state bureaucratization miss this point, Quadagno argues.206   
Beyond a schematic explanation for the exceptional characteristics of the 
American welfare state, Quadagno provides careful case studies to explain the WOP 
training programs’ failure in changing the New Deal racial welfare state to the “equal 
                                                 
204 Ibid., 192-4. 
205 Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol, eds., The Politics of Social Policy in the United 
States (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
206 Quadagno, The Color of Welfare, 189-191.  
116 
opportunity welfare state.”207 For her, it was racial politics from the bottom against racial 
status quo that had finally derailed the WOP. The WOP programs allowed civil rights 
activists to challenge local politics, which then made more tenuous the political coalition 
that the Johnson administration needed for the survival of ambitious social programs.  
During the 1960s, those once excluded from the New Deal liberal welfare 
regime—mostly nonwhites—began challenging the welfare system. Civil rights activists 
made use of Lyndon Johnson’s top-down programs for racial minorities to challenge the 
racial status quo and provide more benefits to the poor. Quadagno describes how such 
bottom-up efforts stirred local politics in such states as Mississippi. Those who attempted 
to mobilize the poor through the community action plan had to confront angry 
Democratic constituents whose stakes were high in the previous Jim Crow racial order.208 
Thus, the contents of “the equal-opportunity welfare state” at the local level seemed 
constantly contested and reshaped by civil rights activists and their opponents during the 
War on Poverty. Racial politics over equal opportunity have become the most important 
factor in shaping the American welfare state since then. 
There was a reason why civil rights activists were unsatisfied with the racial 
status quo despite WOP programs. While WOP’s concentration on training and 
rehabilitating mostly nonwhite unemployed youth reminded the public of the necessity of 
providing public vocational training to the poor to build a “Great Society,” it could not 
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challenge local companies’ discriminatory hiring practices. Without guarantee from local 
companies to hire WOP training program graduates, poor youth remained outside of labor 
markets, relying on subsistence allowances during training.209 Quadagno’s case studies 
on the construction trades union and Chicago machine politics proves why this was the 
case.  
In the fight between civil rights activists and recalcitrant white labor unionists 
over the principle of desegregation under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Department of 
Labor (DOL) and the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) could not get enough 
support from the AFL-CIO to run adult training programs successfully.210 As labor 
movement leaders could not get local unions to comply with the cause of the civil rights 
movement, civil rights activists had to rely on litigation to rectify racist practices within 
the unions, inadvertently undermining union autonomy. The AFL-CIO, therefore, had 
been a passive bystander of the War on Poverty. When OEO’s money was funneled to the 
city of Chicago for poverty programs including adult training, Mayor Daley wanted to 
use the money to strengthen his political machines by getting his supporters jobs without 
challenging segregationist practices. Daley’s rationale was that it was politically suicidal 
to drive white residents from the city and thus undermine the city’s financial 
foundation.211 Such rationale prevailed also in other major cities. The OEO, aware of the 
exploitation of its funds by major cities’ machine politics, decreased its funding for big 
                                                 
209 Ibid., 64-6. 
210 Ibid., 69-78. 
211 Ibid., 54-5. 
118 
cities, which ultimately hurt their adult training programs. OEO’s conflict with the DOL 
added another tier to the problem in cities, as city governments consulted with DOL to 
circumvent the uncooperative OEO.  
 
Limits of Previous Research and Toward an Alternative Framework  
The scholars presented above explain how the American liberal welfare state has 
survived ambitious liberal reforms throughout American history. Numerous attempts to 
reform the welfare system directly addressed the poor during the 1960s. But no structural 
change in the liberal welfare system occurred out of new class mobilization, new cross-
class coalitions, and a breakthrough from historically evolved market institutions during 
the period, leaving the basic characteristics of the American liberal welfare regime 
unchanged (Esping-Anderseon). The Department of Labor, a champion agency in 
developing training programs, was marginalized by the CEA and later by the OEO in 
waging the war on poverty. Innovative DOL policy ideas to reform labor markets were 
adrift in the Johnson administration (Weir). Consequently, the American “racial welfare 
state” had furthered its stratifying effect on racial minorities, which was also accelerated 
by the perverse effect of liberals’ effort to build an equal opportunity welfare state with 
affirmative actions and desegregation (Quadagno). These works provide insights on how 
the U.S. racial welfare regime has been consolidated. 
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But these descriptions of the War on Poverty are too static to capture the 
diversity and changing nature of policy developments during the WOP.212 First, their 
approaches incorrectly presume a rupture from the previous decade in policy orientation 
at the beginning of the WOP. Weir sees the abrupt rise of poverty programs in late 1964, 
which Weir argues rendered fruitless the DOL’s effort to develop a policy package for 
active labor market policy fruitless. When the CEA, preferring to make supplementary 
social policies to its macroeconomic measures, gained the upper hand in shaping the 
content of the War on Poverty in late 1964, the DOL had no choice but to follow the 
CEA’s lead in prioritizing aid to racial minorities. However, the DOL was not passive in 
waging the war and followed the other agency’s lead. Quadagno also pays little attention 
to the internal changes that the WOP training programs underwent, emphasizing instead 
her distinctive periodization between the New Deal welfare regime and the equal 
opportunity welfare regime. Internal and gradual developments in the WOP training 
programs tend to be neglected for Quadagno’s framework because she focuses 
exclusively on explaining the historical establishment of the American equal opportunity 
welfare state in the midst of racial politics that community action programs activated in 
numerous states. 
The previous literature rarely explains how the agencies designated to run the 
WOP adjusted to changing political and economic environments throughout the period. 
As Charles Lindblom explains, policymakers are more likely to “muddle through” with 
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the given policy packages than to embrace a completely new policy package to address 
given policy requests.213 Despite the strong mandate from President Johnson to prioritize 
tackling poverty concentrated on a certain stratum of U.S. citizens, the DOL and other 
related federal and state agencies stuck to their previous policies because the fragmented 
structure of American bureaucracy allowed them to. In waging the War on Poverty, those 
who ran the training programs also tended to rely on their previous policy experiences, 
making a certain kind of policy continuity—through layering (Schickler; Mahoney and 
Thelen) and intercurrence (Orren and Skowronek)—that the perspectives above often 
miss.214 The DOL’s preference for serving a broader population was not displaced by 
CEA’s concern with the poor. Instead the DOL’s policy concern was layered underneath 
the CEA and WOP’s policy preference. 
Second, policy experiment often entails emergent processes of institutional 
creation and transformation, which is often overlooked by the previous literature which 
strives to find a single framework with which all the events from the 1960s can be 
interpreted. Relying on John Padgett and Walter Powell’s and Connolly’s works, Berk 
defines a social process that defies prediction from initial social conditions as an 
emergent process. 215  Unlike Weir’s and Quadagno’s explanations, the WOP training 
programs gradually evolved through such emergent processes, as the importance of adult 
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training (neglected in the beginning of the WOP) suddenly mattered to OEO, to Health, 
Education and Welfare (HEW), and DOL, as CEA started to pay attention to raising 
skilled labor in the threat of inflation, and as the series of urban uprisings forced the 
Johnson administration to reconsider its early refusal to create public jobs for the 
unemployed. 
To be specific, the WOP’s training programs changed as Congress added and 
revised laws throughout the 1960s.216 Training programs evolved as political support 
ebbed and flowed. While responding to the hardship in running programs for poor youth, 
the administrators from OEO, HEW, and DOL kept experimenting with new adult 
training programs in new forms. Strengthening adult training in big cities through 
Concentrated Employment Programs (CEPs) supervised by the DOL is an example. The 
administrators also extended the 1962 Manpower Development and Training Act 
(MDTA) on-the-job training for adults relying on EOA money to address the necessity of 
training nonyouth. 
In a sense, such incremental change was innate in waging the war on poverty. 
Experimentalism in the WOP presupposed close yearly examination by Congressional 
committees, which forced administrators to promptly address feedback from politicians 
and move given financial and organizational resources from initially prioritized programs 
to more prospective programs as requested by powerful members of Congress. The 
difficulty in evaluating internal change among young enrollees of the Job Corps and the 
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Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC) gradually undermined the cause of OEO’s initial 
priority in rehabilitating the school dropouts and reinstating them to labor markets. In 
contrast, the administrators started paying more attention to good placement rates of the 
“on-the-job training” (OJT)”program. The guarantee of private employers participating in 
the program to hire the trainees relieved Congress’s concern for wasting taxpayers’ 
money for unmarketable skills. Thus, the OJT was enlarged, assigned with 35 percent of 
total training funds allocated to EOA. The Department of Labor also changed its 
organizational structure to administer the enlarged program. Unlike Weir’s view that the 
dominance of CEA and Keynesian economics precluded further development of active 
labor market policy, those who envisioned structural unemployment regained the moment 
of applying their policy tools.  
The second and third sources of incremental change in training programs were 
external events. After Johnson signed the Revenue Act in February 1964, the threat of 
inflation arose as major concern for CEA members. While an overheated economy 
lowered the national unemployment rate to a significant degree in 1965, it put upward 
pressure on wages and prices. The lack of qualified skilled laborers in the manufacturing 
industry, where increased demands were met not with increased staffing but with 
increased product prices, led CEA economists to seek an active labor market policy. The 
CEA, only a few years earlier, had defeated the DOL’s proposal for active labor market 
policy. From late 1965 to 1966 the CEA turned to structural measures to promote training 
to resolve “bottlenecks” in manufacturing industries and defuse the devastating 
inflationary pressure. Providing proper training to adults and youths suddenly became an 
important task for Johnson’s economists. President Johnson did not want to jeopardize his 
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entire program with uncontrollable inflation. At the request of Johnson’s economic 
advisers the DOL and HEW embarked on the new task, which changed the previous 
contour of WOP’s training programs.  
The third source of incremental change in the 1960s training program was urban 
uprisings. A series of urban uprisings, starting with Watts, California, in 1965, to 
Newark, New Jersey, in 1967, and Detroit, Michigan, in 1967, undermined the legitimacy 
of WOP programs as a whole. Why did poor neighborhoods rebel against the 
establishment of society despite President Johnson’s effort to tackle poverty? Did the 
WOP programs fail to convey timely public aid to the needy and simply make them 
impatient with society? Or did the WOP’s principle of maximum feasible participation 
merely incite the poor against society rather than guide them to be responsible citizens? 
No one could answer the questions satisfactorily at that time, which led to creation of the 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder, also known as the Kerner 
Commission. What was evident to the policymakers, though, was that the effectiveness of 
WOP’s youth training programs had to be questioned. President Johnson ordered his 
departments and agencies to report on how many had benefited from the programs so far 
and how many had become employed after training. The numbers of vacancies both in 
institutional and on-the-job training slots were examined to gauge the rate of program 
usage.217  
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In addition, Martin Luther King Jr.’s letter to the president suggesting “hire now, 
train later” contributed to creation of pilot programs in select cities in collaboration with 
big businesses for jobs in ghettos.218 The letter and its influence on intragovernmental 
deliberation on viable policy responses to it, which I retrieved from the LBJ Presidential 
Library, are often neglected by those who focus on such structural factors as American 
institutional settings for training and the timing of democratization in comparison to that 
of bureaucratization because King’s letter is an emergent political event that is not seen 
from the structural approaches. The forced overhaul of the WOP’s training programs after 
the uprisings initiated the broad change in their goals and administrative structures. 
Training programs, initially designed by “Opportunity Theorists” like Lloyd Ohlin from 
Columbia University who argued for the need to replace urban ghetto delinquency to 
attain peer status with new opportunities,219 had to be revised to meet the urgent request 
for urban jobs in favor of the New Deal-style public works program. Creating such jobs 
for the unemployed became more urgent for policymakers facing urban uprisings than 
guiding the youth to reinternalize social norms. 
To summarize my criticisms of the literature presented above, researchers pay 
little attention to state capacities in responding to unexpected political events with new 
programs. Various adult training programs were developed and modified under President 
Johnson to respond to unexpected political events as well as to skeptical Congress 
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committees about the programs’ effectiveness. In addition, the DOL did not remain 
marginalized by the CEA and OEO as inflation began threatening the viability of 
Johnson’s domestic programs in late 1965. The DOL increased its influence on the White 
House after 1965 to other federal agencies’ discomfort, proposing different job programs 
ranging from upgraded on-the-job training for the adult employed as well as the adult 
unemployed to Works Progress Administration (WPA)-style public works programs for 
those in urgent need in urban ghettos. The WOP’s early emphasis on training 
unemployed youth was weakened in the series of events, if not completely replaced with 
other policy goals. Despite the fact that most of WOP’s experiments failed to achieve 
their declared goal of eradicating poverty from the United States, it is important to see 
concrete policy developments in training programs to better understand the consolidation 
of the American liberal welfare regime.  
To overcome the limits of previous research, I conducted careful archival 
researches relying on Gerald Berk et al.’s introductory chapter of Political Creativity.220 
First, the evolution of training programs during the 1960s cannot be properly captured by 
a conventional view in policy studies that often assumes that the identities, interests, and 
policy preferences of actors of interest are fixed. The characteristics of institutions that 
surround actors are frequently presupposed as constant. Once the internal qualities of the 
actors and the institutions are seen as fixed, then institutionalist scholars usually draw 
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causal inferences. However, this assumption sometimes hides more than it reveals from 
the eyes of researchers because actors are creative in making use of their relationships 
with other actors and given institutional settings. Such creative use of relationships with 
other actors and institutional environments also affects the actors’ interests, which many 
institutionalist scholars pick as their starting point. Thus, “how institutional features and 
inhabitants form relations of mutual determination and flux” should be asked in a 
complex history of policy development.221  
From an institutionalist standpoint—especially Weir’s—CEA members’ 
preference for macroeconomic policy and its complementary program for the hardcore 
poor contributed to creation of WOP training programs. In addition, CEA members were 
concerned with DOL’s fragmented structure in running nationwide training programs, 
which precluded previously discussed policy options for upskilling the general public. 
However, this view masks the historical development of manpower programs before the 
Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) of 1964, starting with the National Defense Education 
Act of 1958. The EOA was shaped not only by CEA members and other WOP programs 
designers’ policy interests but also by the context of legislative developments as to 
federal manpower programs that preceded the act. The EOA changed during the WOP as 
well, reflecting emergent requests from society. In the “Legislative Developments” 
section I overview the legislative context under which the political actors of concern 
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strategically shaped the WOP training programs and responded to emergent social 
requests by modifying the EOA.  
Second, in the section titled “State Capacity to Adjust and a Recurrent Theme of 
Training the Non-disadvantaged after 1964” I reveal how such factors as federalism, 
underdeveloped bureaucracy, and the absence of a coordinating device for different local 
and state interests, which excpetionalist scholars usually regard as sources of the 
American state’s weakness in implementing a coherent social policy package, 
paradoxically helped policymakers creatively respond to emergent needs from society. It 
turned out that the manpower programs for poor youth were continuously revised by 
policymakers during the WOP period to the extent that could disprove Weir’s argument 
that WOP training programs failed due to an emphasis on black youths. Policymakers’ 
strategies ranged from “recomposition”222 of a previously marginalized strategy of 
training as described in “Threat of Inflation of 1965 and Expansion of the On-the-Job 
Training,” to “layering” of new programs of the EOA as described in “Three Competing 
Policy Ideas in Creating Adult Work Programs in 1966,” to “entrepreneurship”223 of 
policymakers in figuring out how to harness centrifugal forces among fragmented 
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American institutions to pursue a novel way of providing public jobs as described in 
“Martin Luther King’s Urge to ‘Hire Now, Train Later’ and Public Jobs in 1967.” 
 
Legislative Developments 
The legislative history of various manpower programs during the 1960s is a 
patchwork of improvisational responses to national and regional economic changes for 
which there was no blueprint. Overlaps of jurisdiction among the related laws and 
improvisational updates on existing laws concerning poor people were common in the 
patchwork of the manpower legislation. The legislative history of various manpower 
programs during the 1960s shows how the logic of layering and intercurrence had 
prevailed in shaping law in the United States.224  
Administrators continuously tried to mobilize social support to guarantee their 
programs’ survival from hostile congressional members who were suspicious of the 
federal government’s expansion and the efficiency of new programs. Since American 
citizens as well as their legislators were quite new to these programs, federal agencies 
suffered from the lack of the public’s and interest groups’ support in pursuing such new 
programs.225 One way to overcome the problem was to quickly address emergent requests 
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from regional labor markets to cultivate new policy constituencies while carefully 
implementing new programs on an experimental basis, but at the cost of the programs’ 
internal coherency. As a result, reform-minded policymakers were unable to pursue a 
wholesale reform in the field of the manpower policy.  
Unlike Margaret Weir’s view that such incoherency stemmed from the 
fragmented nature of federal agencies, policy incoherency was an outcome of the 
agencies’ adaptive strategy to hostile political environments. The legislative history of 
manpower policies of the 1960s should be reviewed in this sense to reveal the 
multilayered characteristics of those policies.  
Racism in Southern labor markets made matters more complicated. Southern 
states were afraid of federal agencies’ meddling with their racially stratified labor 
markets and disrupting their racial hierarchies.226 Since Southern politicians were 
powerful enough to prevent passage and implementation of new manpower programs, 
federal agencies continuously recalibrated new programs to make them less threatening to 
Southerners. Such a constitutive role of race and racism in the manpower policy 
development of the 1960s is often overlooked by Jill Quadagno because she often 
considers the influence of race and racism as external factors that simply thwarted equal 
opportunity welfare projects. Instead the goals and methods of manpower programs were 
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continuously negotiated to reach a practical middle ground during the period. This 
continuous recalibration of manpower programs was also reflected in the legislative 
history, which is examined in the following section.  
Such layering and intercurrence in the development of U.S. manpower policy 
necessitates a contextual understanding of the War on Poverty to better understand WOP 
training programs. Most training programs were created on top of previously enacted 
training policies or failed legislative attempts. Though it is still important to figure out 
what the initiators of WOP programs—that is, CEA economists and a new group of 
people recruited by Sargent Shriver at Johnson’s request—were trying to do, the contents 
of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 were built upon previous policy developments.  
Reviewing legislative developments before the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act 
has major implications in reconceptualizing the period of the WOP. It reveals, first, that 
there was no rupture in policy development between the period before 1960 and the 
period after 1960. Weir and Quadagno commonly assume Johnson’s War on Poverty was 
an interlude to the general policy orientation in the field of manpower policy. The period 
of the War on Poverty is assumed by Weir to be distinctive compared to other periods 
when no active market policy was salient. However, for Weir the period was distinctive 
only because it temporarily defied the power of U.S. institutions. This perspective 
neglects historical developments that preceded the 1960s.  
Quadagno shares with Weir the same assumption that the period of the 1960s 
was a rupture from the previous welfare regime. Racial issues, which had been 
suppressed by the New Deal coalition, became an engine that reconfigured the national 
politics after the WOP.  
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However, such perspectives do not explain the continuities between manpower 
legislation in the 1950s and the 1960s. The contours of the 1960s policies were 
incrementally changed to survive unfriendly environments briefly described at the 
beginning of this section.  
As for the periodization of the legislative history, it is important to start with the 
National Defense Education Act of 1958 to trace the developments of manpower policy. 
For the first time following the Second World War and Korean War, the Act attempted to 
address manpower issues in peacetime. In revising the Act, policymakers perceived the 
necessity of raising skilled labor following the Cold War. They realized they could not 
wait for a natural workforce distribution based on merits and preferences in the labor 
market to meet new challenges following the Soviet Union’s successful launch of Sputnik 
in 1957.  
Before the Great Depression, state employment services that were federally 
financed sought to fill job orders from local companies focusing the supply side of the 
labor market. This practice changed after the New Deal: the federal government and state 
agencies started to pay attention to providing the unemployed with public jobs and work 
relief. The demand side of the labor market became important for policymakers. In 
waging the Second World War, the American labor market was short on labor regardless 
of skill level. In response, the federal government prepared many skilled and unskilled 
workers for war production, playing a more active role in the labor market out of need to 
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win the war. It provided training and retraining for workers for defense industries.227 The 
attack on Pearl Harbor on December 19, 1941, led to the federalization of state 
employment services under the Social Security Board to prepare for war production. An 
executive order from President Franklin D. Roosevelt transferred the state employment 
services to the federal government, which enhanced the efficiency of the nationwide 
manpower program in wartime.228 
However, the period when the federal government played an enlarged role in 
coordinating nationwide manpower programs was short. The federalized Employment 
Service was returned to the states in 1946 as President Roosevelt promised after the 
national emergency.229 Though the Korean War broke out in 1950, no such federalizing 
attempt as during WWII was made in terms of manpower policy.  
When the Korean War ended in 1953, U.S. policymakers became concerned with 
inflation from overproduction during wartime, to which policymakers responded by 
enshrining the principle of balanced budget and fiscal responsibility.230 This policy could 
hinder national economic growth, however. Mangum argues that this dilemma forced the 
policymakers in the 1950s to reevaluate the task of raising skilled labor for higher 
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productivity.231 Only with enactment of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 did 
policymakers start to make laws to address the task. The National Defense Education Act, 
though it did not encompass the general public’s skill level, was the first attempt by the 
federal government to strategically consider active labor market policy.232 
 
The National Defense Education Act of 1958  
Except for passage of the National Defense Education Act of 1958, no federal-
level manpower legislation was passed during the 1950s. The Act authorized a seven-year 
program costing $1 billion program to financially help students and schools.233 The 
National Defense Education Act, aiming to finance science education, was motivated by 
the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik, but its target mostly was limited to qualified 
students and scholars from the discipline of science. It contained no programs for the 
general public.  
However, the law started to change policymakers’ views on manpower policy. The 
enactment of the National Defense Education Act, though limiting its application to 
science education for the purpose of the arms race against the Soviet Union, opened a 
new arena for the federal government to be active. As the preceding chapter elaborates, 
the passage of the National Defense Act of 1958 interacted with the rise of structural 
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unemployment discourse and influenced the Democratic presidential candidate John F. 
Kennedy’s economic platforms, further explained below.  
 
The Area Redevelopment Act of 1961 
The passage of the Area Redevelopment Act (ARA) of 1961 signaled a change in 
this relatively lukewarm interest in U.S. manpower policy. President Eisenhower vetoed 
the same act twice, in 1958 and 1960, affirming his policy preference for “local 
responsibility” rather than expanding the federal government’s role into the private 
sphere to address community economic problems.234 Eisenhower’s veto also revealed 
Southern politicians’ interest in maintaining the status quo in wage differentials across 
race lines. However, the election of John F. Kennedy turned the political tide in favor of 
active labor market policies. Kennedy in his presidential campaign supported 
interventionist federal programs to address unemployment. After two futile attempts the 
ARA was finally enacted in 1961. Under President Kennedy’s strong leadership, the 
administration persuaded conservative Southern members to rescind their obstruction and 
pass the bill. Southern Congress members started to see the bill’s enormous impact on 
depressed rural areas in the South and perceive “political potency of the depressed area 
issues” in their elections.235 A series of legislation ensued after the passage of the ARA: 
                                                 
234 Richard E. Mooney, “President Vetoes Jobless-Area Aid; Calls it Unsound,” New York Times, 
September 7, 1958; no author, “Bill for Aid to Depressed Areas Vetoed,” Los Angeles Times, May 14, 
1960. 
235 "Congress Enacts Area Redevelopment Bill." In CQ Almanac 1961, 17th ed., 247-56. Washington, DC: 
Congressional Quarterly, 1961. http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal61-1373049 
135 
1) the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) of 1962, amended in 1963, 
1965 and 1966; 2) the Vocational Education Act of 1963; and 3) the Economic 
Opportunity Act (EOA) of 1964, amended in 1965 and 1966. Johnson’s War on Poverty 
and its various training programs were developed in this legislative context.  
The Area Redevelopment Act (ARA) of 1961 provided $300 million to be spent 
over five years for depressed rural and industrial areas to modernize the areas and attract 
private investments. The act also funded training and retraining of the unemployed in 
areas with subsistence wages up to sixteen weeks at the average rate of state’s 
unemployment compensation.236 Unlike the original bill proposed by Senator Paul 
Douglass (D—Ill) and Representative Daniel Flood (D—PA) who wanted to limit the 
targeted areas to mining and industrial regions, the ARA of 1961 included rural areas to 
make it easy to pass the bill in both houses. As a result, the ARA’s funding was too 
diluted to bring about immediate change to individual redevelopment areas whose 
redevelopment projects were approved by the Area Redevelopment Administration in the 
Department of Commerce.237  
Once approved, daily execution of the program was monitored by the Small 
Business Administration, the Community Facilities Administration, Department of 
Agriculture, and Department of Labor. It soon created widespread disappointment with a 
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bureaucratic maze for those seeking the funding. As to training and retraining of the 
unemployed, the Department of Labor (DOL) conflicted with the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare (HEW) over the contents of vocational training and the authority 
to place program applicants after training.238  
At its face value the fragmented nature of the American bureaucracy, to which 
institutionalists attribute the frustration of new manpower policies during the 1960s, was 
the main culprit of the ARA’s unimpressive performance.239 However, such bureaucratic 
hurdles were created intentionally by lawmakers. The ARA had to promote local 
initiative and responsibility in order to placate conservative Congress members concerned 
with the demoralizing effect of federal money on local communities in need.240 The ARA 
required local communities to submit their proposals for local economic development and 
let federal agencies related to the projects evaluate them. At first, local communities in 
need of federal money struggled to prepare sound plans which the ARA expected. Local 
communities had to learn from their failures how to write strong proposals in a persuasive 
manner.241  
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The Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 
The passage of the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) in 1962 
reveals an ongoing effort to install adult training programs in the early 1960s. For three 
reasons it is worth examining the MDTA and its contents. First, the MDTA was for 
adults, and differed from the War on Poverty’s emphasis on poor youth. The policy goal 
of retraining adult workers, which the preceding ARA aimed to achieve, was further 
developed in the MDTA. The enactment of MDTA proves policy continuity regarding 
adult training in the early 1960s. Second, the MDTA inherited from the ARA an 
approach to facilitating training through private as well as public institutions, which 
shows a way to compensate for the undeveloped state apparatus in providing skill 
training. The approach remained dominant even in waging the war on poverty.242 Third, 
the MDTA, like the ARA, was not initiated by political pressure on the federal 
government from the civil rights movement or the series of urban crises to address racial 
minorities’ economic hardships. Therefore, the MDTA is important legislation which 
proves the ongoing currents of manpower policy in the United States of the 1960s. 
The MDTA of 1962 provided the unemployed with training allowances while 
giving them opportunities to acquire new skills for decent jobs through private and public 
institutions or on-the-job training. The act, amended in 1963, 1965, and 1966, enlarged its 
targeted population from family heads with a past history of employment for three years 
or more to school dropouts below age twenty-two and to professional employees who 
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were skilled but temporarily unemployed. Training allowances—or, subsistence 
allowances while training—also became more generous in the amendments because the 
average allowances of $35 per week proved inadequate for most applicants, especially for 
those with financial dependents. Those who suffered from insufficient subsistence 
allowances tended to drop out in the middle of training for part-time jobs. Financial 
support for those who relied on public transportation to get to training facilities was 
added in the amendments.243  
The budgetary issue of the Manpower Development and Training programs was 
also resolved in the amendments. In the original bill of 1962, the federal government was 
supposed to finance all expenditures for the first two years. State governments would 
start to share fifty percent of the expenditures in the third year. While silent on the initial 
budgetary plan of the bill at first, state governments soon realized that they could not take 
on the financial burdens after the grace period. Despite the programs’ positive effects on 
local and regional economies, state governments generally viewed the programs as 
unpopular among their major constituents and thus could not prioritize them in their 
expenditures. The state governments pressured concerned members of Congress to extend 
the bill’s grace period for the states and relieve them of their financial burdens. The 
burden on state governments was adjusted in favor of the states in the series of the 
amendments.244 The 1963 amendments repealed the original bill’s requirement that state 
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governments match MDTA funds by fifty percent. Instead, the 1963 amendments 
required state governments to contribute one third of the whole MDTA training and 
training allowance programs in 1965, and one half of the full amount in 1966.245 The 
1966 amendments relieved state governments of the responsibility to match requirements 
when the federal government would spend money in research and development projects 
carried out under the act.246  
 
The Vocational Education Act of 1963 and Youth Employment Bill of 1963 
Passage of the Vocational Education Act (VEA) of 1963 and a failed attempt to 
pass the Youth Employment Bill (YEB) show an emerging policy concern for youth 
unemployment among racial minorities in 1963. The new policy concern became grafted 
onto previous policy developments on manpower programs. As civil rights activists 
brought racial inequalities to the public’s attention and President Kennedy conveyed his 
message to the Congress on June 19, 1963, to urge the institution to tackle civil rights 
issues, policymakers started to seek ways in which such inequalities could be mitigated 
by legislation.247 Congress members who had interest in promoting racial equality found 
the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958 as a place to add their new policy 
interest, called layering.  
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The Vocational Education Act included a one-year extension of the NDEA of 
1958, which was set to expire in 1964, to financially support students and teachers 
working in the field of science at the college level.248 The rest of the 1963 VEA attempted 
to modernize outmoded vocational education programs established by the Smith-Hughes 
Act of 1917 and George-Barden Act of 1946. While the previous acts focused on training 
for home economics and farming, the new act launched training for almost all types of 
vocations that did not require college bachelor’s degrees.249 The VEA would cover 
various programs administered by institutions such as “comprehensive high schools, 
specialized vocational high schools, area vocational-technical schools and institutes, 
junior colleges, community colleges, and four-year colleges and universities.”250  
After Kennedy’s message urging Congress to include civil rights programs in their 
legislation in June, 1963, the original vocational education bill extended to job training 
programs for school dropouts and those who were illiterate. Most were racial minorities. 
The Act allowed construction of five residential schools on an experimental basis for 
school dropouts and youths living in harmful environments. The schools would provide 
them with skill training as well as basic education. These provisions were added later by 
the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Education Committee in October, 1963. The 
original bill, when discussed on the House floor in August 1963, had no provision for 
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racial minorities. It was difficult for the House Education and Labor Committee to 
respond to Kennedy’s request in June because it had already reported the bill to the 
House floor without provisions for racial minorities. The Kennedy administration 
preferred to work with the Senate Committee than to influence House floor discussion in 
order to add new provisions for racial minorities in the bill.251 
The logic of intercurrence and layering stands out in the process. The original 
vocational education bill was designed to revise the outmoded contents of training 
programs while the preceding ARA and MDTA focused primarily on identifying troubled 
communities that needed special financial aid for the unemployed and incentivizing the 
private sector to train the unemployed. Congressional hearings held in the House of 
Representatives prove this point: the policy discourse of structural unemployment and 
shared concerns for the inimical effect of automation on employment were the main 
motive behind the vocational education bill.252 Though the members of the General 
Subcommittee on Education in the House of Representatives often perceived racial 
segregation in vocational trainings and apprenticeships as big hurdle that hindered racial 
minorities from being semi-skilled and skilled laborers, the subcommittee members 
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strategically avoided including any related provision in the bill because it would make the 
bill too complicated to pass.253  
The preceding currents of manpower policy approach for structural unemployment 
became merged with the cause of the civil rights movement when the Senate Committee 
added new provisions for racial minorities—especially unemployed youth in urban 
areas—to the original vocational education bill of October 1963. They were for work-
study programs and residential schools. To avoid possible blockage from racial 
conservatives, both House members and senators decided not to include the principle of 
desegregation in running the newly added programs in the bill.254 The Commissioner of 
Education, with “approval of the appropriate state board,” would decide the amount of 
federal money to be allocated for the new programs. This allowed passage of the bill in 
both Houses but without any legal guarantee of desegregation.255 
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The new act—an outcome of layering where different orders coexisted—would 
serve, for the first time in U.S. legislative history of vocational education, the 
disadvantaged and racial minorities who suffered from the lack of education and had no 
choice but to apply for low-skilled jobs. The new act aimed to address high 
unemployment rates among the disadvantaged with updated vocational education.256 
Assistant Commissioner of Education for Vocational and Technical Education Walter 
Arnold evaluated the VEA as a systemic attempt to connect demands in local, regional, 
and national labor markets with vocational training programs.257 Meeting such demands 
from local labor markets, Commissioner of Education Francis Keppel believed, was 
closely connected to Kennedy administration’s policy goal of addressing the hardships of 
African Americans in urban areas.258 However, as explained above, the principle of 
desegregation as a condition for federal aid was not installed in the Act. Through the 
VEA, the preceding manpower policy developments in the United States became merged 
with a political cause of the civil rights movement. 
Senator Herbert Humphrey (D—MN) introduced the Youth Employment Bill in 
1963. Humphrey, who had proposed the same bill two times in 1959 and 1961, was 
strongly supported by President Kennedy in 1963 because the nationwide unemployment 
rates declined while the unemployment issue among youth—mainly school dropouts—
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persisted in 1963. Humphrey’s bill, which introduced a Youth Conservation Corps and 
other youth employment programs at the state and community levels for youth aged 
between 16 and 21 to teach them a work ethic and basic skills for future job training, 
passed the Senate but got stuck in the House Rules Committee in 1963. Although 
Representative Carl Elliott (D—AL) of the House Rules Committee, was strongly 
supportive of the Kennedy administration and could have pressured the Committee in 
favor of the bill, decided to be inactive for fear of losing the upcoming election due to 
racial issues within the bill. The bill was widely perceived to benefit African Americans 
in his district by funneling taxpayers’ money to the “undeserved poor”—mostly racial 
minorities in the eyes of white constituents in Alabama.259  
Those opposing the Youth Employment bill took the same strategy as they did in 
the VEA in both Houses. They attempted to add an antidiscrimination clause to the bill to 
make it impossible for the bill to survive. Their attempt to amend the bill failed by party 
line votes both in the House Education and Labor Committee and Senate Labor and 
Public Welfare Committee.260 Nevertheless, members of Congress confirmed the 
Kennedy administration’s will to run the youth conservation camps in an integrated 
manner if the bill became enacted even without an antidiscrimination clause. In Senate 
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hearings both Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Labor Secretary W. Willard Wirtz 
promised Senator Winston L. Prouty (R—VT), who was suspicious of the impact of the 
suggested bill on discriminatory training practices, that the administration would take 
action against any type of discrimination in running conservation camps.261 
Unsurprisingly, conservative members of the House Rules Committee had 
heeded the possible installment of racially integrated conservation camps in their home 
states even without the antidiscrimination clause. It would encroach on states’ rights to 
leave education facilities segregated. They did not let the bill out of the House Rules 
Committee.  
When the prospect of Humphrey’s bill turned dim, the Kennedy administration 
considered expanding “the Youth Component of MDTA.”262 The long-drifting Youth 
Employment Bill of 1963 was finally absorbed by the Johnson administration’s 
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 when Lyndon Johnson started to synthesize the 
Kennedy administration’s legislative tasks into a single grandiose bill.  
At a glance, it seemed a politically reasonable response for the Kennedy 
administration to expand the MDTA and include failed Youth Employment programs in 
it. However, the episode is worth scholarly attention because the Kennedy 
administration’s decision to enlarge the MDTA had created a completely new hybrid 
policy discourse by merging two different policy ideas. Antipoverty policy was quite 
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different from the manpower policy in their goals. The former aimed to raise the level of 
income among the poor while the latter aimed to achieve maximum employment rates 
among employable citizens. When an antipoverty program struggled to pull the poor out 
of the poverty line with public aid and rehabilitation, a manpower program aimed to 
devise an effective program to increase the possibility of unemployed workers being 
hired in the near future. This difference became blurred in the expansion of the MDTA to 
compensate for the failure of the Youth Employment Bill of 1963. 
An effort to merge the manpower discourse with antipoverty programs appeared 
in discussing the Youth Employment Bill. Secretary of Labor Wirtz articulated a 
structural unemployment discourse with the antipoverty program for poor youth in the 
Senate hearings. He emphasized the paucity of available jobs for school dropouts. 
Previously, those who dropped out of schools could get unskilled jobs and gradually 
acquire a means to learn new skills if they wished. Structural industrial changes and 
automation had deprived school dropouts of such opportunities. They would be given no 
opportunities to climb the ladder of skills, and worse, they could not survive 
financially.263 However, Wirtz argued, it would be unwise to “take Peter’s job and give it 
to Paul’s son” to address youth unemployment.264 Setting up new trades or 
apprenticeships only for school dropouts would harm existent organized interests, 
especially when school dropouts were mostly black. Instead, the bill prioritized providing 
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public aid to impoverished youth without considering what marketable skills the federal 
government would teach them. For this reason, the Youth Employment Bill could not 
specify the sorts of trades or apprenticeships the federal government would provide in the 
conservation corps.   
As a result, the Youth Employment bill did not provide any effective program to 
prepare poor and mostly African American youths for real jobs in the labor markets. 
Conservative politicians in both chambers did not miss this point. They soon pointed their 
fingers at the lack of efficiency in getting the corpsmen to acquire marketable skills as 
their reasons for disapproval when their strategy of obstructing the bill with the 
antidiscrimination clause failed.265 Conservatives also wanted to isolate the civil rights 
cause hidden in the bill and show their opposition to providing public aid to black youth 
for free.  
However, this process did not replace a manpower policy idea by Kennedy’s 
civil rights cause, as often believed by institutionalists. For instance, Margaret Weir sees 
identification of the War on Poverty with public aid to African Americans as the main 
culprit in the failure of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to implement 
previously discussed manpower programs.266 The new logic of helping poor youth was 
instead layered on the previous manpower discourse. As seen in the Labor Secretary’s 
effort above, a policy goal of helping school dropouts was carefully explained through 
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the viewpoint of structural unemployment discourse that the DOL had been championing 
for a decade. In the intercurrent combination of ideas associated with different orders 
within a single bill, those who opposed the Youth Employment bill found it easy to 
question the practicality of the programs and kill the bill.  
A policy discourse on antipoverty programs without consideration of race was 
also developed in the Kennedy administration. Inspired by a series of articles from 
various media, Kennedy created the President’s Appalachian Regional Commission on 
April 9, 1963, to address the concentrated poverty in the region.267 The Commission 
collected data that showed dire situations of people living in economically depressed 
rural areas. Kennedy ordered Undersecretary of Commerce Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. to 
create a comprehensive program to relieve poverty in East Kentucky. The administrative 
history written by the Office of Economic Opportunity officers at the end of Johnson’s 
presidency evaluated this moment as the period of devising “an action model for future 
thinking about organization and implementation” in fighting the war on poverty.268  
In fact, the problem of unemployed youth was not new to policymakers in the 
Kennedy administration. In addition to the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses 
Control Act signed by Kennedy in 1961, the MDTA of 1962 had revealed the problem of 
youth unemployment since its enactment. The original MDTA bill targeted those who 
were in the labor market but lost their jobs due to automation. In reviewing how the law 
was executed in 1963, Congress found that the program was not addressing the hardships 
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of those having no experience in the labor market, including school dropouts. State and 
local bureaucrats—for instance, state employment services officers—who took charge of 
referring the unemployed to training programs under the MDTA also tended to screen out 
the least educated for fear of unsatisfactory placement after training. This tendency, so-
called “creaming,” was widely criticized by the members of Congress and brought public 
attention to the issue of youth unemployment.269  
In sum, the rise of a new hybrid policy discourse for antipoverty-manpower 
programs was an outcome of the success of the Vocational Educational Act, the failure of 
the Youth Employment Bill, the Kennedy administration’s decision to embrace 
antipoverty programs, and the civil rights cause. The logic of layering and intercurrence 
determined the hybrid nature of the new policy discourse, which will shed a new 
analytical light on the evolution of the WOP programs.  
 
The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 
The idea of creating an umbrella bill addressing poverty stemmed from Walter 
Heller, Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), when he was asked to devise 
programs for something that could “go beyond the things that have already been 
accomplished” by President Kennedy in December 1962.270 This seems to show how 
Kennedy’s ambition to go beyond “New Frontiers” seeded War on Poverty programs that 
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were implemented by his successor, President Johnson. Also, when facing the 1964 
presidential election, Kennedy planned his return to his 1960 campaign promise to 
alleviate poverty.  
Walter Heller briefed Johnson in November 23, 1963, a day after Kennedy’s 
assassination, which the CEA had prepared for a package of antipoverty programs. 
Johnson, desperate to prove to the American public that he could be a legitimate 
successor of the slain hero, was passionate in embracing the idea of making a 
comprehensive antipoverty bill, even though Heller’s briefing did not provide any detail 
on the individual programs in the package. Johnson persuaded Heller to remain in the 
CEA to help the new administration legislate the programs in 1964.271  
In addition to the role of the CEA and its Chair, Walter Heller, in bridging the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, consensus emerged within the Kennedy 
administration in 1963 on the need for “a comprehensive structural counterpart” to the 
suggested tax reduction of 1963.272 Signed into law by President Johnson in February 
1964, the tax reduction was to promote aggregate demands of the national economy. Such 
macroeconomic measures did not directly address the economic hardships of the poor and 
the unemployed because theoretically the promoted aggregate demands by tax cuts would 
not immediately result in increased job opportunities for the unemployed. The 
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underemployed or unemployed tended to remain out of the labor markets even in an 
economic upturn due to their lack of marketable skills.273 Policymakers were aware of 
this shortcoming of the macroeconomic measure and wanted to implement supplementary 
social policies, including the Youth Unemployment Act of 1963.  
 The Economic Opportunity Act (EOA), signed into law on August 20, 1964, was 
the first legislation that started to fight the War on Poverty (WOP) declared by Johnson in 
his State of Union address on January 8, 1964. The EOA was an omnibus bill having 
several antipoverty programs that had previously been discussed in Congress but failed to 
become laws. The EOA authorized those antipoverty programs for three years from 1965 
to 1967. The EOA is divided into three functional parts: the first part addresses individual 
programs targeting different impoverished groups; the second part addresses the concept 
of community; the third part addresses the Office of Economic Opportunity, which 
monitors and coordinates all programs under the EOA.274 
The issue of youth poverty and youth unemployment stood out in the first part 
that introduced the contents of the individual programs. Title I of the act introduced three 
programs that helped school dropouts and other poor youths get another opportunity for 
decent jobs. At a cost of $190 million, the Job Corps program provided youth with 
residential centers away from their allegedly harmful living environments, which 
reflected the Youth Employment Bill of 1963 that Senator Humphrey suggested. While 
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the Youth Employment Bill of 1963 did not include an antidiscrimination clause, making 
it easier to pass in both chambers, the EOA included the clause for the Job Corps and 
Community Action programs. This shows how the hybrid discourse of antipoverty-
manpower programs became more settled in a new political environment that the civil 
right movement, the sudden death of John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson’s succession 
had cultivated. The principle of desegregation in running accommodations for the youth 
did not have to be compromised for the sake of the bill’s passage.  
In rural areas the Job Corps set up conservation camps on federal lands, such as 
deserted air bases, to give work experience to the youth, while in urban areas it created 
training centers to teach them specific skills for employment. The Work-Training 
program, the second program for youth in Title I, created the Neighborhood Youth Corps 
(NYC), at the cost of $150 million, to give underprivileged youths an opportunity to learn 
skills for jobs in their own communities. Different from the Job Corps, the NYC did not 
provide accommodations to enrollees. The third youth program in Title I of the EOA was 
financial aid to college students who had no financial support from their families. The 
amount of $72.5 million was assigned for part-time work either on or off the campus for 
these college students.275  
The rest of the individual programs under the EOA addressed other 
disadvantaged groups in society. The programs included pilot projects for educating 
illiterate adults with $25 million; loans up to $2,500 to poor farmers to finance their 
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enterprises; authority given to the director of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) 
to develop programs for migrant workers; loans to small business owners; and authority 
to the OEO director to transfer funds to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare 
for pilot projects to train and employ recipients of the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children program (AFDC). In addition, the EOA installed the Volunteers in Service to 
America (VISTA) to help Native Americans, migrant workers, the mentally ill and those 
with mental disabilities. The VISTA program was a domestic counterpart to the Peace 
Corps which was popular and successful abroad.276 
From the first part of the EOA it became evident that the Kennedy-Johnson 
administrations were paying increased attention to the antipoverty aspect from the hybrid 
discourse of antipoverty-manpower programs. Individual programs besides the Job Corps 
and NYC were mainly for welfare recipients, which the previous manpower discourse 
and its institutional champion DOL overlooked. 
The second part of the EOA addressed the concept of community action. 
Maximum feasible participation of local residents was the principle of running the 
individual programs. The purpose of community action was to involve as many residents 
as possible in making decisions on where and how to use the federal financial supports 
and technical assistance under the EOA.277 Individual antipoverty programs could 
become community action programs (CAPs) on request from local communities, and 
would be run by state or local public and private nonprofit agencies where the poor 
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themselves or their spokespersons played an active role in shaping the programs.278 The 
amount of $315 million in the first year was assigned to the community action programs, 
with 2 percent for Puerto Rico and the territories, and 20 percent at the discretion of the 
Director of Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). Of the remaining 78 percent of the 
total budget, one third would be allocated proportionately to states based on the number 
of public assistance recipients per state. The next third would be allocated proportionately 
to states based on the annual average number of unemployed. The last third would be 
proportionately allocated to states based on the number of children under 18 living in 
families with less than $1000 in annual income.279  
The formula for allocating the community action budget reveals what the hybrid 
policy discourse of antipoverty-manpower programs prioritized among various programs 
at the beginning of the WOP. For the unemployed nationwide, whom the previous 
manpower policy discourse or structural unemployment discourse targeted to address, 
one third of 78 percent of the total budget was allocated. The rest went to welfare 
recipients and poor families with children. Unlike Margaret Weir’s assumption that the 
antipoverty programs took the place of the structural unemployment policy programs, the 
policy goal of addressing the unemployed remained in the fight against poverty, even 
though the goal was marginalized in the new package of antipoverty-manpower 
programs.  
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Community action was intended to create local control towers in conducting 
individual CAPs and to funnel federal money directly to local communities without being 
interrupted by possible jurisdictional conflicts. Most of all, the federal agencies had to 
admit that they had little knowledge on what should be done first to address the urgent 
needs of the disadvantaged.280 Poverty issues differed from community to community. 
There was no one-size-fits-all solution to local poverty issues, to the dismay of the federal 
agents. In addition, those planning for the grandiose omnibus bill in late 1963—mostly 
CEA members and Bureau of Budget (BoB) staff—did not know who should be in 
charge of such comprehensive programs in the maze of bureaucratic jurisdictions within 
the executive branch. EOA programs included basic education, training skills, 
counseling, rehabilitation, other public aid, loans to farmers and small businesses 
overseen by a number of bureaus and offices, from the HEW, Departments of Labor, 
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Commerce and Interior, and state and local governments. The issue of coordinating such 
various programs loomed large in designing the EOA in late 1963.281  
In the eyes of CEA members and Budget Bureau staff, the concept of community 
action seemed to solve these governance issues between the federal and local 
communities all at once. David Hackett from the President’s Committee on Juvenile 
Delinquency and Richard Boone who planned a National Service Corps—a prototype of 
VISTA—under Attorney General Robert Kennedy in 1962 suggested the idea of 
community action to those who prepared Johnson’s first message to Congress, 
emphasizing the concept’s merit in addressing the sort of governance problems in terms 
of “knowledge, bureaucracy, and money.”282 By allowing communities to research their 
own problems and ask the federal government represented by the Office of Economic 
Opportunity (OEO) for money to address them, the community action programs would 
relieve federal agencies of the responsibility of defining the problems of concern. By 
delegating the responsibility of running individual antipoverty programs to the poor or 
their spokespersons, the existing federal and state bureaucracy could step aside and play 
just a supportive role in providing services asked by the local communities. Since Hackett 
and Boone suggested the community action programs for a few areas on an experimental 
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basis, the idea of community action seemed to help the Johnson administration start the 
War on Poverty at low cost.  
With no time to digest the concept of community action in the late 1963, CEA 
members and BoB staff overlooked its subversive nature to the existing political 
system.283 The period between Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963 and Johnson’s 
State of the Union Address in January 1964 was too short for CEA members and BoB 
staff to review the negative aspects of the experimental programs for juvenile 
delinquency conducted by Hackett. When the poor or local activists were allowed to 
directly propose almost any program to an independent federal agency under the 
president, executive departments as well as state and local bureaucrats could become 
marginalized in shaping the programs and lose their political influence on the poor.284 
The existence of gubernatorial veto power on community action projects was 
inconvenient to most of the governors because the political cost of using it seemed quite 
high for the majority of them. When President Johnson, anxious to achieve something 
grandiose in his presidency, wanted to enlarge the scope of community action programs 
from a few carefully selected regions to all states to overcome possible obstruction from 
Congress in his meeting of Walter Heller from CEA and Kermit Gordon from BoB in late 
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December 1963, the explosive power innate in the concept of community action was 
destined to spread out nationally.285  
The last part of the EOA bill was creation of the Office of Economic Opportunity 
(OEO) to coordinate all programs under the EOA. But the role of OEO was not limited to 
coordination. It administered the community action programs, Job Corps, and VISTA. 
This made the OEO too busy to play a coordinating role under the act in the years to 
come.286 While the EOA ordered the standing executive agencies to cooperate with the 
Director of OEO and give priority to assisting community action programs, no detail was 
provided about how the departments should work with the OEO in its provisions. The 
Director of OEO was simply empowered to develop guidelines and criteria for the EOA 
programs.287 
The EOA was composed of various programs serving two connected but 
different goals simultaneously: decreasing the number of unemployed individuals and 
decreasing the number of welfare recipients. No plan was in place to administer those 
programs as a whole at the beginning of the WOP programs. For instance, the Office of 
Economic Opportunity had no master plan to lead unskilled youth to adult training 
programs which were outside of OEO’s jurisdiction and the DOL’s responsibility. When 
the EOA allowed local communities to apply for funding directly to the OEO, the 
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communication between local communities and state governments was discouraged, 
further worsening the coordination problem in running antipoverty programs at the local 
and state levels.  
This lack of coordinating capability in the OEO looks like a typical 
institutionalist account concerning the American state’s exceptional quality in 
comparison to European governments. However, this was not the case when considering 
how a new hybrid policy idea for antipoverty-manpower programs arose.288 The lack of 
coordination was a policy effect of the layering of the policy package of antipoverty 
programs on the previous manpower policy package. As explained in the previous 
subsection, a new policy discourse for antipoverty programs was strengthened by such 
factors as the rise of the civil rights movement and Kennedy’s embrace of its cause in 
1963, a dynamic caused by the failure of Youth Employment Bill of 1963. Two different 
orders merged together under the WOP, leaving the Johnson administration unprepared to 
coordinate various programs.  
The conflict—or, temporary failures—in coordinating various WOP programs at 
the early stage of WOP would be part of the process of change in ways of connecting 
different institutions.289 The episodes of failing coordination during the WOP informs a 
researcher of the policy venues to examine to see which orders were in conflict and how 
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such conflict had changed (or failed to change) the previous configuration of American 
state institutions. Thus, an institutionalist account that regards failures in coordination as 
proof of the innate and unchanging characteristics of the American political system that 
prevents a comprehensive package of manpower programs from developing tends to 
mispresent the WOP, because the account regards a few snapshots as an overview of the 
complex WOP programs.290 In contrast, the WOP programs evolved through continuous 
conflicts between old and new policy orders.  
In order to trace the WOP’s change in the intercurrence of different policy 
orders, it’s important to trace where such coordination problems occurred and how they 
promoted new ways of connecting previous policies and federal agencies. The following 
historiography, in contrast to Skowronek and Orren’s view on the outcome of 
intercurrence,291 shows how confusion and uncertainty resulting from intercurrence could 
lead to a new way of coordinating various programs. 
The EOA’s initial coordination problem was evident in the authority given to 
governors to run the WOP programs. Governors had only a negative power on the 
communities’ suggestions. The EOA of 1964 gave governors a veto right to disapprove 
proposed Job Corps, community action, VISTA, and other training programs by 
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communities when the governors thought the proposed plans would not be beneficial to 
their states, especially in terms of their racial order. The principle of desegregation in 
training facilities sponsored by federal funding upset many Southerners. Conversely, 
governors’ right to veto was regarded as a major concession to Southern Democrats in 
order to pass the bill in 1964.292 However, when the election of 1964 drove the Congress 
in a more liberal direction, Congress passed the 1965 amendments that limited governors’ 
veto right further under the EOA. In the 1965 amendments, after a furious fight between 
conservatives and liberals, the Director of OEO was given power to overrule the 
governors’ veto in three out of five programs: community action, work-training program 
(or the Neighborhood Youth Corps), and adult basic education. This action enhanced the 
power of the federal government vis-à-vis state governments to a great extent, but it could 
not restrain governors’ power to disapprove Job Corps and volunteer programs 
(VISTA).293  
The fact that the 1965 Amendments allowed OEO Director Shriver to override a 
governor’s veto only selectively reveals the uneven nature of the new policy discourse for 
antipoverty-manpower programs in the WOP. For Southern Democrats and conservative 
Republicans, the presence of African Americans in their communities through Job Corps 
and possible meddling with their states’ affairs by VISTA volunteers were the last thing 
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they wanted. Even though the political stakes of consolidating the principle of 
desegregation were high for the Johnson administration and liberal congress members in 
revising the EOA, these remaining old orders were hard to quell. In contrast, the OEO 
Director could lift the governors’ veto over approved community action programs where 
many antipoverty-manpower policy experiments occurred. In fact, when Mississippi 
Governor Paul B. Johnson refused to accept $730,000 in Head Start preschool funding (a 
community action program) in southern Mississippi for fear of civil rights activists’ 
influence on the project, Shriver overrode it without damaging OEO’s legitimacy.294 
According to institutionalists’ account, the fragmented structure of the 
government had determined the scope of WOP programs during the 1960s.295 However, 
the influence of federalism on shaping the antipoverty-manpower programs differed as 
different orders collided at different programs. The case of governors’ veto in the 1965 
Amendments shows the asymmetrical effect of the principle of federalism on various 
WOP programs. 
The coordination problem was also found in financing various programs under 
different laws. Even among the federal bureaus, the coordination problem became serious 
in running the programs on a daily basis. Those who were eligible for an antipoverty 
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skills training program were often eligible for another program administered by a 
different agency. Thus, antipoverty program agencies at different levels could compete 
with each other for the same client.296 In addition, to prevent training allowances or 
subsistence allowances from being exploited by an applicant, the administrators across 
agencies needed to work together to screen out those applying for their training programs 
just for the money. Though tracing the trainees in the labor market after training was 
critical in evaluating the effectiveness of the programs, it was not easy to do that in a 
scientifically persuasive manner without a proper institutional structure that could 
promote communication among the related federal and state agencies and accumulate 
comprehensive data on program enrollees. Those who did not seek jobs right after 
training were hard to trace in the system even though President Johnson wanted every 
federal agency to apply a Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) and 
evaluate its program’s effectiveness in a systemic way in October 1965.297  
Indeed, when Senator Clark drafted the Manpower Development and Training 
Act in 1961, he foresaw such difficulty in administering different manpower programs. 
He addressed the concern for coordination by creating the Council of Manpower 
Advisers in his original bill. The role of the Council of Manpower Advisers was similar 
to that of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) in giving coherent long-term policy 
advice to the president. Clark also suggested that the executive branch publish an Annual 
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Manpower Report of the President. The Annual Manpower Report would be analogous to 
the Economic Report of the President published annually. It aimed to give further 
coherency to the national manpower policy along with an analysis of national manpower 
status. Unsurprisingly, CEA members strongly opposed the idea of creating a rival 
organization that would diminish their significance in shaping the administration’s long-
term economic goal. Most of all, CEA members did not like Senator Clark’s assumption 
that there was a manpower issue that should be addressed separately from CEA’s 
macroeconomic approach.298 After negotiating over the contents of the bill inside and 
outside the Kennedy administration, the MDTA of 1962 installed a National Manpower 
Advisory Committee chaired by the Labor Secretary, substituting for Clark’s suggestion 
to make a more powerful council on manpower policy under the president. The National 
Manpower Advisory Committee aimed to coordinate different programs at the federal 
level. The creation of state and regional advisory committees, following the model of the 
national committee, was recommended but not forced under the MDTA. The publication 
of the Annual Manpower Report was also codified by the law, under the charge of Labor 
Secretary.  
Senator Clark’s effort to install a powerful equivalent to the CEA for manpower 
policy turned out to be critical for the Johnson administration to design a new institution 
outside of standing federal bureaus for the coordination of WOP programs. It also helped 
the Labor Secretary and his department, once marginalized in running the WOP 
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programs, to legitimately reassert partial authority over training. However, it took time 
for the Johnson administration to make use of the legacy of Senator Clark’s compromise 
in installing a powerful coordinating agency.  
The Labor Department’s new role in a complex of agencies responsible for 
training can also be seen in the President’s Committee on Manpower. Two separate 
policy goals—training youth and training adults—seemed to merge through the 
committee. The Committee on Manpower was created in April 1964, almost two years 
after passage of MDTA of 1962, to comply with the law’s provision to create the 
National Manpower Advisory Committee.299 The Committee was a coordination 
mechanism among federal agencies for training programs, consisting of 14 cabinet 
members and a few independent agency heads. The Secretary of Labor was designated to 
chair the Committee even though many training programs were administered by the 
Secretary of HEW.300  
When the idea of creating the President’s Committee on Manpower was 
circulated inside the Johnson administration early in 1964, it was also informally shared 
by cabinet members that the OEO Director would be invited to the Committee once the 
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EOA was enacted.301 The Johnson administration intended to install an ad hoc institution 
to coordinate training programs before passage of EOA.  
However, the President’s Committee on Manpower remained dormant for a 
while. It appeared that nobody knew exactly what the Office of Economic Opportunity, 
an institution created to administer War on Poverty programs, could do to promote 
coordination of a maze of training programs across jurisdictions, discouraging the 
Secretary of Labor from intervening in OEO’s activities and taking the coordinating role.  
When the 1966 Amendments to the EOA redefined the role of the President’s 
Committee on Manpower in promoting coordination among “all programs and activities 
within the executive branch of the Government relating to the training of individuals for 
the purpose of improving or restoring employability,” the EOA became intertwined with 
the previous training programs of the federal government.302 The EOA, focusing on 
enhancing the employability among poor youth, became connected with the MDTA 
through the President’s Committee on Manpower.  
It appeared that two different sets of “principles and methods of operations” in 
Orren and Skowronek’s sense merged through the President’s Committee in 1966.303 
Weir’s and Quadagno’s analyses which commonly assume a policy preference in WOP 
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programs for black youth neglect to see that the logic of intercurrence, or simultaneous 
operation of different political orders,304 had determined the policy development in the 
WOP training programs.  
 
Implications of the Legislative Developments 
To summarize, the legislative history concerning training programs during the 
1960s reveals that training programs were intertwined. A training program from the 
Manpower Development and Training Act, for instance, was developed in tandem with 
other training programs like Area Redevelopment Act during the period. When the latter 
expired, the former included some parts of the latter in its amendments. The declaration 
of War on Poverty by Johnson in 1964 was not a complete departure from the past policy 
in the same vein; rather it was another attempt to synthesize previous fragmented 
attempts to address unemployment and youth delinquency. Unlike Quadagno’s 
assumption that there was a policy rupture between the New Deal welfare regime and the 
equal opportunity welfare regime, policy debates over the series of legislation as to 
training continued from the 1950s to the 1960s. Especially, Humphrey’s repetitive failure 
in enacting the bill for youth unemployment created a new policy process that was not 
foreseen when President Kennedy embraced the political cause of the Youth Employment 
Bill and ordered to enlarge the youth component of MDTA. Even though Kennedy 
appeared to keep a distance from civil rights, to the liberals’ disappointment, and showed 
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lukewarm support for the movement after his inauguration, his endorsement of the 
Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act in 1961 and his effort to absorb 
some components of Humphrey’s bill forced the Congress to confront racial inequality 
through the issue of youth unemployment.  
In a sense, addressing youth unemployment became a litmus test for political 
support for 1960s liberalism. This point is overlooked in Weir’s viewpoint that the CEA 
chair Walter Heller and his staffers established the issue of poor youth unilaterally in 
designing the War on Poverty. The CEA, Weir argues, had more institutional power over 
the DOL in determining the contents of the WOP.305 However, Senator Humphrey’s bill 
for youth unemployment became a major part of the Economic Opportunity Act. Job 
Corps centers in article I of the EOA undergirded the point that for a decade there were 
continuous legislative developments before the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.  
Therefore, Weir’s account that the DOL’s attempt to install a Nordic-style active 
labor market policy of training and retraining to address late 1950s unemployment had 
stalled due to Johnson’s abrupt turn to unemployed youth should be reconsidered. Weir 
provides an institutionalist argument that focuses on a conjuncture where more than two 
structural factors meet in deciding the following path. She argues that the series of events 
such as Johnson’s unexpected succession to the presidency which led him to pursue 
something very ambitious for the sake of legitimacy, and the rise of the civil rights 
movement in the South became intertwined with the institutional factors that had 
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hindered the development of coordinating capacities for active labor market policy in the 
federal government. However, when it comes to the legislative developments before the 
EOA, training programs in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were not fully 
determined by such conjuncture. Instead, as shown above, the training programs had 
evolved in continuous policy debates and discussions both within and outside the 
administrations.  
In addition, an emergent political process that was created by congressional 
discussion of the Youth Employment Bill of 1963 forced the Kennedy administration to 
perceive that its stakes were high in addressing racial inequality in the labor market. In 
Humphrey’s attempt to pass the Youth Employment Bill, the principle of desegregation 
in building the Youth Conservation Corps turned out to be the key issue that drove a 
wedge between liberals and Southerners and finally killed the bill in Congress. When 
Walter Heller, chair of the CEA, suggested a package of social policies for poor youth 
first to Kennedy and later to Johnson, his idea of prioritizing youth unemployment 
actually reflected policy developments that preceded 1964. He could find the idea of 
addressing poor youth rather than the adult employed more appropriate to his policy 
preference for macroeconomic stimulus, which seemed to lead him to suggest a package 
of antipoverty programs. 
I find here the logic of intercurrence in social policy where different 
considerations, such as the civil rights movement, economic necessity (from Heller and 
the CEA), personal ambition (Johnson), previously developed structural unemployment 
discourse, and newly developed antipoverty policy discourse, met at a historical point and 
forged a new form of social policy by creatively reworking previous legislative 
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developments. This model for change is incremental because it does not presume an 
appearance of new interest, new institution, or abrupt discontinuity of order that governs 
the previous condition. Instead, continuous interactions among different considerations or 
orders within a new policy package were able to bring further change to policy and 
polity. As Orren and Skowronek write, previous orders are not completely replaced with 
the new ones. Rather, a policy change is more like the rise of another patchwork of 
multiple orders because a new policy element is usually added on top of the previous 
ones, as seen in the legislative developments above, which is also described as layering 
by Schickler or Mahoney and Thelen.306     
Furthermore, the 1966 Amendments to the EOA reactivated the President’s 
Committee on Manpower, created in 1962 but dormant, in order to coordinate training 
programs among federal agencies during the WOP. Counter to Weir’s perspective that the 
DOL—the institutional site of active labor market policy for adults—became 
marginalized at first by the CEA and later by the OEO in waging the war on poverty, the 
DOL retained some control over federal training programs through the President’s 
Committee on Manpower, as DOL Secretary Wirtz became its chair. This does not mean 
that the U.S. government had attained a very effective coordinating tool for numerous 
training programs since the creation of the President’s Committee. Rather, the creation of 
the President’s Committee allowed multiple orders and principles that govern different 
training programs to coexist with WOP’s initial emphasis on rehabilitating poor youth. 
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Put another way, the logic of intercurrence had been shaping the contours of WOP 
programs, which had provided sources of continuous adaptations to the fragmented 
structure of the American state. Institutionalists like Weir and Quadagno tend to neglect 
this point.  
Therefore, what deserves due scholarly attention is whether there was no 
meaningful adult training program during the War on Poverty, and if any programs 
existed, why they remained marginalized in the process of policymaking. In addition, 
how racism in the labor market and urban uprisings in major cities influenced the 
directions of training programs development during the 1960s should be addressed in 
order to know the possibility as well as the limits of the War on Poverty. The following 
section addresses these concerns.   
 
State Capacity to Adjust and a Recurrent Theme of Training the 
Nondisadvantaged after 1964  
The theme of training adults did not disappear in the Johnson administration. The 
failure of the tripartite attempt through the LMAC to moderate the intractable industrial 
conflicts of the 1950s seemed to significantly undermine the policy position of the 
Department of Labor (DOL). Moreover, Johnson’s obsession with grandiose programs to 
persuade the American public that he was a legitimate successor of the slain reformist 
president left little room for the DOL’s goal of upgrading skills among the general 
workforce to meet structural unemployment, and restructuring market institutions in the 
process. The idea of retraining the unemployed was not fresh enough to bring the 
American public’s attention to Johnson’s standpoint. When the Johnson administration 
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immediately embarked on antipoverty programs which at first targeted poor youths in 
urban and rural areas, the DOL’s policy goal seemed marginalized. However, this 
approach which many scholars of 1960s American politics share turns out to be 
inconsistent with the development of many work experience and training programs in the 
latter part of the War on Poverty.  
Most of the previous scholarship on the War on Poverty presumes that the 
Johnson administration clung to its initial goal of addressing the poor. Implicit in such an 
approach was the assumption that federal, state, and local governments had no interest in 
reforming themselves and adjusting to emergent policy needs of the time, out of their lack 
of capacity to do so or their intention to stick to the initially declared goal to fight poverty 
by addressing poor youth. Following the State of the Union Address of January 1964, the 
conventional view assumes that the Johnson administration’s policy goal in administering 
antipoverty programs was not likely to change even though those programs were not 
successful in achieving the goal.  
 However, as described in the previous section, the legislative history of the 1960s 
on federal and state training programs had evolved to accommodate emergent social 
problems and to meet changing economic conditions and—crucially—political 
conditions. The Johnson administration’s training programs under the WOP followed 
suit.   
The Johnson administration changed its position on manpower policy, 
maintaining at face value its emphasis on youth unemployment, especially for those 
living in urban ghettos, yet simultaneously the administration discussed how to update 
training programs, including those provided by the MDTA and the EOA. Three moments 
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drove the administration to consider change in its policy emphasis on youth 
unemployment to meet emergent societal needs. Administrators’ experience in running 
the training programs after enactment of the EOA in 1964 also led them to consider 
revising the existing programs. The first moment was late 1965 when a threat of inflation 
due to a shortage of qualified workers concerned Johnson’s economic advisers and led 
them to modify their previous preference for macroeconomic fiscal policy. The second 
moment was late 1966 when cabinet heads related to federal manpower programs were 
asked to submit their opinions about amending the MDTA, opening room to discuss 
different policy approaches to labor markets. The third moment was the summer of 1967 
when Martin Luther King Jr. asked President Johnson to create jobs in the public sector 
for urban ghetto dwellers, which also stirred the administration with a policy idea for 
public employment. These moments led the Johnson administration to reconsider its own 
policy position as to manpower programs, which are elaborated below in chronological 
order.   
 
The Threat of Inflation and Expansion of the On-the-Job Training  
The first moment in reconsidering the strategy to address unskilled hardcore 
unemployed came in November 1965. Labor Secretary W. Willard Wirtz, who had 
adjusted to President Johnson’s emphasis on youth poverty since the State of Union 
Address of 1964, floated a policy idea of setting up a Human Resources Development 
Program on November 3, 1965, at the Mayor’s Conference on Employment in Chicago. 
The program was to conduct a public relations campaign in major cities to encourage the 
unemployed to voluntarily register as unemployed and let city governments counsel them 
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individually and provide tailored employment services to them. The Department of Labor 
provided those enrolled with remedial education, skill training, and other services in 
support of city governments.307 This plan was in line with Johnson’s antipoverty 
programs, embracing WOP’s priority in addressing the unskilled poor.  
Despite its consistency with other major antipoverty programs, Charles L. 
Schultze, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (BoB), opposed Wirtz’s suggestion for 
fear of repetition and high costs. According to Schultze, Wirtz’s plan was unnecessary 
because the Department of HEW already had a long list of welfare recipients, most of 
whom would be on the roster of the Human Resources Development Program. The 
efforts to get the unemployed to voluntarily register on the new program’s list could also 
inflict unnecessary costs on already overburdened welfare offices in city governments.308 
Considering the BoB’s constant concern for balanced budgets, Schultze’s refusal to 
endorse Wirtz’s new program seemed normal.   
However, CEA Chair Gardner Ackley’s letter to the President changed the 
mundane exchanges between federal bureaus. Ackley’s memo of November 29, 1965 to 
Joseph Califano, Special Assistant to the President, revealed that the CEA staff started to 
be concerned with the possibility of prices rises in the coming months.309 Thus, the CEA 
advised the President to immediately expand the MDTA to meet increased demand for 
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skilled workers in key manufacturing industries. If the heightened demand of production 
in the manufacturing industries was unmet with the timely supply of skilled labor, wage 
increases would ensue and accelerate inflation, which would jeopardize the public’s 
shared sense of material affluence—a basis of public support for WOP programs. 
Ackley’s memo was forwarded by President Johnson to his Secretary Labor to create a 
concrete plan to expand the MDTA.  
In fact, the CEA unexpectedly faced the possibility of inflation in late 1965. 
Relying on the administration’s guidepost for prices and wages, the CEA at first believed 
that it could contain the inflationary pressure successfully, despite the possible increase in 
production of war resources in the escalation of war in Vietnam. Federal Reserve Chair 
William McChesney Martin insisted on higher interest rates to slow down the economy in 
the autumn of 1965. But the CEA did not consider it necessary, based on their confidence 
in the effectiveness of their guideposts to curb wage and price increases. The relative 
calmness of macroeconomic indexes by the autumn of 1965 seemed to support the CEA’s 
judgement.310 However, the CEA figured out from the Commerce Department’s survey in 
late November that the private sector planned to increase its investments to a significant 
degree for the next year to meet increased demands from the war, which would promote 
inflation. To the CEA, “for the first time the danger was now viewed as one of too much 
expansion rather than of too little.”311 The CEA took steps to prevent inflation, which 
                                                 
310 Matusow, The Unraveling of America, 159-60. 
311 Administrative History of the Council of Economic Advisers, Vol. I, Chapter 2, p. 15, Box 1, LBJ 
Library. 
176 
included suggesting tax increases in the following year and suggesting that the 
Department of Labor raise skilled labor more quickly.   
In response, Labor Secretary Wirtz set up a “special inter-departmental group” 
consisting of representatives from the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and CEA to 
research the skill shortages in December 1965. The group was under the chairmanship of 
the Commissioner of Labor Statistics, Arthur Ross.312 The Commissioner reported at the 
end of December that several geographical areas such as Detroit, Milwaukee, Cleveland, 
Cincinnati, and Seattle had started to experience tightening up of labor supplies. 
Commissioner Ross also reported that the shortages of skilled workers concerned 
industries such as communication equipment, basic steel, iron and steel foundries, and 
farm machinery. Labor shortages in these industries would put upward pressure on wages 
within the coming months.313 Secretary of Labor Wirtz, after receiving the dire report 
from the Commissioner, informed the President that there would be “acute and fairly 
general shortages” in manpower in four to six months.314  
In February 1966, Labor Statistics Commissioner Ross expressed a similar 
concern for labor shortages nationwide as before in his second report to the Secretary of 
Labor. He warned that the problem of labor shortages had worsened even though the 
private sector experimented with improvisational ways to mitigate it. Ross indicated that 
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training activities under MDTA programs started to prioritize addressing the occupations 
in short supply, which slowed down the rising labor shortages in the industries 
experiencing them. Major manufacturing industries were reported to hire graduates from 
local MDTA programs to solve their labor shortages, which inspired the Secretary. Ross 
also found that employers were seeking new ways to overcome labor shortages such as 
“scheduling longer workweeks, removing age barriers, and lowering educational and 
experience requirements,”315 all of which helped individual companies to lessen the 
intensity of damage from general skill shortages.  
Labor Secretary Wirtz grasped this opportunity to enhance the Department of 
Labor’s bureaucratic capacity to monitor and coordinate existing training programs by 
creating an Assistant Secretary of Labor for Manpower who would be in charge of the 
tasks.316 Wirtz’s effort was summarized in the President’s Manpower Report which was 
submitted to Congress in March 1966. The Manpower Report suggested the 
establishment of the office of Assistant Secretary of Labor. The Report also promised to 
make full use of MDTA to meet prospective manpower shortages through on-the-job 
training, which had been underused compared to MDTA’s institutional training 
programs.317  
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Previously, on-the-job (OJT) training programs under the MDTA were 
underused for a political reason. The Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training (BAT) in 
the DOL, which was assigned to oversee of OJT programs, seemed captured by special 
interests such as the building trades. The rest of the Labor Department, doubtful of 
BAT’s ability to run the program impartially, was not cooperating with the Bureau and 
allocated no additional Bureau staff for the OJT programs.318 In addition, private 
employers were reluctant to participate in the OJT programs because of low returns. 
MDTA’s allowances for trainees could not be used to subsidize wages because of union 
opposition and union laws which banned paying trainees at a different rate. Labor unions 
were afraid of the possibility that trainees could be used to quell union members in the 
workplace by hiring cheaper trainees in case of strikes or other labor disputes.319 Thus, 
OJT program enrollees were paid wages equal to those normally paid at industry entry 
level. The MDTA could reimburse private employers only for training costs at the 
average rate of $25 per week, while employers had to risk inefficiency in production 
during the training.320  
The labor shortages starting from the end of 1965 had changed the situation. 
Employers’ lukewarm attitude toward MDTA’s OJT programs had changed due to 
employers’ need to hire more workers. This change in attitude among employers was not 
                                                 
318 Mangum, MDTA: Foundation of Federal Manpower Policy, 46. 
319 As to the restraints on U.S. training programs, including rigid regulations on wages, see Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, On-the-Job Training and Wage-Hour Standards in Foreign 
Countries, Bulletin No. 1610 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), 5.  
320 Mangum, MDTA: Foundation of Federal Manpower Policy, 62. 
179 
overlooked by the officials on the DOL’s Federal Committee on Apprenticeship. DOL 
officials started to contract with trade associations or industrial organizations like the 
National Tool, Die, and Precision Machining Association at the national level and let 
them fill local OJT positions with their member firms.321 This form of subcontracting 
local OJT positions greatly decreased the cost of running the OJT programs by the federal 
agency. The DOL would have had difficulty in finding ways to persuade reluctant 
individual employers to participate in OJT programs without the subcontracting.  
However, the expansion of OJT programs through subcontracting created a new 
problem. Not only trade associations but also state apprenticeship agencies or 
nongovernmental organizations like the Urban League could be prime contractors in the 
national contract with the BAT. The number of prime contractors had increased 
significantly, which in turn increased the cost of monitoring numerous subcontracts for 
local OJT positions with the limited number of BAT staff.322 In the situation, some 
employers could get subsidized under the MDTA- OJT program for training their own 
employees whom they would have trained even without the OJT program. MDTA-OJT 
contractors were also known to bid against one another to get a contract with the same 
individual employer, which deepened the monitoring problem in individual OJT 
contracts.323 The problem was unsolved during Johnson’s presidency.   
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 The MDTA-OJT programs expanded to consume 35 percent of the total budget 
allocated to the MDTA while the remaining 65 percent was spent on training the 
disadvantaged.324 Despite the difficulty in running OJT programs, expansion of the 
MDTA-OJT programs shows that the War on Poverty period was not devoted exclusively 
to helping the unskilled young. This was also proved by President Johnson’s memo in 
1966 to Labor Secretary Wirtz, which emphasized dual goals of the administration’s 
manpower policy. Johnson suggested to Labor Secretary Wirtz, who was the chair of the 
President’s Committee on Manpower, that “full recognition be given both to the special 
problems of the disadvantaged and to the manpower shortage situations which are 
developing in some parts of the country and in certain occupations.”325  
The episode described here has significant implications in theorizing the War on 
Poverty. First, the CEA’s preference for macroeconomic measures over interventionist 
labor market policies did not remain unchanged throughout the War on Poverty, which 
runs counter to Weir’s perspective which assumed the policy preferences of federal 
agencies as quite fixed. The CEA had the upper hand in shaping WOP training programs 
and preferred its macroeconomic approach to the general unemployment issue. 
Keynesians in the CEA thought the active labor market policy unnecessary in addressing 
the creeping unemployment rates in the early 1960s because they believed that aggregate 
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economic growth would solve the problem without creating new programs.326 Without 
giving any chance for the DOL to implement active labor market policies through new 
training programs and public jobs, the CEA had limited the DOL’s role to that of running 
the Job Corps at the beginning of the WOP. Weir is correct as long as her snapshot-like 
explanation is related to the initiation and early period of the WOP. However, the 
situation changed as the threat of inflation became a major concern for policymakers in 
late 1965. The CEA, adjusting to the economic contingency, started to argue for the 
necessity of on-the-job training to address manpower “bottlenecks” that would intensify 
the inflationary pressure on wages. The CEA’s policy preference changed and returned 
the DOL to the center of WOP training programs. 
When faced with the threat of inflation, the CEA could reactivate the DOL’s 
dormant policy capabilities and guide them to train the broader population to solve the 
shortage of skilled labor because the DOL retained capacity, despite the WOP’s emphasis 
on youth poverty. In this sense, the logic of intercurrence or layering reemerged. This 
episode shows how multiple orders can provide resources for policy entrepreneurs to 
solve emergent problems. The CEA’s entrepreneurship in recomposing resources to 
address a new task reveals that intercurrence can promote policy innovation.327  
                                                 
326 Notice that the Kennedy administration tried to woo the business community with its proposal for tax 
cuts.  
327 “When we deliberate, we work in effect as Levi-Straus’s bricoleur (1966), rummaging through the 
available resources of partially relevant habits, whole and broken, as well as salient impulses, to cobble 
together a new solution, in Dewey’s terms, a “path of action.”” Gerald Berk and Dennis Galvan, “How 
People Experience and Change Institutions: A Field Guide to Creative Syncretism,” Theory and Society 38, 
no. 6 (November 2009): 543–80, at 554. 
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Second, the fragmented nature of the American state turned out to be functional 
in helping federal agencies to seek together a new solution for the possible inflation. The 
dominance of the CEA over other federal agencies at the beginning of the Johnson 
administration unexpectedly revealed the weakness and limitation of the Keynesian 
approach. Without a fragmented and nonhierarchically organized bureaucracy, the first-
round competition between the CEA and DOL over Johnson’s economic policy and the 
former’s victory would have resulted in significant loss in accumulated expertise by the 
DOL in addressing structural unemployment. However, the DOL remained quite intact, 
retaining its expertise on labor market policy thanks to the less centralized structure of the 
federal government which is often highlighted by institutionalists as a source of failure in 
implementing social policy. When the possible inflation of 1965 threatened the CEA’s 
ultimate goal of achieving stable economic growth, the CEA could turn to the DOL for its 
expertise in labor market policy. This situation confounds researchers who study how the 
War on poverty was waged during the 1960s and why it failed for institutional reasons. 
What promoted collaboration among federal agencies and between BAT and numerous 
subcontractors like trades associations, state apprenticeship agencies, and 
nongovernmental organizations was an emergent process initiated by the threat of 
inflation or by the CEA’s failure in predicting private investments in late 1965.328  
In the emergent situation the roles of federal agencies and their capacities to 
address the situation are adjusted in an entrepreneurial effort to reactivate dormant 
                                                 
328 No federal agency anticipated the threat of inflation in late 1965 and the shortage of skills that inflation 
would accompany. In the sense, the process of responding to it and creating a new form of collaboration 
among federal agencies is “emergent” in Padgett and Powell’s, Connally’s and Berk’s sense. See fn 215.  
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elements—for example, a previous manpower policy, inactive bureaucratic offices like 
BAT—or sometimes to borrow a new form of coordination from somewhere, such as a 
subcontracting practice among companies, which this subsection attempts to analyze. In 
this regard, whether the fragmentation of the American state hinders the United States 
from meeting emergent problems or not must be an empirical question. The answer will 
differ case by case based on the process and way of reorganizing intercurrent governing 
capacities to address a given emergent task by an entrepreneur or an entrepreneurial 
group of policymakers.  
Third, the emergent process initiated by the threat of inflation did not result in the 
creation of permanent coordination mechanisms for OJT, which is congruent with 
institutionalists’ conclusion. But this outcome was not simply due to no coordinating 
institution in the American political economy, which the institutionalist perspective often 
indicates as a prime source of problems in liberal market economies. Rather, the 
expansion of OJT through subcontracting created another problem that greatly increased 
the cost of monitoring individual contracts by a federal agency. The failure of OJT 
programs after 1965 is better explained by delving into continuous responses to new 
tasks, which also created new emergent processes where previous interests and 
preferences were articulated in a new manner. 
 
Three Competing Policy Ideas in Creating Adult Work Programs in 1966 
The Johnson administration started to pay attention to the issue of unemployed 
adults in 1965. A Task Force on Adult Work Programs was created at President 
Johnson’s request to develop community work programs that address chronically poor 
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adults in local communities in 1965. The Task Force worked out of public view, which in 
a sense explains why previous scholars like Weir and Quadagno failed to notice it. 
When realizing that the unemployed remained even in economic upturns, 
Johnson asked his cabinet members for additional programs for unemployed adults.329 
The Task Force on Adult Programs, chaired by Elmer B. Staats from the Bureau of the 
Budget, came up with three proposals in November 1965, representing respectively the 
policy positions of HEW, DOL, and OEO on unemployed adults. The contents of the 
three proposals and the way of discussing them within the administration show that 
different approaches to unemployment had competed with one another in the Johnson 
administration regardless of the administration’s initial priority of addressing youth 
poverty in 1964.  
The first proposal came from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW). HEW suggested providing work experience to Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) mothers in public or nonprofit jobs.330 Such programs were possible 
without any legislative change because Title V of the Economic Opportunity Act had 
already directed OEO Director to delegate the Secretary of HEW to embark on pilot 
projects to employ and train heads of families receiving help under the AFDC program. 
Enlarging Title V of EOA would just suffice to fulfill HEW’s suggestion, which also 
shows the merit of the strategy of layering in bringing meaningful policy change.  
                                                 
329 Memo, the Bureau of the Budget to Joseph Califano, 12/3/65, C.F. JL, WHCF, Box 60, LBJ Library.  
330 “Adult Work and Training Programs: Discussion Paper,” the Task Force on Adult Work Programs, no 
date, attached to the Bureau of the Budget’s memo to Joseph Califano, 12/3/65, C.F. JL, WHCF, Box 60, 
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The Task Force members all agreed on the proposal of the HEW, which proved a 
consensus on the importance of decreasing welfare dependence without allocating extra 
money to the programs. Giving an opportunity for welfare recipients to learn skills for 
jobs provided by local public or nonprofit institutions seemed to conform to the principle 
of “individual liberalism” which President Johnson personally championed to counter 
welfare dependence.331 HEW’s approach to the adult unemployed focused on 
rehabilitating welfare recipients and returning them to the labor market with an ability to 
stand on their feet.  
While the Task Force on Adult Work Programs agreed to HEW’s suggestion, it 
disagreed on choosing between proposals from the Department of Labor and the Office of 
Economic Opportunity.332 The White House was asked to make a final decision after 
consulting with the CEA and BoB staff. The DOL suggested enlarging MDTA training 
programs for the hardcore poor, while the OEO suggested creation of public jobs on a 
permanent basis. The DOL’s proposal was to relax the requirements of MDTA training to 
accommodate hardcore poor adults. In the DOL’s proposal, one could apply for the 
MDTA programs if unemployed for 15 weeks or more. The previous requirement of the 
MDTA training programs was more than two years of work experience. In the DOL’s 
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proposal, those who were not actively searching for jobs could apply for the programs. 
The DOL’s proposal also aimed to relax the previous MDTA requirement that there be 
reasonable expectation of employment as a condition for approval of training. The 
hardcore poor, if they were nonwhites, were highly unlikely to be hired in the targeted 
jobs even after finishing the MDTA program, and thus would not be admitted to the 
training program in the first place.333 Overall, the DOL’s proposal was consistent with its 
long-championed principle of using job training as a tool to make the workforce capable 
enough to adjust itself to new demands from the labor market. After training under the 
MDTA, the trainee could work for public or nonprofit entities. The DOL’s program had 
time limits: those under 45 years of age could work for a year in the provided jobs, while 
those between 45 and 55 could work for two years.  
The OEO’s public employment program was to “create new public and semi-
public jobs at the sub-professional and unskilled occupation levels.”334 The requirements 
for entering the program were meager, if any, which was intended by the OEO to address 
as many poor adults as possible. Program enrollees would not have to move out of the 
program, while the DOL’s program had limits on the period being hired by public or 
semipublic institutions. Because of the financial burden of running unlimited jobs for the 
adult poor, CEA member Otto Eckstein expressed his concern about the OEO’s 
                                                 
333 “Possible Changes in the Manpower Development and Training Program (MDTA): Bureau of Budget 
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suggestion.335 Also, the threat of an overheated economy concerned CEA members as 
well as other administrative economists in late 1965. OEO’s proposal for creating jobs, if 
accepted, could worsen the upward pressure on prices and wages, according to the 
economists.  
 Surprisingly, all three proposals from the HEW, DOL, and OEO became reality 
after the Amendments of 1966 to the EOA. AFDC recipients were provided with work-
training experience under the EOA’s Title V, while requirements for the MDTA 
program’s applicants were relaxed to accommodate racial minorities. The period of 
training under the MDTA was expanded for the most disadvantaged, providing them with 
basic education. OEO’s proposal to create jobs at a subprofessional level also became 
realized. The House Democratic Study Group (DSG) supported the OEO’s idea of 
creating public and semipublic jobs for the hardcore poor by issuing a policy proposal, 
which supported the OEO’s policy idea. Representative James H. Scheuer (D—N.Y.) led 
the DSG’s Full Employment Steering Committee to pressure the administration to create 
public jobs in January 1966.336 In December 1966, the DOL was delegated to run “New 
Careers,” the OEO’s proposal for public and semipublic jobs, by the OEO.337 Though the 
New Careers program did not create permanent jobs, it created subprofessional level jobs 
auxiliary to professional jobs. Those new jobs would not have been created without the 
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program. New Careers provided training assistance to adult unemployed for “entry-level 
employment opportunities in subprofessional positions that can lead to career 
advancement in such fields as health, education, welfare, neighborhood redevelopment, 
and public safety.”338 Practical nurses, aides in dental offices, assistant teachers, social 
workers, and others were trained by the program, which began in August 1967 under the 
Bureau of Work-Training Programs in the Manpower Administration of the DOL. 
Enrollees of the New Careers program were paid $1.60 per hour, up to 40 hours per 
week. During the first year of training, the Federal government would pay 90 percent of 
all costs. Employers would pay up to 50 percent of enrollees’ wages during the second 
year of training. The training provided supplementary education for entry level positions 
as well as on-the-job training.339  
The episode of three policy alternatives developed in late 1965 to address the 
issue of adult unemployment reveals that no linear policy development existed, starting 
from a relatively fixed policy preference of a federal agency. The Task Force on Adult 
Work Programs struggled to come to an agreement among the three proposals that 
respectively represented different values in addressing poverty and unemployment. 
Despite the financial burdens in embarking on new programs during year two of the 
Vietnam War, these proposals became successful and effective programs in the following 
year.  
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189 
The way that the three different policy ideas were discussed within the Johnson 
administration and chosen as parts of the Amendments of 1966 to the EOA provides us 
with a good reference point about how the American state, though fragmented at its face 
value, could work. When asked by the White House for policy proposals to address 
unemployed adults, HEW, DOL, and OEO submitted three proposals that respectively 
reflected each department’s policy orientation. It shows that the discursive capacities for 
adult training were still present within the administration even after the passage of the 
EOA that allegedly prioritized training poor youth.  
This is a different discursive landscape from the one depicted by Quadagno. Far 
from her assumption that the principle—the cause of equal opportunity—that governed 
the 1960s welfare regime was coherent and consistent, the Johnson administration was 
able to tap different principles to enlarge adult training in late 1965. In discussing the 
three policy proposals, policymakers within the administration competed not for the 
policies’ principles and philosophies but for their costs and effectiveness. As a result, 
President Johnson could be pragmatic in eclectically choosing proper policy packages to 
solve the issue of adult unemployment. 
It is also noteworthy that the relative power among the HEW, DOL, and OEO 
did not determine which proposal became part of the 1966 Amendments to the EOA. 
Instead, the White House embraced all the proposals after moderations undertaken by the 
BoB. The best strategy might be for the White House to embrace all of the proposals 
because it could not know which proposal would generate positive policy outcomes. Such 
“pluralism” in policy choice might be common in the American state which is too 
fragmented for a federal agency to impose a single order on the rest of the administration.  
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Martin Luther King’s Urge to “Hire Now, Train Later” and Public Jobs in 1967 
Martin Luther King Jr. sent a telegram to the White House on July 25, 1967. He 
condemned Congress’s failure to stem the causes of urban uprisings by enacting 
progressive bills. Existing programs for the poor had been underfunded and watered 
down by the Congress. Many civil rights activists felt frustrated with Congress’s 
sluggishness. Congress’s inaction continued even after a series of urban uprisings before 
1967. King’s suggestion for solving the problem was simple: revive the Works Progress 
Administration (WPA) from the New Deal to create jobs immediately for those in urban 
ghettos. He wanted the federal government to create public sector jobs without waiting 
for new legislation. But those jobs should not be conditional on training, he urged. 
“Training [needed to] follow … employment,” King stated, because he was skeptical of 
the previous work-training programs that put additional hurdles in front of black 
employment. Blacks had often been screened out before getting the training.340  
King’s telegram, combined with dire situations in major cities, forced the 
Johnson administration to consider the creation of WPA-style jobs in urban areas. The 
White House, confused about the causes of the urban uprisings, wanted to do something 
to defuse the uprisings by all means, including symbolic gestures. Johnson desperately 
attempted to address the suspicion of any connection between his antipoverty programs 
and the factors that sowed urban uprisings, because the fate of the War on Poverty 
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seemed reliant on complete vindication of the antipoverty programs. To this end 
President Johnson ardently sought policy advice concerning urban joblessness from his 
cabinet members. King’s diagnosis and policy suggestion in the midst of such uncertainty 
had a significant influence which the White House could not ignore. 
Secretary of Labor Wirtz drafted a quick reply to King on July 28 by relying on 
DOL’s “concentrated employment program” which aimed to guide local private 
employers to offer jobs to the urban poor. By incentivizing employers who would not 
have offered these available jobs otherwise, Wirtz believed that the concentrated 
employment program could mitigate the aimless anger of the rioters.341 However, the 
concentrated employment program was in line with DOL’s work-experience programs 
that accompanied training with work opportunities as in the New Careers program, from 
which King distinguished his proposal of public works.342   
Not fully satisfied with Wirtz’s idea, Johnson sought another round of policy 
advice from his cabinet members. In September 1967, President Johnson had two 
proposals for public works program before him.343 One, from Labor Secretary Wirtz, 
suggested a billion dollar public works programs on a 75-25 percent matching basis 
which expected to produce about 400,000 jobs. Wirtz’s proposal for asking the Congress 
to appropriate an extra billion dollars would leave the previous antipoverty programs 
                                                 
341 Draft: Wire to Martin Luther King Jr., W. Willard Wirtz to Martin Luther King Jr., no date, attached to 
Wirtz’s memo to the President, 7/28/67, Ex LA 2, WHCF, Box 8, LBJ Library. 
342 As to the concentrated employment program as part of the New Careers program of the Department of 
Labor, see Administrative History of the Department of Labor, Vol. 2, Part I, p. 92, Box 1, LBJ Library. 
343 Memo, Califano to the President, 9/12/67, Ex LA 2, WHCF, Box 8, LBJ Library.  
192 
financially uncompromised. The public works programs would be added to the previous 
antipoverty programs. Meanwhile, Wirtz did not hide his suspicion of the necessity of 
such additional public works programs because he believed it would take time for the 
newly added antipoverty programs under the revised MDTA and EOA to have effects. 
Wirtz believed it was too early to embark on a new public works program despite the 
political urgency.344  
The other proposal submitted to President Johnson was prepared by Secretary of 
Transportation Alan Boyd. He suggested increasing tax revenues mainly from gasoline 
tax increases to finance public works such as local street maintenance and repair, ghetto 
cleanup, beautification and repair, and school repair. He suggested the federal 
government take almost 100 percent of the costs because the 75-25 percent matching 
requirement might slow down the program to a great extent.345  
Johnson remained undecided on which proposal he would choose. He was 
familiar with the WPA-style public works program as he had successfully brought two 
WPA projects to his 10th district back in his days as a member of House in 1938.346 
However, the liberal coalition of the Senate, under the leadership of Senator Clark (D—
PA), also pursued an emergency public works program out of possible savings from 
Johnson’s nondefense programs and wanted to add the program to the Johnson 
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administration’s antipoverty bill.347 The administration’s bill for WOP programs, initially 
$2.25 billion, would cost more than $5 billion if it included $2.8 billion for Clark’s 
program for ghetto jobs. This would risk the bill’s passage on the Senate floor because of 
its swollen price tag.348 Johnson took the liberal coalition’s attempt as an assault on his 
antipoverty programs and decided not to endorse the WPA style public works programs 
suggested.349 
Instead the Johnson administration came up with a new policy proposal to 
substitute the public works proposals. Califano (Special Assistant to the President), 
McNamara (Defense), Wirtz (Labor), Trowbridge (Commerce), Wood (HUD), Hughes 
(District Court Judge), and Gaither (White House Aide) worked together to devise a new 
program on a pilot basis that assisted big businesses to locate in the ghetto and provide 
training and employment for the disadvantaged. The program would provide those 
deciding to invest in the five cities selected on a pilot basis with “Federal assistance for 
manpower development and training, transportation, insurance, capital investment, 
technical assistance and planning, surplus property,” and so on. The program promised to 
offer a “complete package of assistance” for the private company to focus on on-the-job 
training for the disadvantaged by subsidizing the training cost fully. The Small Business 
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Administration under the Department of Commerce would guarantee any investment on 
plants and other buildings on the site. Since the suggested program required no further 
legislation, it could be implemented immediately within the administration’s budgets.350 
With the program’s success in bringing visible change in urban ghettos with participation 
of private companies at its early stage, the proposal was renamed as a Job Opportunities 
in the Business Sector (JOBS) program and extended to fifty cities in January 1968.351  
Johnson’s new program guiding big businesses to move to ghetto areas also 
achieved his political goal of keeping his political rival, Senator Kennedy (D—N.Y.) in 
check. In July 1967 Robert Kennedy introduced bills that included a proposal offering tax 
credits to large corporations on the condition that they would decide to move production 
facilities to urban ghetto areas.352 Because Johnson’s new program rendered Kennedy’s 
bills redundant to some extent, the bills died in the Senate.  
The episode of 1967 urban uprisings and their impact on the Johnson 
administration’s recalibration of its manpower policy for the hardcore poor reveals the 
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importance of political entrepreneurship in recombining existing resources beyond 
Johnson’s and federal bureaus’ policy preferences. When the Johnson administration was 
asked to respond to society’s urgent call to address complex problems of urban ghetto 
areas in 1967, it could not choose, given policy proposals for public works programs for 
political and economic reasons. In the escalating Vietnam War, the liberals’ attempt to 
expand the administration’s antipoverty bills was overt resistance to Johnson’s “guns and 
butter” strategy that required disciplined restraints on domestic expenditures. To fulfill 
Johnson’s “guns and butter” strategy, the Vietnam War would have to be fought without 
hurting his domestic policies, which turned out to be impossible in 1968. The Johnson 
administration’s decision to involve big employers from the private sector was an 
entrepreneurial strategy to avoid not only liberals’ criticism of the administration’s 
inaction but also Congress’s opposition to the administration’s expensive antipoverty 
bills. As a result, the Johnson administration refused to enact any WPA-style public 
works program in 1967, which cannot be explained by the perspectives that neglect the 
importance of emergent political factors.  
In addition to the factors that forced the Johnson administration to consider 
WPA-style public works but reject them for political reasons, the episode shows which 
type of active labor market policy was acceptable to U.S. institutional and political 
environments. An idea of outsourcing workforce training to the private sector was hailed 
by liberals as well as conservatives in 1967 and 1968. This was another form of active 
labor market policy, which is unnoticed by most institutionalists including Weir and 
Quadagno. The ideal of active labor market policy presumes that the state is equipped 
with institutional devices to adjust training programs to the request of the labor market 
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and has a monitoring capability to see whether the devices work well. The American state 
is known for its lack of such conditions. The success of the JOBS program in 1967 and 
early 1968 shows that the American state can develop an active labor market policy in a 
different form despite the absence of strong state capacities. However, the big companies 
that promised publicly to partake in JOBS rescinded their oaths as the Johnson 
administration became helplessly enmeshed in the Vietnam War, antiwar movements, 
and urban uprisings. The Johnson administration’s efforts to rely on the private sector to 
provide job training in urban areas were fully derailed.  
 
Chapter Conclusion 
Policymakers, with different perspectives, at different institutional locations, 
moved forward in an iterative process in response to one another throughout the WOP. 
The results are real policies, which need to be examined and assessed on their own 
merits, as partial responses to evolving problems, not against an ideal set up by a 
particular set of reformers or another ideal regime type.  
In the Legislative Developments, policymakers had developed policy discourses 
on the issue of youth unemployment that turned out to be critical in shaping the WOP. 
The Kennedy administration realized in the process that its stakes were high in dealing 
with the issue of youth employment, which became part of CEA chair Walter Heller’s 
plan to address poverty. The President’s Committee on Manpower, created by the 1966 
Amendments to the EOA, allowed the DOL to have a voice in coordinating numerous 
federal training programs. This shows that the WOP training programs had evolved in a 
direction that allowed multiple orders and principles, for example, a policy discourse of 
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structural unemployment, an antipoverty policy discourse, and principle of desegregation, 
to coexist.  
Regarding state capacity to adjust to emergent problems like inflation, adult 
unemployment, and urban uprisings, the state appeared not to follow a coherent policy 
package previously set by a federal agency or a group of reformers. Instead, as seen in the 
case of the threat of inflation in late 1965, the policymakers “muddled through” the 
policy options and expertise given by multiple federal agencies, which gives us a glimpse 
of how the fragmented American state can work to institutionalists’ surprise. In 
discussing three different approaches to the issue of unemployed adults, the Johnson 
administration was pragmatic in eclectically adopting necessary elements from the 
proposals from the HEW, DOL, and OEO, which seemed to mitigate the possible 
conflicts emerging from fundamental differences in views among different federal 
agencies.  
The way the Johnson administration discussed public works in responding to 
Martin Luther King Jr’s letter to President Johnson and ultimately to a series of urban 
uprisings shows the importance of presidential politics—such as the political rivalry 
between President Johnson and Senator Clark. Also, the idea of outsourcing to big 
businesses the task of training residents of urban ghettos seemed to work well in 
American institutional and political environments. It questions whether the ideal of active 
labor market policy that presupposes prior development of nonmarket coordinating 
mechanisms such as peak industrial associations, a labor party, and overarching union 
memberships is adequate in analyzing the policy experiments conducted during the WOP 
period. Close collaboration between the federal agency and the private sector in running 
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training programs proves to be functional in the U.S. fragmented institutional 
environment, which scholars often overlook if starting from the ideal of institutional 
arrangements for successful active labor market policy.  
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CHAPTER IV  
CONCLUSION 
The four perspectives I have proposed in study the American state include: 1) the 
Weberian pessimist; 2) the Weberian optimist; 3) the non-Weberian pessimist; and 4) the 
non-Weberian optimist. Historical institutionalists take the Weberian pessimist approach, 
while scholars of American exceptionalism take the Weberian optimist approach. Some 
scholars of American political development (APD) focus on the dysfunctionality innate in 
American state building by relying on a non-Weberian pessimist perspective; other 
scholars of APD tend to emphasize the possibilities of implementing policy experiments 
successfully beyond the dysfunctional arrays of institutions, by relying a non-Weberian 
optimist approach.  
With the non-Weberian optimist approach, I examine a series of policy 
experiments conducted by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in such policy areas 
as industrial relationship, labor training, and welfare. In so doing, I focus exclusively on a 
group of policy entrepreneurs inside the administrations and their efforts to overcome 
given predicaments and solve newly arising problems. Compared to the other 
perspectives, the non-Weberian optimist perspective provides the best conceptual tool for 
a researcher to examine the continuous recalibration of the American state through 
various entrepreneurial efforts to challenge the status quo. In these closing remarks, I will 
explain why this is the case. I also discuss applying the non-Weberian optimist 
perspective to various contexts and different countries.  
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In contrast to the assumption of Weberian pessimists, my case studies reveal that 
the predicaments of institutional, cultural, and political environments in building a 
centralized and efficient government did not unconditionally limit the range of policy 
options for the policymakers of the 1960s. The predicaments sometimes provided 
entrepreneurs with opportunities for creative action. Well aware of the limits imposed on 
their policy options by the American state’s structure and culture, entrepreneurs of the 
1960s endeavored to enlarge their options by rediscovering previously neglected policy 
subjects and combining them with more agreeable policy goals. At the same time, these 
entrepreneurs struggled to create a new law or policy order by reinterpreting the given 
rules, transforming the ways in which previous laws were applied, and adding a new 
element to the previous array of laws.  
As non-Weberian pessimists indicate, the newly added layer occasionally 
conflicted with the previous array of orders. Unfortunately for the policy entrepreneurs 
who succeeded in adding a new layer of order to attain a new jurisdictional realm for a 
new task, they knew little about the emerging conflict until it occurred. Even experienced 
policymakers could not predict fully which specific old order(s) would clash with the 
newly added one. In this regard, unexpected conflicts might arise between the previous 
and new orders in the wake of entrepreneurs’ success. Orren and Skowronek describe 
such conflict as built-in frustration in the rise of the “policy state” in the United States.  
However, such frustration was not built into the American state. My case studies 
of the 1960s experiments show both success and failure in policy experiments. If the 
entrepreneur was not poised to address emergent conflicts between old and new orders, a 
policy experiment failed to achieve its desired goal. If the entrepreneur could manage to 
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handle the emergent conflict, the experiment could survive and produce the desired 
outcome.  
In the early 1960s tripartite experiment, Arthur Goldberg, creator of the LMAC, 
failed to quell the reignited labor-management conflict because he did not actively nip it 
in the bud during Subcommittee No. 3’s recommendation for shortened work hours. 
Goldberg’s failure to respond quickly was not predetermined by the possibility that a 
newly created decentralized platform for deliberation among labor, management, and 
public representatives could tap the ready-made discourse on the union’s power 
monopoly. Rather, Goldberg’s entrepreneurship simply could not stand up to the test.  
With regard to training programs during the WOP, the Johnson administration 
successfully brought conflicts between old and new policy orders under control. When 
the Kennedy administration merged the civil rights cause with the previous manpower 
programs, the Council of Economic Advisers played a key role in strengthening 
coherence among various WOP programs. While checking the Department of Labor’s 
policy preference for training unemployed adults and upgrading skills, the CEA also 
offered the rationale behind the Johnson administration’s simultaneous pursuit of 
economic growth and antipoverty programs. According to the rationale, the 
administration should help only the chronic poor who lacked marketable skills because 
the rest of the unemployed would get jobs when the national economy accelerated. The 
CEA precluded the probable revolt from old policy orders by limiting DOL’s influence in 
shaping the WOP training programs.  
When the CEA realized in late 1965 that its macroeconomic approach, along 
with a social policy package for poor youths, had failed to curb inflation, it swiftly invited 
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the DOL to address the shortage of skilled labor. The CEA guided the once marginalized 
DOL to strengthen its on-the-job-training programs to raise skilled labor and moderate 
the upward pressure on wages and prices. As a result, the DOL retained some control in 
running federal training programs through the President’s Manpower Committee, chaired 
by the Labor Secretary. The old policy orders for unemployed adults returned after late 
1965, but in an orderly manner under the CEA’s guidance.  
This episode shows that the disruptive effect of conflicting orders could also be 
tamed by entrepreneurship. While Orren and Skowronek are correct in indicating the 
tendency for an entrepreneurial effort to create conflicts between old and new orders, the 
conflicts do not necessarily lead to frustration in reforming the American state’s capacity. 
Whether the phenomena of layering, patchwork, and intercurrence in the entrepreneurial 
response to emerging problems enhance or frustrate the American state’s capabilities is 
an empirical question that begs a close examination of what the American state actually 
does.  
The non-Weberian optimist perspective provides us with an analytical tool to 
trace the unintended consequences that the tripartite experiment generated, which may 
not be visible with other frameworks. By tracing actual policy actions that the American 
state took to address policy requests in the early 1960s, the non-Weberian optimist 
perspective shows not only when entrepreneurship succeeded and failed, but also how 
conservative Keynesianism and industrial pluralism arose after Goldberg’s tripartite 
experiment.  
The non-Weberian optimist perspective can also contribute to studying other 
countries. The layered structure of orders is not uncommon to other countries with 
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different political systems. Though it is tailored to explain the American state which was 
founded on federalism and the principle of checks and balances, the non-Weberian 
perspective can provide a useful analytical tool to examine the ways in which a potential 
challenger or policy reformer in a different country with a less fragmented structure 
navigates an array of multiple orders and exploits political opportunities to add another 
layer onto it. At the same time, by enabling a researcher to see which specific old orders 
have collided with the new, the perspective can guide the researcher to see how the 
state’s capabilities are continuously adjusted and wielded.   
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